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Even as a college credential becomes more critical than ever for economic security and 
social mobility, the risks associated with attending college have also grows. Many individuals 
leave higher education institutions without a credential but with student loan balances that they 
struggle to repay for years. In such an environment, it is unsurprising that higher education has 
come under criticism for a lack of accountability and waning affordability. This dissertation 
presents three empirical studies into different aspects of these two issues. 
Chapters 2 and 3 deal with specialized accreditation in business and nursing. Those two 
fields are crucial to higher education, accounting for a large share of degrees conferred annually 
and preparing students for entry into critical industries and roles. Both fields have longstanding 
accreditors that purport to define what a quality business or nursing education looks like, to 
evaluate programs based on the standards and criteria they define, and to certify what programs 
satisfy those standards. Accreditation is costly and intertwined with broader accountability 
practices in higher education, but it is little understood and virtually unstudied. Chapter 2 traces 
the evolution of specialized accreditation in business and nursing. Business is characterized by a 
lower prevalence of accreditation, significant stratification of institutions across accreditors, and 
large racial inequities in who earns degrees from accredited programs. By contrast, nursing has 
near-universal coverage by accreditors and smaller though long-standing disparities by race and 
ethnicity in access to accredited programs. Chapter 3 analyzes the impact that accreditation has 
on program-level degree conferrals and costs. Business accreditation is associated with small 
gains in degree conferrals but large impacts on instructional costs. Nursing shows just the 
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reverse: attaining accreditation accelerates the growth of programs while causing no changes to 
the underlying cost of delivering education.  
One conspicuous failure of higher education accountability is the very real student loan 
crisis affecting millions of borrowers. Chapter 4, coauthored with KC Deane, Brian McCall, and 
Stephen DesJardins, analyzes student loan repayment patterns for up to 12 years, tracking 
borrowers through formative ages from early 20s to late 30s. Using social sequence and cluster 
analysis to understand these longitudinal repayment histories reveals five archetypes of loan 
repayment describing borrowers’ experiences: persistent defaulters, perpetual payers, rapid full 
payers, late full payers, and consolidators. There is significant stratification by race/ethnicity and 
social class into these repayment clusters, with minoritized borrowers, borrowers who do not 
graduate, and those attending for-profit institutions more likely to experience adverse borrowing 
outcomes and to experience them over a longer period of time. Borrowers face barriers to 
repayment frequently and repeatedly, with 30% defaulting at least once, 40% deferring on loans, 
and three out of every four borrowers missing payments at least once. Findings also show that 
the narrative of defaulters owing relatively small amounts is not entirely accurate. Though it is 
true that occasional defaulters do have low loan balances, persistent defaulters account for half 
of all defaulters and owe on average $15,000. These borrowers see their balances grow by 30% 




Chapter 1 Studying Accountability and Affordability in Higher Education 
 
The Spellings Commission released its A Test of Leadership report in 2006, giving voice 
to long-simmering concerns about affordability and quality in postsecondary education in the 
United States. The report took particular aim at the sector’s “lack of clear, reliable information 
about the cost and quality of postsecondary institutions, along with a remarkable absence of 
accountability mechanisms to ensure that colleges succeed in educating students” (Department of 
Education, 2006, p. x). Whatever the merits of the report in diagnosing the maladies of American 
higher education and necessary solutions, Zemsky (2007) argued its central themes are critical: 
“The possibility that Americans, in ever-increasing numbers, would find themselves unable to 
afford a college education for either themselves or their children. [And] [t]he growing sense that 
college students are no longer learning enough of the right kind of stuff.” (p. 5). The next three 
chapters in this dissertation address two topics broadly at the intersection of affordability, 
learning, and accountability: accreditation and student debt.  
Studying Accreditation 
The next two chapters focus on accreditation, one of the longest-standing mechanisms for 
accountability in higher education. Accreditation can refer to regional accreditors with oversight 
over entire institutions, national accreditors of career training programs or faith-based colleges 
and universities, or the programmatic accreditation of specific fields of study or single-purpose 
institutions (Eaton, 2015.; Young, 1979). Accreditation operates through external review of an 
institution’s or program’s quality which, when affirmed by an accreditor, entitles the college or 
university to access federal funds like student aid and other federal programs (Eaton, 2015). 
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Partly because it serves as gatekeeper to federal funds, accreditation is ubiquitous: there 
are almost 7,900 colleges and universities accredited by at least one of the 18 institutional 
accrediting organizations currently operating (Eaton, 2015). Despite its long history and expanse, 
accreditation has few proponents and many critics. It is largely perceived as weak, ritualistic, and 
protective of the colleges and universities it presumes to hold accountable (Kelly, 2014; Vergari 
& Hess, 2002; Zemsky, 2011). The Spellings Commission report concluded that “growing public 
demand for increased accountability, quality and transparency coupled with the changing 
structure and globalization of higher education requires a transformation of accreditation” (p. 
15). Accreditors have until recently survived these criticisms largely unscathed, as the 2008 
reauthorization of the Higher Education Opportunity Act (HEOA) precluded the Department of 
Education (ED) from interfering with the work of accreditors (Eaton, 2008; Eaton, 2017). In 
2019, however, ED eliminated the geographic monopolies historically enjoyed by regional 
accreditors and opened the door for the entry of new accreditors (Department of Education, 
2019); this new landscape potentially changes the relationships of accreditors to each other and 
to the institutions they oversee. 
Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the accreditation of programs. Specialized or programmatic 
accreditation is perhaps the most leading form of program-level accountability in (pre-) 
professional fields ranging from architecture to zoology. There are more than 100 specialized 
accreditors currently operating in the US, with oversight over 23,000 programs across some 
3,000 institutions (Vibert, 2018). Though some of these accreditors are highly prominent, such as 
the American Bar Association or the American Medical Association, most specialized 
accreditors are little-known outside their fields. Table 1.1 attempts to document their collective 
reach in higher education by listing accreditors among the fifteen largest fields as measured by 
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degree conferrals. All told, well over 40% of degrees conferred in 2015 came from fields subject 
to oversight by a specialized accreditor. 
Attaining and maintaining programmatic accreditation are substantial undertakings. 
Compliance with accreditation standards can require significant institutional and departmental 
efforts and resources, including modifications to curriculum, assessment, and instructional 
practices, investments in facilities, and hiring of additional faculty and support staff (Vibert, 
2018). Academic leaders deciding whether to pursue such accreditation must weigh not only its 
costs but also its accompanying loss of departmental autonomy (McKee et al., 2005), resistance 
or indifference from faculty (e.g., Vican et al., 2020), and the possibility that the program realize 
no tangible benefits from its efforts (Hunt, 2015). On the other hand, specialized accreditation 
presumably assures programs of the relevance of its curriculum to relevant professional 
communities and gives programs a third-party seal of approval attractive to prospective students 
choosing among numerous largely undifferentiated academic offerings. Specialized 
accreditation, then, has a broad reach in higher education and purports to benefit students, 
programs, and the field at large. Yet, it remains a fundamentally voluntary undertaking about 
which little is known, with a persistent dearth of research about the practice (Kelchen, 2018; 
Zemsky, 2011) including a lack of “well-identified studies of the consequences” of accreditation 
(Deming & Figlio, 2016, p. 48).  
Taking business and nursing as two focal fields, the chapters analyze the evolution of 
specialized accreditation and its consequences for programs. The choice of business and nursing 
is intentional for a few reasons. Both fields have several aspects of specialized accreditation in 
common: the presence of multiple competing accreditors, accreditors that differ in prestige and 
approach to program evaluation. They also differ in compelling ways, most notably in terms of 
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the professionalization of each field and stringent licensure requirements in nursing that are 
entirely absent in business. Just as importantly, both fields have long histories of specialized 
accreditation that is still transforming. Scholars and administrators in business are engaged in 
active debate over the relevance of business education curriculum, the value of a business 
education, and the role that accreditors have played in shaping these (Bennis & O’Toole, 2005; 
Lowrie & Willmot, 2009; Pfeffer & Fong, 2002). Nursing has undergone significant change in 
specialized accreditation since 1997, culminating in several lawsuits regarding the governance of 
accrediting agencies in the field (Lederman, 2015). Accreditation in nursing continues to grow in 
complexity as more subfields of the profession develop their own recognition processes, as the 
nursing profession continues to specialize and grow in complexity, and as students and nurses 
demand greater flexibility in attaining credentials. Table 1.2 summarizes the accreditors included 
in the analyses and serves as a reference for the next two chapters. 
Chapter 2 sets much of the context around the spread of specialized accreditation and its 
implications for the two fields under study. I draw on theories of professionalization and 
institutionalism to understand why programs pursue accreditation. Specialized accreditors serve 
as the vehicle through which professional associations exert influence over universities (Stark et 
al., 1986), by codifying professional knowledge into accreditation standards and selectively 
recognizing programs that meet those standards. This process serves to define “field-specific 
expertise that determines what quality practice and quality education is and ensures advancement 
of a profession” (Vibert, 2018, p. 47). The advancement and credibility of professions has been 
at the core of specialized accreditation from its inception, as accreditors aim at “protecting and 
improving the status of the profession and its practitioners,” making programmatic accreditation 
“attractive to any professional group that has or desires its own identity” (Glidden, 1983, p. 200). 
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Institutions internalize specialized accreditation as they strive for prestige in a competitive 
enrollment environment where a valuable signal of quality from a credible third-party arbiter 
pays dividends (Bloland, 1999; Jost, 1994; Mause, 2009). 
My findings show that programs stratify across accreditors by selectivity, size, and 
control. Larger programs in business and nursing, those with graduate-level offerings, and those 
housed at public institutions are more likely to attain accreditation from the most prestigious 
accreditor in each respective field (. For-profit and, to a lesser extent, not-for-profit institutions 
are less likely to be accredited. The prevalence of specialized accreditation is highest in nursing, 
where 86% of baccalaureate programs hold some accreditation (relative to 42% for business). 
The patterns in what programs attain accreditation has implications for what students have access 
to accredited programs. In business, Black graduates are significantly underrepresented among 
those earning AACSB-accredited degrees and overrepresented among graduates of ACBSP-
accredited programs. This pattern has accelerated since 2012 given the large share of minoritized 
students, especially Black students, graduating from large for-profit institutions – most 
pronouncedly for graduate degrees. As of 2015, 92% of all nursing degrees at the baccalaureate 
level were granted by accredited institutions, with ACEN accounting for 14% and CCNE for 
78%. Even with such a high prevalence of accreditation, there are significant disparities in the 
distribution of nursing graduates by race and ethnicity. In 2015, while fewer than 4% of White 
nursing baccalaureate graduates earned their degree from unaccredited programs, around 8% of 
Black and Latinx students did so. Differences are even more pronounced among associate degree 
earners. If specialized accreditation serves to legitimize credentials in the eyes of employers, 
these disparities can have important bearings on the labor market outcomes of different students. 
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Building on the historical overview and findings of Chapter 2, Chapter 3 investigates 
whether attaining accreditation is associated with changes to demand for and costs of programs. 
To the extent that accreditation status is a desirable signal and increases the perceived 
desirability of a business program, it is plausible that accredited programs will experience an 
influx of students, thus increasing the number of degrees conferred (Adams & Eveland, 2007; 
Rapert et al., 2004). To the extent that accreditation status implies greater programmatic quality, 
it is possible for programs to increase degrees awarded holding constant the number of students, 
for example through increased student retention. As for costs, I frame specialized accreditation 
as imposing constraints on the tradeoffs that academic departments can pursue to manage costs 
(Hemelt et al., 2020). Specialized accreditors impose faculty qualification requirements that 
place programs in competition for hiring a smaller pool of eligible candidates, driving up salaries 
(Callie & Cheslock, 2008; Hedrick et al., 2010; Levernier et al., 1992). Requirements for 
research productivity simultaneously increase research expenditures and reduce faculty 
instructional workloads, increasing costs (Levernier et al., 1992). Requirements around 
curricular, instructional, and assessment practices can constrain adoption of cost-saving measures 
like increased class sizes or online instruction.  
With this framework of college choice and of departmental production functions, I use a 
generalized difference-in-difference framework that identifies the causal effect of accreditation 
on degree conferrals (a proxy for demand) and on instructional costs. Effects on degree 
conferrals in business are small in magnitude at the baccalaureate level (approximately a 2% 
increase) but much larger for two-year programs (a 7% increase). There is suggestive evidence 
that graduate programs see even larger increases when accredited by AACSB but effects are 
imprecisely estimated and dependent on comparison groups. Results for nursing are consistent 
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across accreditors and degree levels: Any specialized accreditation is associated with increases in 
degree conferrals that are smallest at the undergraduate level (5% increase) and largest at the 
graduate level (5 to 20% at the master’s and doctoral level respectively). In terms of instructional 
costs, I find that business accreditation results in an 8 to 12% increase in costs, driven largely by 
higher salaries and to a lesser extent lower teaching loads that faculty experience after 
accreditation. In nursing, on the other hand, accreditation is not associated with any increase in 
costs. Because nursing programs are subject to numerous other regulations in addition to 
accreditation (such as Board of Nursing approval), the attainment of accreditation may not carry 
the same costly implications that business accreditation does. 
Studying Student Debt 
 Chapter 4, coauthored with KC Deane, Brian McCall, and Stephen DesJardins, addresses 
the second theme of the Spellings Commission report: college affordability. Student loans make 
college affordable for millions of students (Akers & Chingos, 2016), but a student loan 
repayment crisis (Dynarski, 2014) points to significant and harmful flaws in the higher education 
financing regime. Drawing on life course perspectives, this study analyzes patterns in student 
loan repayment of individual borrowers for up to 12 years post-college. We argue in favor of a 
life course perspective because loan repayment is a longitudinal process taking place within 
borrowers’ lived context and should be treated, conceptually and empirically, as such. After 
constructing student loan repayment histories, we study the student-level and institution-level 
characteristics that correlate with patterns in those histories and evaluate disparities by race and 
ethnicity and by sector in loan repayment trajectories.  
Rather than taking single, discretized outcomes as the unit of analysis, we study the full 
lifecycle of loan repayments using social sequence analysis and clustering methods. We identify 
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a high prevalence of adverse loan outcomes across all borrowers that coincide with significant 
disparities by race and ethnicity. These adverse outcomes include repeated cycles of deferment, 
negative amortization/forbearance, and default during which student loan balances grow. 
Disparities by race and ethnicity in student loan repayment extend beyond different indebtedness 
and default rates. They manifest themselves throughout the loan repayment lifecycle, with 
minoritized borrowers and those attending for-profit institutions not only at higher risk for 
adverse outcomes but experiencing those outcomes repeatedly and over longer stretches of time 
than their White peers. We identify five patterns that characterize student loan repayments 
persistent defaulters, perpetual payers, rapid full payers, late full payers, and consolidators. The 
first two groups experience perhaps the most adverse repayment histories; the former has 
frequent and long-lasting spells of unresolved student loan default, whereas the latter alternates 
between repaying loans and spells of deferment and forbearance. Both groups owe more at the 
end of the observation period than when they begin repayment. Rapid full payers have low loan 
balances and reach full repayment quickly, while late full payers go through stretches of 
deferment, forbearance, and default before fully repaying. Consolidators settle their original debt 
quickly but face new repayment obligations on consolidated loans. At least 10% of borrowers in 
each cluster default on loans and half or more struggle through periods of negative amortization 
or forbearance. Black students, Pell recipients, first-generation collegegoers, students at for-
profit institutions, and students who do not earn a credential are disproportionately represented 
among persistent defaulters. White borrowers are over-represented among full payer and 
consolidator clusters. Baccalaureate-degree recipients are over-represented among perpetual 




 Chapters 2 and 3 constitute, to the best of my knowledge, some of the most complete 
empirical evidence on the spread of specialized accreditation and its impact on academic 
programs and their students for business and nursing. I hope the chapters are of use to 
researchers interested in questions of accountability and quality and to academic administrators 
navigating a complex accreditation environment and trying to make the right decisions on behalf 
of their programs and students. Chapter 4 presents a new approach to the analysis of student loan 
repayment that is particularly timely given the increased complexity of student loan repayment 
options, persistently low repayment and high default rates, and growing calls for meaningful 
relief for borrowers. It should prove useful to our understanding of student loan repayment and 
inform equity-minded reform of a student loan system that reifies numerous inequities. In 
Chapter 5, I outline possible extensions of this research and more generally research into higher 
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Table 1.1 Summary of Degree Conferrals and Specialized Accreditation. 





Management and Operations 
Yes Association to Advance Collegiate Schools 
of Business; Accreditation Council for 
Business Schools and Programs 
Registered Nursing, Nursing 
Admin, Nursing Research and 
Clinical Nursing 
Yes Accreditation Commission for Education 
in Nursing; Commission on Collegiate 
Nursing Education 
Psychology, General Yes (clinical 
psychology only) 
American Psychological Association 
Biology, General No  
Criminal Justice and Corrections Yes Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences 
Accounting and Related Services Yes Association to Advance Collegiate Schools 
of Business; Accreditation Council for 
Business Schools and Programs 
Communication and Media 
Studies 
Yes Accrediting Council on Education in 
Journalism and Mass Communications 
Teacher Education and 
Professional Development 
Yes Council for the Accreditation of Educator 
Preparation 
Liberal Arts and Sciences, 
General Studies and Humanities 
No 
 
Health and Physical 
Education/Fitness 
Yes Council for the Accreditation of Educator 
Preparation 




Political Science and Government No 
 
Finance and Financial 
Management Services 
Yes Association to Advance Collegiate Schools 
of Business; Accreditation Council for 
Business Schools and Programs 
Marketing Yes Association to Advance Collegiate Schools 
of Business; Accreditation Council for 
Business Schools and Programs 
Economics No 
 
Notes: List includes 15 largest academic programs by undergraduate degree conferrals in 2014-
2015. 




Table 1.2. Business and Nursing Accreditors in Scope for Analysis. 
Field Accreditor  
(acronym) 





Association to Advance 
Collegiate Schools of Business 
(AACSB) 
1916 Baccalaureate and above 482 
Accreditation Council for 
Business Schools and Programs 
(ACBSP) 
1988 Associate’s,  





Accreditation Commission for 
Education in Nursing  
(ACEN) 
1952 Associate’s,  




Commission on Collegiate 
Nursing Education  
(CCNE) 
1996 Baccalaureate and above 641 
Notes: Excludes the International Assembly for Collegiate Business Education (IACBE) accreditor in business as it largely accredits 
programs outside the United States. Excludes Commission for Nursing Education Accreditation (CNEA) in nursing as it was founded 
in 2017.  






Chapter 2 A Brief History of Specialized Accreditation in Business and Nursing 
 
A ubiquitous but little-studied aspect of accountability in higher education is specialized 
accreditation. Specialized or programmatic accreditation refers to the review of academic 
programs or single-purpose institutions by an external entity that determines and certifies 
whether an academic unit meets relevant standards of quality for that field or profession (Hegji, 
2017). It is widespread, with most fields subject to oversight by at least one of the more than 100 
specialized accreditors operating in the US. These organizations accredit over 23,000 academic 
programs across 3,000 institutions (Vibert, 2018), including virtually all occupational and 
professional fields that account for most degrees granted annually (author’s calculations based on 
data from the National Center for Education Statistics, 2018).  
The broad aim of specialized accrediting standards is to ensure that curricula reflect the 
priorities of each profession’s community of practice, establishing the professional relevance of 
academic programs and codifying standards of quality for (pre-)professional education. Attaining 
such accreditation can require a substantial investment of institutional and departmental 
resources, such as modification to curricula, implementation of new assessment or instructional 
practices, investments in facilities, and hiring of additional faculty and support staff. For many 
professional fields, specialized accreditation is also intertwined with licensure requirements and 
employer expectations, making accreditation particularly desirable to prospective students 
(Yuen, 2012). Yet, for all the influence these organizations hold and their continual expansion in 
higher education, specialized accreditation remains a fundamentally voluntary undertaking. 
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 Two fields with highly influential accreditors are business and nursing. These fields are 
substantively important to higher education. Business accounts for one in five undergraduate 
degrees and one-quarter of all master’s degrees granted annually (author’s calculations). Nursing 
is an increasingly credentialed profession, with growing demand for seats in nursing programs 
during an ongoing shortage of nurses (Bargagliotti, 2003) and a global pandemic. Both fields 
have long histories of specialized accreditation dating to the early 1900s; both have multiple 
accreditors recognized by the Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA) and the U.S. 
Department of Education; and accreditors in both fields have a history of enforcing meaningful 
standards through rigorous evaluation of member programs (McKee, Mills, & Weatherbee, 2005; 
Phelbs & Gerbasi, 2009). There is also a high degree of awareness of specialized accreditation in 
these fields among faculty and administrators (Ard et al., 2017; Roberts et al., 2004; Romero, 
2008). Business and nursing also present interesting contrasts that can add insight to a study of 
specialized accreditation. The two fields prepare graduates for vastly different labor markets with 
differing levels of professionalization and occupational licensure regimes. Programs face very 
different enrollment outlooks, with strong competition for students among business programs 
(Zammuto, 2017) and a shortage of seats for qualified prospective nursing students (Kovner & 
Djukic, 2009) that leaves many programs unable to expand.  
This paper investigates three basic research questions about specialized accreditation in 
nursing and business: What business and nursing programs are accredited (RQ1) and by whom 
(RQ2)? Finally, what students do accredited programs serve and what students are excluded from 
these programs (RQ3)? I answer the first two research questions by tracing the spread of 
specialized accreditation in the fields of business and nursing and the characteristics of programs 
and institutions across accreditation statuses. The third question evaluates the implications of 
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accreditation for equity both in higher education and as graduates move into their profession. 
Specialized accreditation is costly and voluntary, necessarily excluding certain programs. As it 
purports to ensure quality and advance graduates in their respective profession, exclusion from 
accreditation can carry consequences to labor market outcomes of graduates. Findings reveal that 
specialized accreditation in business and nursing reflect many of the inequities and stratification 
present in higher education, favoring selective institutions with greater resources and prestige 
and the students that typically attend them. This chapter provides the most comprehensive 
overview of the sorting of business and nursing programs and students across specialized 
accreditation. The chapter not only clarifies what accreditation does and who participates in it, 
but also serves as important context for future research into the consequences of specialized 
accreditation for programs and students.  
Background 
 This section draws on several resources to define accreditation, situate specialized 
accreditation within this system, and describe the evolution of the practice in business and 
nursing.  
History and Definitions of Accreditation 
 Accreditation is perhaps the longest-standing accountability practice in higher education 
in the United States (US), dating to the late 19th century and spanning a wide swath of practices, 
organizations, and stakeholders. The term encompasses regional accreditors with oversight of 
entire institutions, national accreditation of career and training programs or faith-based colleges 
and universities, and programmatic accreditation of specific degrees and fields of study and 
single-purpose institutions (Eaton, 2015; Young, 1979). Accreditation as currently practiced in 
US higher education developed “through evolution, not design” (Brittingham, 2009, p. 14) after 
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rapid expansion and a high degree of diversity of institutions through the 19th century, which 
gave rise to numerous institutions of dubious quality (Thelin, 2011). Accreditation emerged in a 
vacuous regulatory environment and in response to public concern over the quality of 
postsecondary institutions.  
In the 1880s, some colleges formed associations that served accreditation-like functions 
by identifying and publicly listing institutions deemed legitimate (Brittingham, 2009). The aim 
of these associations was to signal to a skeptical public their quality, and to codify in their terms 
what quality meant. Membership in these associations grew and eventually they came to assert 
some independence from member institutions on the standards that institutions are held to 
(Fester, Gasman, & Nguyen, 2012). Between 1885 and 1895, the three first regional accreditors 
of colleges and universities were founded. The early focus of accreditation was on explicit, 
quantitative measures of resources (e.g., number of library holdings) eventually gave way to 
more qualitative, mission-centered approaches centered on continuous quality improvement 
practices that are reviewed periodically (Brittingham, 2009; Young, 1979). The 1965 Higher 
Education Act officially designated accreditors as gatekeepers to Title IV federal funds, 
including the grants and student loans that comprise a large share of federal expenditures on 
higher education. Some states also require accreditation as a condition for participation in state 
financial aid programs and grants. Unsurprisingly given this gatekeeper role, virtually all 
institutions of higher learning in the US engage with accreditation in some form (Eaton, 2015).  
Programmatic or specialized accreditation dates to the early 20th century and in some 
ways mirrors the evolution of institutional accreditation. Its earliest manifestation is the 
Association of American Medical Colleges, which codified requirements for medical schools and 
curriculum and was empowered to inspect members (Glidden, 1983). Efforts to improve medical 
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education culminated in the Flexner Report, a joint effort of the American Medical Association 
and Carnegie Foundation that reshaped medical schools across the country (Hiatt & Stockton, 
2003). The practice quickly expanded across fields as professional associations recognized that 
specialized accreditation presented an opportunity to define the training and curriculum of those 
joining the profession (Hagerty & Stark, 1989) and as college administrators saw a venue for 
excluding certain providers and reducing competition for students (Glidden, 1983). Specialized 
accreditation has diffused throughout higher education, with well over 100 accreditors in 
operation currently overseeing more than 23,000 programs (Vibert, 2018). New accreditors 
continue to emerge, and the reach of existing accreditor grows, now including accreditation of 
many programs based on institutions outside the US (Altbach, 2003). 
With varying degrees of specificity, accreditors determine minimally acceptable 
curricula, resources, and student outcomes for academic programs (Kelchen, 2018). The broad 
aim of specialized accrediting standards is to ensure that curricula reflect the priorities of each 
profession’s community of practice, establishing the professional relevance of academic 
programs and codifying standards of quality for (pre-) professional education. Programs seeking 
accreditation begin by notifying the appropriate agency of their intent and conducting a self-
study in accordance with guidelines provided by accrediting bodies. The self-study is reviewed 
by experts chosen by the specialized accreditors; in many cases these are volunteers coming from 
programs or departments that have already attained accreditation. After the review of the self-
study, accreditors send a team of reviewers for a multi-day site visit; these reviewers submit a 
recommendation affirming or denying accreditation to the applicable accrediting board. The 
accrediting board votes on any final decisions to accredit or renew accreditation for a program 
(Brittingham, 2009; Ewell, 2008). Specialized accreditors are funded by annual dues charged to 
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member institutions and additional fees associated with reviews (Eaton, 2009); these fees range 
from a few hundred to the tens of thousands of dollars depending on accreditor and on the size of 
the program under review (Trifts, 2012; Yuen, 2012). 
Business Accreditation 
Specialized accreditors operate in some of the most popular and critical fields including 
business (19% of all bachelor’s degrees granted in 2014-15) and the allied health fields (12%; all 
percentages author’s calculations). The embrace of specialized accreditation was particularly 
swift among business programs. The first accreditor of business education, the Association to 
Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB), was founded in 1916 and remained the sole 
accreditor for the field for decades. New entrants emerged in 1988 with the founding of the 
Association of Collegiate Business Schools and Programs (ACBSP); nine years later, the 
International Assembly for Collegiate Business Education (IACBE) was formed.1  
 The standards enforced by each accreditor embody different perspectives on quality for 
business education. The 15 criteria AACSB uses to assess programs run the gamut from 
adequacy of resources and sufficiency of professional support staff; commitment to continuous 
enrollment; faculty promotion policies; currency of curricula; assessment of learning and 
intended student outcomes; and student-faculty interaction and engagement (Association to 
Advance Collegiate Schools of Business, 2020). Most strongly associated with AACSB 
accreditation are standards governing the qualifications and intellectual contributions of faculty 
to the field. AACSB has long emphasized that qualified faculty hold terminal degrees in their 
 
 
1I exclude IACBE from consideration in this paper. Many of the programs accredited by IACBE are housed in 
institutions outside the United States and the accreditor only attained recognition by CHEA in 2011.  
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respective fields and maintain active research agendas. (Navarro, 2008; Roller, Andrews, & 
Bovee, 2003).  
Just as business programs face significant competition for enrollments, AACSB itself is 
not immune to competitive and expansionary pressures. By the late 1980s, most “elite” business 
programs and schools had already attained accreditation. Programs ineligible for accreditation by 
AACSB still seek the assurance and prestige associated with accreditation. Unaccredited 
programs and institutions “engaged in several collective efforts to pressure the AACSB to make 
accreditation more accessible (Casile & Blake, 2002, p. 182). To continue its expansion and in 
response to these pressures, AACSB underwent a marked shift in the early 1990s to a “mission-
linked approach” (Lowrie & Willmott, 2009, p. 412) to accreditation. As part of this shift, the 
two criteria governing faculty qualifications and research productivity were broadened, 
expanding the definition of qualified faculty and intellectual contributions to the field (Casille & 
Blake, 2002).   
The Accreditation Council for Business Schools and Programs (ACBSP) arose as a 
competitor to AACSB in 1988. ACBSP defines its standards in accordance with quality 
principles outlined by the Baldrige National Quality Program (Beem, 2017). In sharp contrast to 
AACSB criteria that dictate minimal standards for programs, ACBSP standards center teaching 
excellence and assessment practices. Across all seven of its criteria, which span leadership, 
strategic planning, and curriculum, the standards emphasize systematic evaluative processes that 
identifies strengths and gaps needed for continuous improvement (Accreditation Council for 
Business Schools and Programs, 2019). The ACBSP definition of qualified faculty also differs 
from AACSB, recognizing that practitioners with extensive professional experience are well-
equipped to serve as qualified faculty. The organization is also less exigent with respect to 
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scholarly productivity (Brink & Smith, 2012). Its focus on assessment and continuous 
improvement practices makes ACBSP accreditation less costly and thus accessible to a range of 
colleges and universities, including for-profit and two-year institutions (Tullis & Camey, 2007). 
ACBSP accreditation has grown rapidly since 1988, with well over 400 programs currently 
accredited in the US (author’s calculations). 
Even with its long history, specialized accreditation of business programs remains 
controversial within the field. In particular, AACSB has come under criticism for creating a form 
of “accreditation sickness” (Lowrie & Willmot, 2009, p. 411) in the field that has compromised 
the relevance of the business curriculum. The emphasis that AACSB has historically placed on 
research is alleged to produce a glut of scholarship of limited utility and makes business 
education less relevant to practitioners, representing “an inappropriate – and ultimately self-
defeating – model of academic excellence” (Bennis & O’Toole, 2005, p. 98) for business 
programs. By contrast, the less prestigious business programs typically accredited by ACBSP or 
wholly unaccredited have retained a focus on business as a profession rather than discipline, 
ensuring that teaching integrate knowledge and practice (Bennis & O’Toole, 2005). Even under 
such critique, however, AACSB persists as the premier accreditor for business programs. 
Further, there is no empirical evidence that the model of accreditation offered by ACBSP leads 
to better outcomes for programs or students. The controversy around foundational questions 
about what to teach business students and how to teach them make obvious the need for 
significant research into programmatic accreditation practices.  
Nursing Accreditation 
 Nursing programs have long operated under specialized accreditation, preceding even 
their counterparts in business (Van Ort & Butlin, 2009). Unlike business, however, the early 
 
 24 
period of nursing accreditation from the late 1890s to the middle of the twentieth century was 
marked by a proliferation of accrediting agencies. These numerous accreditors eventually 
consolidated under the National League for Nursing (NLN, the parent organization of the 
Accreditation Commission for Education in Nursing or ACEN), which operated as the primary 
accreditor of nursing programs from 1952 to 1997. The six criteria enforced by ACEN largely 
mirror the themes found among business programs: nursing program’ capacity to deliver on 
intended program outcomes; faculty qualifications and credentials; adequacy of student support 
services; curricular alignment to nursing learning outcomes; sufficiency of fiscal, physical, 
technological, and learning resources; and systematic assessment of the program’s performance 
(Accreditation Commission for Education in Nursing, 2020). These standards apply with a few 
modifications across all degree levels that ACEN accredits, from diploma and associate’s 
programs to doctorate level. The standards aim to ensure the relevance of programs to licensure 
and preparation for the profession and can serve to support recruitment and retention of students 
(Ard et al., 2017). 
As in business, tensions gave rise to new entrants into accrediting. A long-running 
lawsuit alleged that ACEN was not sufficiently independent from the NLN, culminating in 2015 
with a recommendation by the National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and 
Integrity (NACIQI) for withdrawal of ED recognition of ACEN. The most notable entrant into 
nursing accreditation was the Commission on Collegiate Nursing Education (CCNE) in 1997. 
CCNE differentiated itself by focusing solely on baccalaureate and graduate nursing programs, 
with its board arguing that “rising accreditation costs, financial strains in higher education, 
proliferating numbers of specialized accrediting bodies within nursing, and the duplicative 
activities” therein necessitated a new, streamlined accreditor (Van Ort & Butlin, 2009, p. 3). Its 
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four accreditation standards concern mission and governance, institutional commitments to the 
nursing program, curriculum and teaching, and assessment of program outcomes (CCNE, 2018). 
In addition to presenting a simpler set of accreditation standards, CCNE administrators led the 
founding of the Alliance for Advanced Practice Registered Nurse Credentialing, which 
coordinates accreditation efforts across 15 advanced practice nursing fields (Van Ort & Butlin, 
2009). As such, CCNE promised a significant reduction in the complexity of accreditation for 
baccalaureate and graduate nursing programs. CCNE experienced very rapid growth, with nearly 
700 programs accredited as of 2015 (author’s calculations). Most CCNE-accredited nursing 
programs were previously accredited by ACEN but voluntarily withdrew from that accreditation 
to join CCNE. Yet another accreditor emerged in 2017, the Commission for Nursing Education 
Accreditation (CNEA). The CNEA is also governed by the National League for Nursing, which 
now operates two nursing accrediting agencies. In contrast to ACEN, CNEA enforces fewer 
standards and criteria that leave more discretion to programs, focusing instead on assessment and 
continuous improvement practices (NLN CNEA, 2016). In many ways, CNEA mimics the 
approach that CCNE has taken in streamlining accreditation and represents an effort by the NLN 
to reassert itself as a viable accreditor for baccalaureate and higher programs.  
Comparing Business and Nursing Accreditation 
Though there are parallels in accreditation across business and nursing (e.g., their long 
history, multiple accreditors), there are two important features unique to nursing. The first is the 
presence of quantitative standards governing student outcomes; chief among these are minimum 
expected graduation rates, licensure exam pass rates, and job placement rates (ACEN, 2020; 
CCNE, 2018). These criteria reflect that central to nursing programs’ missions is the preparation 
of nurses. Business is less aligned to any single profession and thus lacks such exacting, bright-
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line standards – as do accreditors in most other fields, which tend to focus on quality 
improvement rather than quantitative benchmarks (Ewell, 2005).  
Second is the complex regulatory environment under which nursing programs operate. 
Accreditation by ACEN or CCNE is voluntary, but even unaccredited programs must be 
approved by the relevant state Board of Nursing (BON). Board of Nursing approval is a 
prerequisite for eligibility for licensure exams such as the NCLEX-RN (Spector, 2004). The 
criteria that BONs consider when approving programs overlap with those of accreditors and 
include organization and governance of the program, documentation of curriculum and course 
materials, faculty qualifications, and faculty/student ratios (Spector, 2004). Approval by BONs 
focuses on the implications that nursing programs have for public health, safety, and wellbeing 
(National Council of State Boards of Nursing, 2004). As summarized by Spector et al. (2018), 
the substantial differences between accreditation and approval are that “BON approval is 
essential for NCLEX eligibility; BONs are government entities that serve the public, whereas 
national accreditors are businesses, with the programs being their customers; and BONs have the 
legal authority to close substandard programs, whereas accreditors do not” (p. 25). 
Notwithstanding both the seeming duplication in standards and differences in the aim of the two 
entities, BONs are very supportive of specialized accreditation in nursing. The National Council 
of State Boards of Nursing (NCSBN) has since 2012 called for all nursing programs to attain 
accreditation (though doing so is not mandated) as a way of reducing the oversight burden of 
BONs beyond initial approval (Spector et al., 2018). 
Another significant difference between business and nursing is the enrollment economy 
faced by programs in each field. Nursing has for years faced a well-publicized looming shortage 
of nurses (Bargagliotti, 2003) compounded by enrollment constraints in undergraduate programs 
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like Associate and Bachelor of Science in Nursing that routinely turn away qualified applicants 
(Kovner & Djukic, 2009). Other degrees, such as shorter BSN programs for registered nurses 
(RN to BSN programs) and graduate-level offerings, on the other hand, have experienced 
significant enrollment growth over the past two decades, including the entry of entirely new 
programs (Institute of Medicine, 2011). In contrast, business programs operate in a highly 
competitive enrollment environment, particularly at the graduate level (Zammuto, 2017), where 
markers like accreditation status and external rankings that allow programs to distinguish from 
peers are highly valued (e.g., Fee et al., 2008).  
In the next section, the conceptual framework outlines why programs may pursue 
accreditation, how they may choose among multiple accreditors, and how differences and 
similarities across business and nursing play out in this process. Before presenting this 
framework, Table 2.1 serves as a reference summarizing the characteristics of the four 
accreditors included in this study that can help the reader navigate the frequently used acronyms 
in this paper. 
Conceptual Framework 
 Now understanding what specialized accreditation entails, this section sketches a 
conceptual framework for why academic programs pursue it. I draw from two theoretical 
traditions to identify external and internal factors that help explain why specialized accreditation 
has expanded across higher education, how different institutions may sort across accreditors, and 
what this expansion and sorting mean for equitable access to accredited programs.  
The professionalization of occupations is one external driver for specialized 
accreditation. Professionalization refers to the process by which occupations make claims to their 
own domain space and expertise, securing prestige and monetary returns. Wilensky (1964) 
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proposed that professionalization is a process that begins by formalizing the training of an 
occupation, typically advocated by professional associations that define the tasks and expertise 
belonging to the profession. Abbott (1988) noted that such a procedural view of 
professionalization overlooks the interconnected nature of occupations. Abbott proposed instead 
a focus on the boundaries between professions and on how different professions claim 
jurisdiction over certain knowledge and tasks. This process establishes a credible, legitimate 
claim over exclusive professional knowledge (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997) that serves to “influence 
the everyday realities of professional status, interprofessional competition and jurisdictional 
division between professions” (Kroezen et al., 2013, p. 2). In other words, professions need 
boundaries that can be asserted over competing claims by other occupations. Specialized 
accreditors are one mechanism by which boundaries of professional knowledge are created and 
enforced. They are vehicle through which professions, typically through professional 
associations, exert influence over universities (Stark et al., 1986), codifying professional 
knowledge and defining the “field-specific expertise that determines what quality practice and 
quality education is” (Vibert, 2018, p. 47).  
The advancement and credibility of professions has been at the core of specialized 
accreditation from its inception, as accreditors aim at “protecting and improving the status of the 
profession and its practitioners,” making programmatic accreditation “attractive to any 
professional group that has or desires its own identity” (Glidden, 1983, p. 200). But business and 
nursing are not equally professionalized. Business programs do not prepare students for one 
single occupation, but many of the roles that business majors take have professionalized over 
time, such as accounting (Cooper & Robson, 2006), management (Spender, 2007), consulting 
(David et al., 2013), and human resources (Wright, 2008). Nursing has become increasingly 
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professionalized for over a century as nursing tasks grow in complexity, nurses gain broader 
scope of practice (Markowitz & Adams, 2020), and nurses specialize and stratify across ranks. 
One constraint on the professionalization of nursing is its highly gendered nature, which has 
historically limited its effectiveness in jurisdictional disputes with largely White and male 
dominated professions like doctors (Manley, 1995). Specialized accreditation may thus be 
especially appealing in nursing: lacking the status to prevail in jurisdictional disputes, 
accreditation is one avenue for establishing a system of control, a professional association, and 
the licensure and certification of members of good standing. Thus, as it relates to the first 
research question, it is reasonable to expect a higher prevalence of accreditation in nursing than 
in business. 
 Professionalization may stimulate the rise of specialized accreditors, but why do so many 
programs internalize the demands of accreditors? Just as colleges and universities expend 
resources in the competition for status (e.g., Bowman & Bastedo, 2009; Winston, 1999), so do 
programs and departments (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997). Podolny (2005) argued that status flows 
in part from associations and relations. Attaining specialized accreditation is a way to secure a 
valuable association that lets programs claim as peers all other selectively accredited members, 
just as administrators engage in strategic partnerships with other institutional membership 
associations to advance status (Orphan & Miller, 2019). Such an association is valuable 
internally as programs leverage their accreditation status to secure greater resources within their 
institutions (Glidden, 1983) and externally as a third-party assurance of quality attractive to 
prospective students and faculty (Bloland, 1999; Jost, 1994; Mause, 2009). Reinforcing the 
importance of accreditors as “legitimating agents” (Durand & McGuire, 2005) is the dependence 
of American institutions on professional and occupational programs. Colleges and universities 
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have become “definitively oriented to occupational-professional education at the end of the 
twentieth century, at a time when they were becoming mass terminal institutions” with such 
programs accounting for around 60% of bachelor’s degrees granted annually (Brint et al., 2005, 
p. 174). Specialized accreditation also enables business and nursing programs to pursue other 
markers of prestige. Only programs accredited by AACSB are eligible for inclusion in the US 
News & World Report ranking of business programs, while nursing programs considered for 
ranking must hold accreditation from ACEN or CCNE.  
Research question 2 examines the sorting of programs across accreditors. Business and 
nursing are somewhat unique for having multiple accreditors with distinct accrediting 
philosophies and levels of prestige. Because of its long history and roots in the most selective 
institutions in the country, AACSB has long been the premier accreditor of business programs. It 
also serves as a gatekeeper to the all-important US News & World Report rankings that drive so 
many decisions of both students and administrators (Corley & Gioia, 2000; Fee et al., 2008; Zell, 
2005). As such, programs housed in more selective institutions, those granting doctoral degrees, 
and those of higher research intensity should be more likely to pursue accreditation by AACSB. 
Comprehensive universities, baccalaureate colleges, less well-resourced, and less selective 
institutions will be more like to attain accreditation by ACBSP (or to remain unaccredited).  
Prior empirical work provides some supporting evidence for this. Researchers have 
documented that pursuit of AACSB accreditation is viewed as necessary for programmatic 
legitimacy (Holmes, 2001; Trapnell, 2007) especially when compared to accredited peer 
programs (Casile & Davis-Blake, 2002; McKee et al., 2005). Competition for enrollments and 
the signal value of accreditation are also frequently reported motivations for accreditation 
(Webster & Hammond, 2012), particularly among private institutions (Casile & Davis-Blake, 
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2007). Academic leaders report the belief that AACSB accreditation “improves the brand of 
programs and/or schools, which in turns aids in the recruitment of talented students and the 
attraction of qualified faculty” (Smith et al., 2017, p. 4). Survey data bear this out for faculty and 
academic leaders (e.g., Roberts et al., 2004), though students generally do not cite accreditation 
status as a strong determinant of their choice of business program (Hunt, 2015). But because 
accreditation in business is intertwined with rankings, students need not associate their decisions 
to an accreditor for it to impact where they enroll. The very limited research on ACBSP 
accreditation finds that programs pursue this accreditation as a marker of quality and as a tool for 
quality improvement, with little to no evidence that extrinsic benefits like increased enrollment 
or prestige drove administrators to pursue accreditation (Beem, 2017). 
Nursing is an interesting contrast as the newer accreditor, CCNE, carries a higher level of 
prestige because of its focus on baccalaureate and higher degree levels and because of the active 
role that AACN takes in promoting greater credentialing for nurses. Research suggests that 
administrators are attracted to accreditors because of their desire for recognition as a quality 
program, to improve programmatic quality, and to gain more resources and greater recognition 
from their home institutions (Freitas, 2007). With respect to the choice of nursing accreditor, 
Belack et al. (1999) found that programs offering graduate-level degrees and those housed at 
research-intensive institutions were more likely to pursue CCNE accreditation; administrators at 
private institutions and at programs without graduate offerings reported an intent to pursue or 
remain with ACEN accreditation.  
Because business and nursing programs stratify across accreditors, findings for research 
question 3 are likely to mirror such stratification. There is ample research demonstrating the 
various ways that enrollment patterns by race/ethnicity and income are stratified across 
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institutional prestige and selectivity (e.g., Bastedo & Jaquette, 2011; Carnevale & Rose, 2004; 
Posselt et al., 2012). As such, one would expect minoritized graduates in business and nursing to 
be less likely to complete their degrees in accredited programs. These disparities should be most 
pronounced for the more prestigious accreditor in each respective field, AACBS and CCNE.  
Empirical Approach 
 The analysis for all three research questions makes use of a panel dataset created to track 
business and nursing programs and their accreditation status from 1985 to 2015. Based on this 
data, I contrast various characteristics of programs and institutions by accreditation status over 
time. To measure characteristics of students served by accredited programs, I use data on the 
race/ethnicity of students completing degrees in business and nursing by institution annually. 
The next section provides detail on the data source and methods used. 
Data 
 The analysis uses a panel dataset at the institution-degree-program-year level that spans 
from 1985 to 2015. The universe of business and nursing programs is derived from the Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). Data on awards conferred identifies all degree-
granting programs in business under the two-digit Classification of Instructional Programs (CIP) 
code 52 (formally business, management, marketing, and related support services) and in nursing 
under the four-digit CIP code of 5138 (formally registered nursing, nursing administration, 
nursing research, and clinical nursing). Because CIP codes are revised every ten years, I create a 
crosswalk mapping all codes from 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010. The IPEDS is also the source for 
program- and institution-level measures like control, Carnegie classification, and selectivity (as 
proxied by Barron’s category); financial measures like total revenue; the count of degrees 
awarded by race/ethnicity; and the share of degrees conferred in business and nursing.  
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To measure the timing and incidence of accreditation, I developed a novel dataset 
capturing all business and nursing programs that are currently accredited and the year in which 
they earned their initial accreditation. These data were gathered by retrieving information from 
websites, program profile pages maintained by accreditors, and membership rosters published 
regularly by accreditors. This information was then spot-checked and validated manually or 
through inquiries about accreditation status directly to each accreditor before matching to 
IPEDS. These data are the basis for creation of a time-varying categorical variable that reflects 
the accreditation status of each degree granting program in business and nursing by year from 
1985 to 2015. The results generally focus on programs at the associate or baccalaureate levels, 
though I disaggregate the analysis to higher degree levels as warranted throughout. 
 There are limitations to this dataset. For one, accreditors do not provide consistent 
information on the loss of accreditation. As a result, programs that earned and lost accreditation 
within the time span of the panel could be (erroneously) categorized as never accredited. The 
loss of accreditation is relatively rare so bias associated with this issue should be minimal. An 
important exception to this is the impact of CCNE’s entry on ACEN accreditation. The entry of 
CCNE into nursing accreditation led to programs voluntarily withdrawing from ACEN 
accreditation to join CCNE instead. For example, the University of Michigan was accredited by 
ACEN from 1953 until 2002 without interruption, when it voluntarily withdrew from ACEN 
accreditation and became accredited by CCNE. Hundreds of other nursing programs did the 
same. In short order, CCNE established a near-monopoly on accreditation at the baccalaureate 
and higher level, accounting for nearly 80% of accredited programs at the four-year or higher 
level (author’s calculations). By contrast, since 2014 ACEN has granted accreditation to 30 such 
programs while 61 withdrew from accreditation. There is no comprehensive publicly available 
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data source on these voluntary withdrawals. To fully capture this phenomenon, I acquired a 
membership roster for ACEN in 1996 (the year preceding the entry of CCNE) from a publication 
by the National League for Nursing. Combining this list with the year of initial accreditation by 
CCNE allows for the identification of all former ACEN members that switched accreditors and 
the timing of each switch. 
These limitations may impact findings by resulting in an undercounting of accredited 
programs. The great deal of manual processing involved in acquiring these data also could 
introduce some error affecting the analysis. However, there is no reason to assume that possible 
errors and undercounting are systematic rather than random. Thus, I cautiously interpret these 
findings as establishing a lower bound of the coverage of accreditation in business and nursing. 
Because of the survivor bias inherent in only capturing the status of currently accredited 
programs, it is also important to keep in mind that all discussion of the characteristics associated 
with accreditation generalize only to programs that have remained accredited. 
A final limitation to the data used relates to IPEDS. Information from IPEDS is largely 
measured at the institutional level, with relatively little data measured about academic programs 
themselves. For example, measures of substantive interest like enrollment, admissions, or 
finances are not captured by program, requiring the use of institution-level proxies instead. The 
information available on student characteristics by academic program is also limited to 
race/ethnicity and is only measured at graduation (i.e., reported only for completers). It is 
possible for the characteristics of business and nursing graduates to differ from those of business 
and nursing students if there are differential retention and graduation rates by race/ethnicity or 




The research questions in this paper are purely descriptive; the research methods follow 
from there. The first research question deals with the growth of accreditation in business and 
nursing and the characteristics of programs by accreditation status. I begin by tracing 
accreditation over time as the annual and cumulative number and share of programs accredited 
by field. Descriptive statistics of the characteristics of accredited programs and institutions 
relative to their unaccredited peers are also reported for three points in time for business (1985, 
2000, and 2015) and two points in time for nursing (1996 and 2015). These unconditional 
characteristics of institutions by accreditation status are of substantive interest and drive much of 
the discussion. Because it is possible for descriptive statistics to obscure confounding 
relationships, Supplemental Materials include results for a series of linear probability models of 
the form:  
𝑃(𝑌𝑖𝑎 = 1) = 𝑋𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝑖  (1) 
where 𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1) is the probability of program i being accredited by accreditor a as of 2015, 𝑋𝑖
′𝛽 
are vectors of covariates at the program and institution level and their associated coefficients, and 
𝑖 are robust standard errors. These covariates include measures for institutional control, 
selectivity, graduate-level offerings, enrollment, degrees conferred in business/nursing, and the 
business/nursing share of all degrees (all measured in 2015). Results from this analysis do not 
change the substantive conclusions derived from the simpler descriptive statistics. 
For the third research question, I track the proportion of degree conferrals by 
programmatic accreditation status from 1985 to 2015 by degree level for business and nursing. 
This time series is then subdivided by race/ethnicity and by accreditation status from 1995 on 
(the first year of data availability in IPEDS), which yields trends per race/ethnicity of the share 
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 The two business accreditors collectively accredit 738 programs at the baccalaureate and 
higher degree levels as of 2015, with AACSB accounting for 70% of them. Annually since 1985, 
AACSB has accredited eight new programs annually, with a large uptick in the late 1990s 
coinciding with revised standards that made accreditation attainable for less research-intensive 
institutions. ACBSP averaged nine newly accredited programs annually over the same period. 
Table 2.2 reports summary statistics of institutions and programs by accreditation status.  
Programs accredited by AACSB remained remarkably consistent over the 30 years in the panel. 
The accreditor continues to accredit a disproportionate share of programs in institutions ranked 
in the top three selectivity categories from Barron’s. It also continues to accredit a large 
proportion of business programs at public institutions, with only a small increase in the number 
of not-for-profit institutions holding AACSB accreditation. Unsurprisingly, colleges and 
universities with AACSB accreditation are significantly larger than their peers, conferring twice 
as many degrees as ACBSP-accredited institutions. The most notable shift in the characteristics 
of AACSB-accredited programs is the ascendance of historically Black colleges and universities 
(HBCUs), which have attained equitable representation with the accreditor within the past thirty 
years after decades of exclusion. Programs accredited by ACBSP differ from AACSB-accredited 
ones in numerous ways. In particular, ACBSP is more likely to accredit programs at minority-
serving institutions and HBCUs, accredits a smaller share of programs based at public 
institutions (and a greater share of those at not-for-profits). These programs are also housed at 
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less selective institutions. Finally, ACBSP has accredited many programs at for-profit 
institutions, especially since 2000. Regression results in Table 2.7A (in Supplemental Materials) 
confirm that the differences in characteristics across accreditation status hold simultaneously. 
With over 700 programs now accredited, the share of baccalaureate degrees granted by 
unaccredited programs dropped sharply over time from about 50% in 1985 to fewer than 30% as 
of 2015 as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Over the same period, AACSB increased its share by 10 
percentage points while ACBSP rose steadily until 2012, when it experienced significant growth 
in degrees conferred after accrediting several large online and multi-campus for-profit operators 
like Capella, DeVry, Strayer, and University of Phoenix. The share of students graduating from 
these programs reveals disparities by race and ethnicity that mirror disparities in enrollments at 
the institutions served by each accreditor. Specifically, Black business graduates are significantly 
underrepresented among those earning AACSB-accredited degrees and overrepresented among 
graduates of ACBSP-accredited programs. This pattern has accelerated since 2012 given the 
large share of minoritized students, especially Black students, enrolled at the colleges and 
universities most likely to be accredited by ACBSP.  
The trends in accreditation coverage and in disparities for Black students are even more 
pronounced at the graduate level, included in Figure 2.2. The share of master’s degrees conferred 
by AACBS-accredited programs is virtually unchanged over the 30-year period, with Black and 
Latinx business graduates consistently underrepresented in this group. At the doctoral level, the 
share of degrees conferred by unaccredited programs essentially doubled over the past 30 years – 
largely reflecting that the share of business doctorates with AACSB accreditation dropped from 
90% to less than half. The significant gains in doctorate share by ACBSP in recent years do not 
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fully compensate for the relative reduction in AACSB coverage of doctoral business degrees and 
ascendance of doctoral programs holding no programmatic accreditation.  
Programmatic accreditation remains somewhat uncommon among business programs at 
the two-year level, with 9% of programs accredited by ACBSP as of 2015 (Table 2.3). Public 
institutions are more likely to be accredited (13% are) and constitute most two-year colleges, so 
they account for most accredited programs. Colleges housing accredited programs are twice as 
likely to be classified as “high transfer” institutions by Carnegie class. These are institutions that 
grant fewer than 30% of degrees and certificates in career and technical education and whose 
students have high transfer rates into four-year programs. Two-year colleges with accredited 
business programs are larger by about one-third (or 800 full-time students) and grant almost 
twice as many business degrees as unaccredited programs (111 vs. 64 annually). Because these 
programs are larger on average, in 2015 13% of two-year business degrees were granted by 
accredited programs, ranging from 16% for White students to 9% for Latinx business graduates. 
Nursing Accreditation 
 The current state of accreditation for nursing programs is characterized by a high 
prevalence of accreditation that is diffused across sectors of higher education, as summarized in 
Table 2.4. At the baccalaureate level, 87% of programs are accredited, 20% by ACEN and 67% 
by CCNE. Of programs that remain unaccredited, those at for-profit institutions account for a 
large share (5% of all nursing programs but 68% of unaccredited ones). Unaccredited programs 
produced an average of 127 nursing graduates each in 2015; even as nursing professionalizes and 
accreditation diffuses unaccredited programs graduate thousands of nurses annually. ACEN 
accredits a large share of programs housed in public institutions, HBCUs, and predominantly 
Black institutions. After significant and constant growth, CCNE now accredits most programs, 
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including virtually all from institutions ranked moderately selective or higher and those with 
graduate-level offerings: 76% of MSN programs and 89% of DNP programs carry CCNE 
accreditation. CCNE-accredited programs are also larger on average, though since they operate 
in colleges and universities that are themselves larger, the nursing share of all degrees is 
smallest. Table 2.8A in Supplemental Materials reports results of a regression of accreditation 
status as of 2015 on these same characteristics. 
Moving to nursing accreditation over time, the panels in Figure 2.3 display the initial 
accreditation dates of currently accredited programs in nursing. The graph makes clear that 
CCNE has become the primary accreditor of nursing programs at the baccalaureate and higher 
level, accrediting on average 34 programs annually since 1997. In its early years, the limiting 
factor to the expansion of CCNE was not a lack of applicant programs but a shortage of 
reviewers to evaluate programs (Van Ort & Butlin, 2009).  
By contrast, ACEN has accredited fewer than 10 programs annually since 1997 and has 
seen numerous voluntary withdrawals over the same period. To understand the migration 
between these two accreditors, I compare accreditation in 1996-1997 (the year preceding the 
entry of CCNE) and 2015 in Table 2.5. In 1996, there were 482 programs with ACEN 
accreditation; of those, 399 (83%) have since switched to CCNE. Table 2.4 makes clear that 
programs that have switched from ACEN to CCNE differ from those that remained: HBCUs and 
predominantly Black institutions are less likely to switch, whereas institutions that did switch are 
more selective on average. Switchers are also larger and more likely to offer graduate-level 
programs: as of 2015, they are 28% more likely to offer MSN degrees and three times more 
likely to offer DNP programs. The last column of Table 2.4 makes apparent that the profile of 
programs that ACEN has accredited since 1997 has also changed: programs earning ACEN 
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accreditation since then are more likely to be for-profit institutions, include no institutions in the 
most or highly competitive Barron’s categories, and are less likely to offer graduate degrees in 
nursing.  
  The patterns and trends in nursing accreditation have important implications for students. 
Figure 2.4 plots the share of nursing degrees that are granted overall and by race/ethnicity, split 
by accreditation status. As of 2015, 92% of all nursing degrees at the baccalaureate level were 
granted by accredited institutions, with ACEN accounting for 14% and CCNE for 78%. Since 
1996, the coverage of degrees by accreditors has mirrored that of academic programs: CCNE has 
increased its share steadily while ACEN experienced a decline from a high of 87% in 1996 to 
under 20% since 2008. The share of nursing graduates earning their degrees at unaccredited 
programs has declined slightly since 1996, averaging 10% annually. There are significant 
disparities in the distribution of nursing graduates by race and ethnicity, however. Black and 
Latinx students are disproportionately represented among unaccredited programs. In 2015, 4.6% 
of nursing baccalaureate degrees were granted by unaccredited programs, ranging from 3.7% for 
White students to 6.5% for Black and 6.9% for Latinx students.  
 Nursing programs at the associate level (Table 2.6 and Figure 2.5) are characterized by a 
lower overall prevalence of accreditation. There are almost 700 ACEN-accredited two-year 
programs, representing around 60% of all programs. Almost 90% of ACEN-accredited programs 
are housed in public institutions; institutions with accredited programs enroll more students on 
average and have larger nursing programs graduating 50% more students on average 
(approximately 30 students). As of 2015, ACEN accreditation covers 66% of all degrees 
conferred but there are significant disparities by race and ethnicity: 70% of White students 
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completing two-year nursing degrees do so at ACEN-accredited programs relative to 56% for 
Black and Latinx students.  
The gap in the accreditation coverage of Black and Latinx nursing graduates generally 
reflects enrollment patterns. Latinx students earning nursing degrees are most represented at 
Hispanic-serving institutions (HSIs), which have a 9-percentage point lower probability of 
holding specialized accreditation than predominantly white institutions (see Table 2.8A in 
Supplemental Materials). Additionally, as of 2015 21% of Black and 18% of Latinx nursing 
graduates earn their degrees at for-profit colleges, the institutions least likely to hold such 
accreditation. Note that the sample excludes Puerto Rico. With the inclusion of Puerto Rico, the 
proportion of Latinx nurses graduating from unaccredited programs would have more than 
doubled over this period as few Puerto Rico-based programs were accredited previously. 
Recently, however, ACEN and CCNE have made significant inroads in Puerto Rico institutions: 
Since 2015, ACEN has accredited 8 and CCNE has accredited 11 such programs. 
Discussion 
The analysis presented here finds support for the growing importance specialized 
accreditation plays in business education across each of these areas. Highly selective elite 
business programs continue to sort into the prestigious accreditation of AACSB, though striving 
middle-selectivity institutions have also recently come to pursue this accreditation – especially as 
AACSB relaxed standards to take a more mission-centered approach to accreditation. The 
connection between AACSB and rankings of business schools, coupled with these new 
standards, has made accreditation by AACSB more attainable and a near-necessity for striving 
business programs. In contrast, ACBSP has come to accredit many institutions that are unlikely 
to meet AACSB standards and unlikely to seek out gains in published rankings but seeking 
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greater legitimacy nonetheless: the least selective colleges and universities and those in the for-
profit sector. This stratification is reflected in what students have access to accredited programs. 
To the extent that AACSB sees itself as a key determinant of students’ labor market success 
(which they claim) and to the extent that attending the “right” institution and attaining the “right” 
cultural fit play a central role in access to elite jobs (e.g., Rivera, 2012), this exclusion could 
have significant implications for labor market outcomes. At the same time, to the extent that 
ACBSP lends some legitimacy to programs with high concentrations of minoritized students, it is 
crucial to get a better understanding of whether and how its accreditation improves 
programmatic quality and student outcomes.  
Future research should also investigate doctoral programs lacking specialized 
accreditation given the explosive growth of such programs, especially among minoritized 
business students. Doctoral degrees prepare individuals for some of the most professionalized 
occupations available to business students and seem at first glance to be the one credential level 
where specialized accreditation is most justified, making the prevalence and growth of 
unaccredited doctoral-granting programs puzzling. Graduate school is an important driver of 
student debt and one cause of wide disparities in debt burden by race and ethnicity (e.g., Scott-
Clayton & Li, 2016). The prestige of graduate business programs is the strongest determinant of 
labor market outcomes for PhD holders (Bedeian et al., 2017). Unaccredited doctoral programs 
in business can certainly make such credentials more attainable given the very limited number of 
slots at selective graduate programs, but these programs may combine high tuition charges with 




Given the licensure regime that characterizes nursing and the field’s striving for greater 
professionalization, it is unsurprising that its prevalence of accreditation is high. Perhaps more 
surprising are the lower rate of accreditation among two-year programs and the persistence of 
unaccredited programs. Nursing accreditation can be a costly endeavor, so community colleges 
strapped for resources and already running oversubscribed nursing programs may forgo it with 
little consequences, which appears to be the case. What remains unknown, however, are the labor 
market consequences that students face, especially minoritized students. Nursing programs have 
not managed to expand enrollments sufficiently to meet demand by qualified applicants, running 
counter to the stated goals of professional associations to increase the education level of the 
nursing workforce. Future research (like the next chapter of this dissertation) should explore the 
implication of specialized accreditation to the supply of nursing seats at colleges and universities 
and to the labor market outcomes of students, especially in the context of CCNE’s goal of 
streamlining the complicated web of accreditation across registered nursing and advanced 
practice nursing programs. The entry of CNEA introduces yet more change and complexity to 
nursing accreditation at the two- and four-year levels and demands additional research into the 
accreditor choices administrators face and their implications for the success of programs and 
their students. It is critical to understand the impact that differences in nursing programs, 
including accreditation, have for students’ labor market outcomes and for the quality of care and 
health outcomes for patients.  
The persistence of unaccredited programs in nursing also warrants future research into 
the types of programs that are available to aspiring nurses and how students navigate such 
choices. One example of such work is the investigation of college choice by Iloh and Tierney 
(2014). They interviewed nursing students at a low-cost community college and at an expensive 
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for-profit institution, finding that many turned to the for-profit sector because of hurdles faced in 
attending and succeeding at an under-resourced community college, including limited available 
seats, course waitlists, and complex bureaucracy. Combined with the findings in this paper, it is 
critical to study what implications accreditation status has for career advancement and diversity 
of the nursing labor force – especially as Black and Latinx nursing graduates continue to 
disproportionately attend unaccredited programs. For example, Latinx individuals comprise only 
3% of the nursing workforce, a significant underrepresentation given this group accounts for 
18% of the US population (Devoe, 2016) and has accounted for at least 5% of baccalaureate 
nursing degrees granted annually since 1996 (author’s calculations). Black and Latinx nurses 
also have the lowest earnings among registered nurses, a differential not explained by variation 
in education level or experience (Moore & Continelli, 2016). Future research should investigate 
whether the unaccredited degrees that many aspiring Black and Latinx nurses earn is a possible 
cause for leaving the profession and being systematically underpaid.  
Conclusion 
 This paper provides some of the first and most thorough documentation of specialized 
accreditation in business and nursing, including its evolution over time, its coverage of programs 
and institutions, and the students it serves. The contrast between the two fields is instructive, as it 
illustrates how the licensure regime of nursing and professionalization of the occupation requires 
a higher degree of accreditation for program legitimacy. The similarities between the fields are 
the voluntary nature of specialized accreditation and the presence of multiple accreditors; these 
similarities serve to reinforce the stratification across accreditors as prestige and isomorphism 
drive programs’ accrediting ambitions. Another goal behind documenting specialized 
accreditation in detail for these two fields is to properly contextualize the practice in future 
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research. For example, the next chapter makes use of quasi-experimental methods to study the 
effects of accreditation on degree conferrals and costs. The information in this chapter informs 
that study by defining what the accreditation “treatment” is and what types of institutions 
comprise the “counterfactual” to a program that has attained accreditation. As specialized 
accreditation pervades higher education, tracking its scope across and within fields is critical in 
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Table 2.1 Specialized Accreditors for Business and Nursing in Scope for Analysis. 
Field Accreditor  
(acronym) 





Association to Advance 
Collegiate Schools of Business 
(AACSB) 
1916 Baccalaureate and above 482 
Accreditation Council for 
Business Schools and Programs 
(ACBSP) 
1988 Associate’s,  





Accreditation Commission for 
Education in Nursing  
(ACEN) 
1952 Associate’s,  




Commission on Collegiate 
Nursing Education  
(CCNE) 
1996 Baccalaureate and above 641 
Note: Excludes International Assembly for Collegiate Business Education (IACBE) accreditor in business as it largely accredits 
programs outside the United States. Excludes Commission for Nursing Education Accreditation (CNEA) in nursing as it was founded 
in 2017. “Program” defined as institution-CIP code (52 for business, 5138 for nursing) collapsed across degree levels within 
institution. 
Source: Author’s calculations from extracted accreditation data. 
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Table 2.2 Descriptive Characteristics for Business Programs by Accreditation Status (four-year level). 

















HBCU 0.009 0.065 0.033 0.125 0.044 0.045 0.105 0.028 
Pred Black Institution 0.009 0.022 0.007 0.025 0.026 0.005 0.017 0.025 
Hispanic-Serving 
Institution 
0.087 0.093 0.088 0.125 0.097 0.104 0.092 0.092 
Control 
Public 0.725 0.360 0.706 0.400 0.303 0.712 0.262 0.219 
Not-for-profit 0.275 0.599 0.294 0.592 0.600 0.288 0.498 0.561 
For-profit 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.008 0.096 0.000 0.240 0.219 
Barron’s ratings (as of 2014) 
Most competitive 0.153 0.013 0.112 0.009 0.010 0.091 0.000 0.013 
Highly competitive 0.126 0.037 0.116 0.009 0.040 0.116 0.006 0.048 
Very competitive 0.293 0.229 0.294 0.204 0.217 0.293 0.175 0.219 
Competitive 0.386 0.497 0.399 0.454 0.503 0.398 0.512 0.476 
Less competitive 0.037 0.159 0.066 0.269 0.148 0.083 0.244 0.143 
Noncompetitive 0.005 0.052 0.013 0.046 0.064 0.019 0.056 0.069 
Special purpose 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.009 0.018 0.000 0.006 0.032 
Undergraduate degrees conferred 
Total 1,679.8 320.1 1,684.3 420.2 382.3 2,218.8 923.4 507.8 
 (1194.7) (405.1) (1324.1) (276.8) (508.1) (1976.8) (1759.1) (907.0) 
Business  502.0 123.0 422.0 84.6 107.2 473.4 225.9 118.1 
 (338.1) (154.5) (335.9) (42.01) (162.1) (433.1) (458.9) (255.7) 
Business share  0.247 0.288 0.211 0.187 0.244 0.186 0.225 0.208 
Total FT Enrollment 10,050.3 1,984.7 9,225.7 2,463.0 1,908.8 10,749.4 1,875.9 2,066.7 
 (6491.8) (2319.1) (6792.4) (1461.0) (2279.2) (8879.8) (1481.2) (3567.2) 




Table 2.3 Descriptive Characteristics for Business Programs by Accreditation Status in 





Control   
Public 0.941 0.565 
Not-for-profit 0.044 0.169 
For-profit 0.015 0.257 
Total FT Enrollment 3,529.2 2,736.1 
 (3415.9) (6089.0) 
Transfer intensity (from 
Carnegie Class) 
  
High transfer 0.348 0.174 
Mixed transfer 0.319 0.172 




Total 1,806.2 578.7 
 (2,174.3) (797.7) 
Business 118.8 74.5 
 (99.4) (120.5) 
Business share 0.075 0.133 





Table 2.4 Descriptive Characteristics for Nursing Programs by Accreditation Status (four-
year level). 











HBCU 0.045 0.046 0.112 0.013 0.028 
Pred Black Institution 0.010 0.011 0.031 0.008 0.014 
Hispanic-Serving 
Institution 
0.092 0.149 0.068 0.103 0.138 
Control 
Public 0.542 0.402 0.565 0.437 0.241 
Not-for-profit 0.456 0.586 0.404 0.532 0.414 
For-profit 0.002 0.011 0.031 0.031 0.345 
Barron’s ratings (as of 2014) 
Most competitive 0.032 0.014 0.000 0.033 0.029 
Highly competitive 0.043 0.057 0.009 0.044 0.029 
Very competitive 0.232 0.171 0.085 0.253 0.176 
Competitive 0.504 0.614 0.479 0.512 0.544 
Less competitive 0.148 0.114 0.282 0.111 0.147 
Noncompetitive 0.032 0.029 0.137 0.026 0.059 
Special purpose 0.009 0.000 0.009 0.022 0.015 
Undergraduate degrees conferred 
Total 1,177.1 784.5 925.1 1,539.5 1,167.4 
 (1351.4) (1007.2) (1200.8) (1987.1) (3128.3) 
Nursing 92.3 52.3 129.6 171.0 127.0 
 (111.1) (44.97) (152.3) (393.6) (173.2) 
Nursing share 0.130 0.099 0.186 0.165 0.221 
Total FT enrollment 5,254.7 3,661.0 3,499.6 6,246.5 4,879.3 
 (5867.3) (5914.2) (3496.3) (7872.3) (14302.8) 
Graduate programs 
Offers MSN 0.785 0.529 0.410 0.638 0.407 
Offers DNP 0.399 0.184 0.068 0.344 0.103 

















HBCU 0.124 0.015 0.062 
Pred Black Institution 0.023 0.008 0.031 
Hispanic-Serving 
Institution 
0.062 0.095 0.077 
Control 
Public 0.558 0.514 0.569 
Not-for-profit 0.434 0.481 0.354 
For-profit 0.008 0.005 0.077 
Barron’s rating (as of 2014) 
Most competitive 0.017 0.043 0.000 
Highly competitive 0.017 0.045 0.000 
Very competitive 0.108 0.265 0.037 
Competitive 0.533 0.503 0.407 
Less competitive 0.250 0.104 0.259 
Noncompetitive 0.067 0.024 0.296 
Special purpose 0.008 0.016 0.000 
Undergraduate degrees conferred 
Total 1,337.441 1,823.830 1,041.742 
 (3157.8) (2177.0) (1640.3) 
Nursing 143.806 185.361 127.708 
 (182.0) (339.0) (124.0) 
Nursing share 0.165 0.161 0.204 
Total FT enrollment 5,747.023 7,649.594 3,336.800 
 (14372.7) (8552.4) (4105.3) 
Graduate programs 
Offers MSN 0.636 0.820 0.169 
Offers DNP 0.163 0.474 0.015 





Table 2.6 Descriptive Characteristics for Nursing Programs by Accreditation Status in 





Control   
Public 0.890 0.609 
Not-for-profit 0.082 0.107 
For-profit 0.027 0.263 
Total FT Enrollment 3,354.3 2,943.2 
 (3,626.8) (5,652.1) 
Transfer intensity (from 
Carnegie Class) 
  
High transfer 0.325 0.168 
Mixed transfer 0.268 0.235 




Total 931.2 571.1 
 (1,109.5) (1,052.5) 
Business 91.3 63.7 
 (83.1) (110.9) 
Business share 0.192 0.268 







Figure 2.1 Share of Business Degrees Conferred by Accreditation Status. 
a. Bachelor’s Unaccredited 
 
b. Bachelor’s AACSB accredited 
 




d. Master’s Unaccredited 
 
e. Master’s AACSB accredited 
 




g. Doctoral Unaccredited 
 
h. Doctoral AACSB accredited 
 
i. Doctoral ACBSP accredited 
 




Figure 2.2 Share of Associate’s Business Degrees Conferred by Accreditation Status. 
 
















Figure 2.4 . Share of Baccalaureate Nursing Degrees Conferred by Accreditation Status. 
a. Unaccredited 
 
b. ACEN accredited 
 
c. CCNE accredited 
 




Figure 2.5 Share of Associate’s Nursing Degrees Conferred by Accreditation Status. 
 











HBCU 0.131* 0.068~ 
 (0.062) (0.040) 
Pred Black Institution -0.064 -0.004 
 (0.084) (0.006) 
Hispanic-Serving 
Institution -0.062 -0.004 
 (0.046) (0.003) 
Control (ref. Public)  
Not-for-profit -0.334*** 0.004 
 (0.034) (0.009) 
For-profit -0.162** -0.010 
 (0.060) (0.027) 
Selectivity (ref. Most Competitive)  
Highly competitive -0.268*** -0.001 
 (0.070) (0.002) 
Very competitive -0.364*** 0.009 
 (0.057) (0.007) 
Competitive -0.476*** 0.001 
 (0.055) (0.005) 
Less competitive -0.515*** -0.012 
 (0.063) (0.009) 
Noncompetitive -0.637*** 0.010 
 (0.074) (0.027) 
Enrollment FT (logged) 0.061*** -0.008~ 
 (0.018) (0.005) 
Business degrees 
granted (logged)  0.065*** 0.008 
 (0.017) (0.007) 
Business as share of 
degrees -0.073 -0.027 
 (0.114) (0.041) 
Constant 0.243~ 0.034~ 
 (0.133) (0.020) 
N 1,095 1,095 
Adjusted R-squared 0.514 0.029 
Notes: Outcome is accredited in 2015 by either AACSB or ACBSP. Coefficients are estimated 
by linear probability model. For-profit institutions included as non-competitive. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. ~p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from IPEDS and accreditation data. 
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HBCU 0.394*** -0.358*** 
 (0.091) (0.087) 
Pred Black Institution 0.259~ -0.245~ 
 (0.136) (0.134) 
Hispanic-Serving 
Institution -0.083* 0.083~ 
 (0.039) (0.049) 
Control (ref. Public)  
Not-for-profit -0.071* 0.056 
 (0.034) (0.042) 
For-profit -0.510*** -0.049 
 (0.093) (0.106) 
Selectivity (ref. Most Competitive)  
Highly competitive -0.010 0.090 
 (0.040) (0.090) 
Very competitive -0.032 0.089 
 (0.023) (0.078) 
Competitive 0.025 0.015 
 (0.027) (0.080) 
Less competitive 0.110* -0.072 
 (0.054) (0.095) 
Noncompetitive 0.323*** -0.300** 
 (0.088) (0.116) 
Enrollment FT (logged) -0.040* -0.010 
 (0.017) (0.029) 
Nursing degrees granted 
(logged)  0.039* 0.049~ 
 (0.016) (0.027) 
Nursing as share of 
degrees -0.007 -0.306 
 (0.126) (0.192) 
Offers MSN -0.032 0.010 
 (0.034) (0.041) 
Offers DNP -0.113*** 0.154*** 
 (0.029) (0.036) 
Constant 0.364* 0.572* 
 (0.145) (0.236) 
N 795 795 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.185 0.227 
Notes: Outcome is accredited in 2015 by either ACEN or CCNE. Coefficients are estimated by 
linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ~p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; 
***p<.001. Source: Authors’ calculations from IPEDS and accreditation data. 
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Table 2.9A Regression Results for Nursing Accreditation Switch Among 4-year Programs. 
Outcome: Switched from 















Selectivity (ref. Most Competitive) 
Highly competitive 0.104 
 (0.099) 








Enrollment FT (logged) -0.013 
 (0.040) 
Nursing degrees granted 
(logged)  0.039 
 (0.033) 
Nursing as share of 
degrees -0.371 
 (0.299) 
Offers MSN 0.056 
 (0.058) 





Adjusted R-Squared 0.398 
Notes: Outcome is switched from ACEN to CCNE between 1996 and 2015. Coefficients are 
estimated by linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ~p<.1; *p<.05; 
**p<.01; ***p<.001. Source: Authors’ calculations from IPEDS and accreditation data. 
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Chapter 3 Specialized Accreditation and its Consequences for Academic Programs: 
The Case of Business and Nursing 
 
In 2015, administrators at Vanderbilt University published a study detailing expenditures 
on compliance with federal regulations in higher education. The authors alleged that the sector 
spent over $27 billion on compliance in 2013-2014. Outside of spending related to research 
activity and grants management ($16 billion), by far the largest contributor to compliance 
expenditures was accreditation, which cost colleges and universities over $7 billion annually 
(Vanderbilt University, 2015). Published as accreditors continued to face significant skepticism 
stemming from the Spellings Commission report, the study laid bare not only the direct expenses 
associated with accreditation but also the significant time required of faculty and staff to ensure 
compliance with accreditors. Surprisingly, about half of those expenses are associated with 
specialized accreditation.  
There are more than 100 specialized accreditors currently operating in the US, with 
oversight over 23,000 programs across some 3,000 institutions (Vibert, 2018), almost 
exclusively in professional and pre-professional fields. Unlike its regional equivalent, specialized 
accreditation applies to a single academic unit within a larger higher education institution (such 
as a school of business), to subspecialties of disciplines like engineering, or to standalone single-
purpose institutions such as dedicated nursing schools (Vibert, 2018). As with the more familiar 
practice of regional accreditation, the purpose of specialized accreditation is to ensure quality 
improvement and to hold programs accountable to accreditation standards. Unlike regional 
accreditation, however, specialized accreditors emphasize the relevance of programs to their 
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associated communities of practice and employers, validating specific academic offerings over 
others as more legitimate in the eyes of a profession (Hagerty & Stark, 1989).  
There is near-unanimous agreement among higher education administrators that 
specialized accreditation carries significant costs. For each such accreditor, departments may be 
on the hook for application and membership fees, costly site visits, and expensive consultants; 
maintaining accreditation also requires resources and time required for preparation of frequent 
mandatory reports and self-studies (Baker et al., 2004; Glidden, 1983). What is more, these 
direct costs may pale in comparison to the expenditures required to bring programs into 
compliance with accreditation requirements in the first place. Doing so could involve updating of 
facilities, hiring of additional faculty, changes to teaching and research loads, and large-scale 
curricular and pedagogical reforms (Eaton, 2009; Heriot et al., 2009; Trifts, 2012; Yuen, 2012). 
Accredited programs do not undertake such expenditures without some expected benefit. A 
stamp of approval from an accreditor signals that programs “demonstrate to their external publics 
that they are responsible stewards of the resources invested in them, that they are soundly 
managed, and that they produce the kinds of results that they are expected to produce” (Ewell, 
2005, p. 104). The assurance of programmatic quality from a credible third-party arbiter may be 
particularly desirable in a competitive enrollment environment (Bloland, 1999; Jost, 1994; 
Mause, 2009). Students can also benefit from such accreditation through professional networks, 
greater professional mobility, and pathways to relevant professional licensures (e.g., Ard et al., 
2017; Yuen, 2012). 
Two fields with long-standing but differing traditions of specialized accreditation are 
business and nursing. Specialized accreditation has played a role in business education since the 
early 1900s. Currently, the field has multiple accreditors recognized by the Council for Higher 
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Education Accreditation (CHEA) or the U.S. Department of Education (ED) accrediting 
hundreds of business programs. The history and ubiquity of accreditation among business 
programs has not diminished controversies over its influence over the field. Some argue that 
“accreditation sickness” (Lowrie & Willmot, 2009, p. 411) has led institutions to pursue the 
prestige of specialized accreditation while compromising the relevance of the business 
curriculum, making it “less and less relevant to practitioners” (Bennis & O’Toole, 2005, p. 98). 
The need to demonstrate high levels of research productivity has allegedly resulted in business 
faculty producing a glut of scholarship of limited utility (Lowrie & Willmot, 2009; Simons, 
2013). Perhaps most concerning to scholars of business education is the dearth of evidence “that 
mastery of the knowledge acquired in business schools enhances people’s careers” (Pfeffer & 
Fong, 2002, p. 80) as “business schools are teaching students the wrong things in the wrong 
way” (Simons, 2013, p. 3).   
Accreditation in nursing has several similarities to business, most notably the presence of 
multiple accreditors of varying prestige that reflect different philosophies toward the recognition 
of nursing programs (Phelps & Gerbasi, 2009). Nursing has operated under some form of 
oversight by accreditors for over a century, affording nursing programs recognition of their 
quality, purporting to improve the training that nurses receive and providing students a clear path 
to licensure and professional certification (Ard et al., 2017). But a long-standing and well-
publicized shortage of nurses in the United States (Bargagliotti, 2003) has brought renewed 
attention to accreditation practices. Nursing accreditors are subject to the familiar concerns over 
the costs associated with accreditation (Baker et al., 2004), in addition to criticism that too-
stringent accreditation standards, particularly around faculty qualifications, hiring, and clinical 
training requirements, constrain enrollment growth and exacerbate nursing shortages (e.g., 
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Nevidjon & Erickson, 2001). Evidence suggests that accredited nursing programs deliver better 
outcomes for students (Ard et al., 2017), but these programs do not provide sufficient seats as 
large numbers of otherwise qualified applicants are routinely denied admission to accredited 
nursing programs each year (Kovner & Djukic, 2009). Unaccredited, largely for-profit providers 
have quickly emerged to serve this unmet pool of aspiring nurses, accounting for 14% of nursing 
degrees in 2016, up from less than 2% in 2007 (Pittman et al., 2019). Even as accreditors and 
professional associations have set ambitious goals for a more highly educated nursing workforce, 
only 56% of registered nurses in 2019 held a BSN – well short of the 80% goal set by the 
American Association of Colleges of Nursing for 2020 (American Association of Colleges of 
Nursing, 2019).  
Research Questions 
Specialized accreditation covers vast swaths of higher education, requires potentially 
sizable investments and forgone autonomy on the part of academic programs, and may carry 
significant implications for students’ educational and career trajectories. In the two fields of 
focus for this paper, specialized accreditation is long established and still expanding as dozens of 
programs become newly accredited each year and as new accreditors emerge.1 Yet we know 
surprisingly little of how specialized accreditation affects these programs (Kelchen, 2018; Klasik 
& Hutt, 2018; Zemsky, 2011), owing to a dearth of “well-identified studies of the consequences” 
of accreditation (Deming & Figlio, 2016, p. 48). Much of the literature on accreditation is aimed 
 
 
1 In business, the International Accreditation Council for Business Education (IACBE) began to accredit programs 
in the US in 2011. Nursing saw the recent addition of the Commission for Nursing Education Accreditation (CNEA) 
to the ranks of accreditors in the field though the organization is yet to accredit any programs. Because neither 




at practitioners, focusing on the nuts and bolts of the accreditation process and favoring 
narratives, documentation of institutional practices, and descriptions of accreditation efforts over 
empirical evaluation of what accreditation accomplishes (Fester et al., 2012; Volkwein et al., 
2007; Zemsky, 2011). The consequences of accreditation remain an open question at an 
inopportune time for accreditors. Its critics have become emboldened in their calls for reform or 
outright elimination of the accreditation system (Gillen et al., 2010; Kelly, 2014; Neal, 2008; 
Vergari & Hess, 2002) and these critics found a receptive audience in the Trump-era Department 
of Education (US Department of Education, 2018). Academic leaders, meanwhile, make critical 
accreditation-related decisions for their departments with little to guide them.  
This paper seeks to answer two interrelated questions about the consequences of 
specialized accreditation for business and nursing programs’ operations and attainment of their 
educational mission. The research questions are:  
(1) What are the effects of specialized accreditation on the number of degrees granted, 
and  
(2) What are its effects on instructional costs?  
Put another way, these questions tell us how accreditation affects the core functions of most 
academic departments: the production of graduates and the cost of teaching students. For 
policymakers in the higher education space, these questions can help our understanding of how 
specialized accreditation shapes the sector beyond the usual claims of accountability and 
continuous quality improvement.  
I choose to study accreditation in both business and nursing because each field captures 
important dimensions of the practice of specialized accreditation. The stakes of business 
accreditation are especially high because the field covers such a large portion of students in 
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higher education: business accounts for about one-fifth of all undergraduate and one-quarter of 
master’s degrees awarded annually (author’s calculations from IPEDS data), with over 900 
universities offering graduate business programs that are important sources of revenues for 
institutions (Murray, 2012; Simons, 2013). Nursing accreditation is of critical importance amidst 
a shortage of nurses, as unaccredited programs produce 10,000 nurses annually, and during a 
global pandemic laying bare the need for nurses while complicating their clinical training. 
Background on Specialized Accreditation 
The analyses that follow are specific to each accreditor. The previous chapter presented 
in detail the history of specialized accreditation in business and nursing; this section provides 
only a brief summary to contextualize the rest of the study. In business, the two competing 
accreditors are the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB) and the 
Association of Collegiate Business Schools and Programs (ACBSP). These organizations 
perform the same role in creating standards for accreditation of business programs and 
evaluating programs against those standards, but each embodies a unique philosophy of business 
education. The most pronounced difference is that AACSB emphasizes the importance of 
research in the preparation of business majors. It enforces stringent requirements around faculty 
qualifications and research productivity, which limit the amount of teaching faculty are expected 
to do (Navarro, 2008; Roller et al., 2003).  
On the other hand, ACBSP emphasizes the importance of instruction tied to real-world 
experience as delivered by scholar-practitioners with professional experience in the field. 
ACBSP programs prioritize teaching over research, tend to employ practitioners as faculty, and 
reflect a broader but generally less selective set of institutions among its accredited members 
(Beem, 2017). The ACBSP accreditation process also sets fewer bright-line standards, focusing 
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instead on systematic evaluative processes that identifies strengths and gaps needed for 
continuous improvement (Accreditation Council for Business Schools and Programs, 2019).  
accreditation is more realistically attainable by a wide range of institutions like two-year colleges 
and for-profits (Tullis & Camey, 2007). 
In nursing, the Accreditation Commission for Education in Nursing (ACEN) operated as 
the sole accreditor for decades until 1997. The standards enforced by ACEN are intended to 
ensure the relevance of programs to licensure and preparation for the profession and can serve to 
support recruitment and retention of students (Ard et al., 2017) across all degree levels. In 1997, 
the Commission on Collegiate Nursing Education (CCNE) emerged as a specialized accreditor of 
nursing programs at the baccalaureate and higher level (Van Ort & Butlin, 2009). CCNE 
standards address fewer areas than ACEN and aim to streamline accreditation of nursing and 
various advanced practice nursing fields as four-year nursing programs found themselves facing 
a growing number of accreditors across specialties (Van Ort & Butlin, 2009). The entrance of 
CCNE into nursing accreditation gave programs at four-years a choice of accreditor at a time 
when ACEN faced criticisms and lawsuits because of its alleged insufficient independence from 
the National League of Nursing. Since 1996, almost 400 programs switched from ACEN to 
CCNE.  
Conceptual Framework and Literature Review 
I study the consequences of accreditation for two core functions of academic 
departments: the number of degrees it awards, and the costs associated with its instruction. 
Specialized accreditation may affect either through numerous channels, but there is no specific 
integrated conceptual framework that speaks to the relationship between specialized 
accreditation and these outcomes. Rather, I draw from the college choice literature to motivate 
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the relationship between specialized accreditation and degrees awarded. I then turn to economic 
theories addressing the determinants of costs for academic departments to discuss how 
specialized accreditation affects the cost of instruction. This section also reviews the (limited) 
empirical literature addressing these outcomes. 
Specialized accreditation and degree conferrals 
Since the late 1970s, scholars have developed increasingly nuanced models of college 
choice to explain postsecondary enrollment decisions. Drawing from economics, psychology, 
and sociology, college choice models make explicit the factors and mechanisms that inform 
decisions throughout the college-going process (e.g., Hossler & Gallagher, 1987; Manski, 1993; 
Perna, 2006). Research on college choice has analyzed the roles of the high school context (e.g., 
McDonough, 1997; Perna et al., 2008), familial resources (e.g., Paulsen & St. John, 2002), self-
efficacy (Stage & Hossler, 2000), geography (Hillman, 2016), and the characteristics and 
amenities of colleges themselves (Long, 2004; Jacob et al., 2018; Skinner, 2019). For the most 
part, however, conceptual models of and empirical research on college choice do not speak 
directly to attributes of academic programs themselves.  
Choices regarding schooling and occupations are deeply intertwined (Lent et al., 1994; 
Sullivan, 2010). From a college choice and major choice perspective, it is plausible that 
accredited programs will produce more graduates if specialized accreditation is a desirable 
attribute to prospective students. There is a “high level of ignorance and faith embedded in the 
college purchase decision” (Winston, 1999, p. 17) that credible third-party information brokers 
can mitigate, which many argue accreditors do (Bloland, 1999; Jost, 1994; Mause, 2009). Many 
programs feature their accreditation status prominently on websites and marketing and 
recruitment materials (Adams & Eveland, 2007). And though the evidence on whether students 
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care about programmatic accreditation is mixed, prospective students do frequently report that 
quality is an important factor in their choice of institution and major (e.g., Rapert et al., 2004). 
Eligibility for the ever-popular rankings of business and nursing programs published by US News 
& World Report is also governed by accreditation – only AACSB-accredited programs are 
eligible in business, and only those with ACEN or CCNE accreditation are eligible in nursing. 
Perhaps most illustrative of how specialized accreditation affects enrollment decisions are the 
numerous lawsuits students have filed against programs that lose or never attain accreditation 
that prospective students expected (e.g., Bird, 2018; Hult, 2014).  
The preceding paragraphs treat specialized accreditation as serving a signaling role that 
increases degrees awarded mechanically by driving up interest and thus enrollment in a program. 
But it is also possible (and in fact alleged by accreditors) that accreditation increase degrees 
awarded through improvements in programmatic quality. That is, when a department implements 
and complies with the standards specified by accreditors, the overall quality of the program 
should increase. This increased quality should in turn translate into higher rates of student 
success, persistence in the major/program, and eventually more graduates. Though “quality” is 
an imprecise, contested concept in higher education, accreditors almost universally claim to 
improve the quality of programs through exposure to more highly credentialed faculty, better 
assessment practices, professionally relevant curricular content, and adequate facilities (see, e.g., 
Ard et al., 2017; Bieker, 2014; Trapnell, 2007; Vibert, 2018; Webster & Hammond, 2012).  
A final consideration in the relationship between the production of degrees and 
specialized accreditation relates to capacity. Increased demand for a program is mediated by a 
department’s willingness or capacity to serve additional students. One possibility is for increased 
demand for a program to just result in a more selective program. Elite institutions compete for 
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students and resources through their claims of prestige (Winston, 1999); increasing the 
selectivity of an institution or program is a conspicuous way to claim a more elite status 
(potentially with associate gains in other markers of status like rankings). Accreditors with 
bright-line standards on measures such as licensure exam pass rates (as both nursing accreditors 
have) could encourage programs to maintain or increase selectivity in order to ensure high marks 
on those standards. This unwillingness to serve additional students is more likely among 
graduate programs that have greater control over their own marketing and admissions practices 
than undergraduate programs operating under institutional admissions policies and decisions, but 
it shouldn’t be ignored.  
A second possibility is that capacity is constrained because of specialized accreditation. 
Academic departments combine a mix of inputs including faculty, support staff, services, and 
equipment to produce instruction and eventually degrees (e.g., Dundar & Lewis, 1995). To the 
extent that inputs are efficiently converted into those outputs, programs may have a harder time 
increasing output. Prior research has generally found a high degree of efficiency within 
institutions and departments (e.g., Doyle, 2014; Dundar & Lewis, 1995; Titus & Eagan, 2016; 
Titus et al., 2017). Specialized accreditation constrains the types of inputs that academic 
programs can use, for example through standards related to facilities and faculty qualifications, 
that could mediate programs’ ability to meet increased demand for seats. It is plausible that the 
costs associated with increasing capacity are systematically higher among accredited programs – 
limiting any increase in degrees awarded even as interest in a program grows. Nursing programs, 
for example, have largely been oversubscribed for many years, owing at least in part to an 
inability to hire sufficiently qualified faculty and to secure students clinical sites (AACN, 2017). 
 
 82 
The costs of specialized accreditation 
Academic programs are complex, using a variety of inputs to produce some mix of 
instruction, research, and service (Cheslock et al., 2016). Within these broadly defined outputs 
are meaningful distinctions across programs based on mission, level of instruction, and numerous 
other factors, resulting in differing production functions between programs (Dundar & Lewis, 
1995). Among accredited programs, the obligation to meet standards can have important 
implications for costs precisely because specialized accreditors unwittingly constrain some of the 
cost-saving tradeoffs that programs may typically resort to. One example is AACSB standards 
for faculty research productivity: by expecting greater research productivity, AACSB could 
directly increases research expenditures for accredited departments and indirectly increase 
instructional costs because of the reduced faculty teaching load required to sustain research 
productivity (Levernier et al., 1992). Stringent requirements for terminally credentialed faculty, 
found across business and nursing accreditation, can place programs in direct competition for 
hiring from a relatively smaller pool of qualified candidates, driving up salaries and reducing 
reliance on contingent faculty (Callie & Cheslock, 2008; Hedrick et al., 2010; Levernier, Miles, 
& White, 1992). Standards governing faculty qualifications and curricular or instructional 
practices, such as the use of frequent formative assessment or active learning pedagogies, can 
constrain class sizes, shifts to cost-saving modes of instruction such as large online courses, or 
the use of contingent faculty.  
Finally, accreditors may advocate for greater credentialing within professions, leading 
departments toward higher cost graduate-level academic offerings. The American Association of 
Colleges of Nursing (AACN), which oversees CCNE, has long advocated for higher educational 
attainment for nurses – not only calling for all nurses to hold baccalaureate degrees but also 
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encouraging graduate-level training for nurses and nurse administrators nationwide (AACN, 
2019) and advocating for expansion of Doctor of Nursing Practice programs (AACN, 2004). The 
emphasis that AACSB places on research by faculty may also necessitate expanded graduate 
programs that attract the types of faculty members interested in conducting research in the first 
place and provides them access to graduate students that can serve as research assistants. 
In all, specialized accreditation can plausibly change departments’ costs and degree 
production in several ways, with important implications for how departments operate, educate, 
and spend. Next, I turn to prior empirical work investigating these relationships. 
Prior Empirical Literature  
 The empirical evidence about the impact of accreditation on degree production and on 
costs is extremely narrow. Among this small body of research, few if any studies have made use 
of causal inference methods. Much of the prior work in this area is based on limited case studies 
and surveys of administrators, faculty members, and prospective students and largely measure 
attitudes toward and familiarity with accreditation. I review this literature below, beginning with 
business as it comprises the most studies before moving to the more limited research 
investigating nursing programs. 
 The most mature body of research on specialized accreditation centers on AACSB. 
Though extant research has not demonstrated a link between accreditation by AACSB and the 
production of degrees, several scholars have demonstrated that the competitive nature of student 
recruitment underlies many programs’ motivation for seeking accreditation. AACSB 
accreditation intends to assure prospective students that an “AACSB-accredited business school 
provides access to great educational resources and future employment opportunities” (Trapnell, 
2007, p. 69); the same accreditation signals to prospective students that they will be “associated 
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with other outstanding students and a highly qualified faculty” (p. 69). The recruitment benefits 
may be even greater for graduate education, as business schools and programs housed therein are 
more directly responsible for student recruitment at the graduate level and thus most feature their 
AACSB accreditation status prominently on marketing materials and websites (Trifts, 2012). 
Survey evidence suggests that AACSB accreditation is increasingly salient to students and 
employers (Tulis & Camey, 2007) and legitimates programs – especially programs at institutions 
not typically thought of as “elite” such as HBCUs (Holmes, 2001), striving public and private 
institutions (Durand & McGuire, 2005), and even institutions outside the United States (e.g., 
McKee et al., 2005).  Deans of a broad sample of business schools affirm that AACSB 
accreditation “highly enhanced student marketing appeal, enhanced recognition as an elite 
institution, and faculty recruitment advantages” (Roller et al., 2003, p. 201).  
Similar (though markedly weaker) beliefs on the part of deans apply to accreditation by 
ACBSP (Hunt, 2015; Roller et al., 2003); prior work has also found lower awareness of ACBSP 
accreditation among prospective students through surveys (Bennet et al., 2015). But research into 
ACBSP represents a small fraction of the already limited extant research into AACSB. Thus, the 
analysis presented in this paper advances our understanding of the effects of specialized 
accreditation on degree awards by (1) employing causal methods better suited to the question at 
hand, (2) by covering a much broader set of institutions, and (3) by assessing these effects for 
both primary accreditors of business programs.  
 Research on the costs associated with accreditation is somewhat more extensive, and 
again largely centered on AACSB. Several articles have documented the concerns that academic 
administrators feel about the direct costs of specialized accreditation (e.g., McKee et al., 2005; 
Roller et al., 2003). Though instructive for planning purposes, these studies generally reflect the 
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one-time or occasional expenditures programs face without telling us much about how 
accreditation affects costs on a more permanent basis.  
The objective of the analysis in this paper is to identify shifts in the instructional costs of 
academic departments resulting from the attainment of accreditation. Three previous articles are 
closely related to this analysis. Heriot, Franklin, and Austin (2009) collected detailed information 
on the costs of AACSB accreditation for ten business schools during their initial accreditation 
cycles. Deans at nine of the ten reported increased annual expenses of “far greater economic 
significance than one-time costs” (p. 286). Chief among these was increases in salary 
expenditures associated with hiring additional faculty; across the nine institutions reporting 
increased faculty headcount, additional salary expenses averaged $320,000 annually for each 
department. Not only are there costs associated with employing additional faculty, these 
additional faculty at AACSB-accredited institutions are paid more than their counterparts at 
unaccredited business schools (Levernier et al., 1992). These higher salaries are compounded by 
lower teaching loads for faculty in accredited business programs (Hedrick et al., 2010). Faculty 
at these programs are more productive researchers (Hedrick et al., 2010; Yunker, 2010), which is 
consistent with the vision of AACSB for quality and partly accounts for the lower teaching load. 
A limitation of this literature, however, is that issues of selection into accreditation are not 
sufficiently addressed to establish any causal relationships. 
Lower teaching loads carry yet another cost: Heriot, Franklin, and Austin (2009) 
identified at least one program that had to reduce enrollment (forgoing tuition revenue) because 
of constraints the program faced in scaling up enrollment while ensuring instruction by faculty 
meeting AACSB rules. Their findings are echoed in interviews conducted by Kelderman (2009), 
where the anticipated costs of AACSB accreditation led one business school to abandon its 
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accreditation ambitions entirely while another reported shrinking its continuing education 
programs because it was unable to find sufficient faculty meeting AACSB qualification 
requirements. Research on the cost implications of ACBSP is virtually nonexistent beyond brief 
mentions in case studies (e.g., Beem, 2017) and comparisons of its direct costs to those of 
AACSB. The latter consistently shows ACBSP as the less costly accreditor in business (Brink & 
Smith, 2012). Weighed against these costs are the benefits of accreditation that accrue to 
business programs in areas like recruitment, enrollment, hiring, and teaching quality (e.g., Elliott, 
2013; Hunt, 2015; Trapnell, 2007); evidence in support of these claimed benefits is mixed at best 
(Hunt, 2015). 
The research base for specialized accreditation in nursing is even more limited than that 
for business. What few studies do exist suggest similar themes as those observed in business. In 
general, across several survey-based studies, administrators believe that ACEN and CCNE 
accreditation are valuable to prospective students, improving the marketability of nursing 
programs (Bellack et al., 1999; Freitas, 2007). An important distinction between nursing and 
business is the primacy of licensure for aspiring nurses. Accredited programs have much higher 
success rates for nursing licensure exams than their unaccredited counterparts (Freitas, 2007; 
Spector et al., 2018). Graduating from accredited nursing programs can also provide nurses more 
geographic mobility as those credentials are more likely to be valid across state lines and 
preferred by employers (Ard et al., 2017). The licensure regime in the nursing profession may 
thus increase the salience of nursing accreditation to prospective students. Unfortunately, to the 
best of my knowledge no study has quantified this relationship. Similarly, numerous articles 
document concerns over the costs associated with nursing accreditation but none establishes a 
causal link between accreditation and the costs that departments face in delivering instruction. 
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The costs documented in this limited research largely overlap with those studied in accreditation 
more generally, including the demands that accreditation place on faculty and staff time (Freitas, 
2007) and the political costs related to loss of autonomy on aspects of mission and curriculum 
(Wirt & Kirst, 1997).  
In broad strokes, this body of research strongly suggests that there may well be 
substantively important impacts of specialized accreditation on costs in business and nursing. 
But the existing research is limited in scope and in terms of methods used. So, the present paper 
contributes to our understanding of the causal nature of the relationship between accreditation 
and costs, expands the evidence base to include multiple accreditors in each field, and covers a 
wider, more representative swath of higher education institutions than prior work. The 
conceptual framework and existing literature also imply important differences across the two 
fields in terms of expected findings. In terms of degree production, the higher rate of 
accreditation coverage in nursing (see Chapter 2) implies that for the marginal program attaining 
such accreditation, it may not be much of a differentiator. In other words, if specialized 
accreditation drives up degree production by making programs more attractive to students, this 
effect should be smaller in nursing where many of the programs a student may consider are 
likely already accredited. In business, on the other hand, accreditation is less prevalent and thus 
may set programs apart from peers more readily. This is especially true for AACSB if accredited 
programs find themselves in popular published rankings so valued by academic leaders and 
students (Athavale, 2017; Dahling-Brown, 2006). The relationship between accreditation and 
instructional costs is similarly likely to vary by field. The accreditation of business programs by 
AACSB carries numerous implications for the kinds of faculty members hired, the salaries they 
earn, and the amount of time they dedicate to research. In nursing, on the other hand, CCNE may 
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impose few if any increases to costs because comparison programs – those that are unaccredited 
or previously accredited by ACEN – do not operate in meaningfully different ways. These 
comparison programs are still bound by the standards enforced by Boards of Nursing, meaning 




Universe of programs. I identify degree-granting programs at two- and four-year 
institutions using the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). Through a 
series of annual surveys required of Title-IV eligible institutions, IPEDS collects and makes 
publicly available a wealth of program- and institution-level information. I define the universe of 
relevant business and nursing programs with data from the IPEDS Completions Survey. This 
survey reports degree conferrals by degree level and Classification of Instructional Program 
(CIP) code. For business, I identify programs granting degrees at the 2-digit CIP code 52 
(broadly business, but defined as Business, Management, Marketing, and Related Support 
Services). The code 51.38 broadly identifies programs in Registered Nursing (specifically 
defined as Registered Nursing, Nursing Administration, Nursing Research, and Clinical 
Nursing), which are the focus of ACEN and CCNE accreditation. Academic programs are 
identified at the Associate’s, Baccalaureate, Master’s, and Doctoral level for all years from 1985 
to 2015. I use IPEDS data to capture several program- and institution-level characteristics as 
well. These include measures like institutional characteristics like control, enrollment, Carnegie 
classification, selectivity, financial measures (e.g., revenue, tuition share of revenue), and 
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programmatic measures such as degrees conferred and the share of degrees in business or 
nursing. 
Accreditation information. To determine the accreditation status and date of initial 
accreditation for each program, I collected information from websites, membership rosters, and 
profile pages maintained by the four accreditors operating in the business and nursing fields. The 
year of initial accreditation for each program was used to generate an indicator variable for each 
program-year observation in the panel reflecting accredited status (1 = accredited; 0 otherwise). 
This time-varying indicator for the presence of accreditation drives the identification under the 
difference-in-differences approach described in the next section.  
Instructional costs. The last data source used is the National Study of Instructional Cost 
and Productivity from the University of Delaware (the Delaware Cost Study, hereafter DCS). 
Since 1998, the DCS has collected program-level data on costs and productivity from over 700 
four-year institutions. The survey collects detailed information at the four-digit Classification of 
Instructional Programs (CIP) level on instructional, research, and service expenditures. These 
data capture spending on faculty salaries and benefits, as well as expenditures associated with 
instructional facilities like laboratories if allocated to individual departments. The DCS also 
collects information on total instructional activity measured by faculty full-time equivalents 
(FTEs), student credit hours, and organized class sections. Faculty FTE are reported by rank, and 
credit hours and class sections are disaggregated into lower and upper divisions (for 
undergraduate instruction) and graduate division. These data allow me to construct numerous 
measures of interest, such as instructional expenses per credit hour, faculty salary and teaching 
load, and class size.  
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The DCS provides the most comprehensive measure of instructional costs and 
productivity but has several limitations. First, the survey does not include two-year or for-profit 
institutions. Compounding this problem is the small number of ACBSP and ACEN accredited 
programs that participated in the survey multiple times after attaining accreditation (fewer than 
10 for each). Second, the DCS is a voluntary survey that institutions opt in to or out of each year. 
Though the DCS captures a large share of institutions of higher education and is generally 
representative of four-year institutions (Hemelt et al., 2020), it is a highly unbalanced panel at 
the program level. Finally, the survey has only been conducted since 1998. These limitations 
mean that the analysis of the impact of accreditation on costs applies only to four-year 
institutions and to accreditation by AACSB in business and CCNE in nursing.  
Sample characteristics. In all, the analysis includes 2,710 unique degree-granting 
undergraduate programs in business (1,771 at the baccalaureate level and 939 at the associate’s 
level) and 2,028 degree-granting nursing programs (960 baccalaureate, 1,068 associate’s). A 
degree-granting program is defined as a unique combination of the IPEDS identifier of 
institutions (unit ID) and the appropriate CIP code (52 denoting business degrees, 51.38 denoting 
registered nursing) in the IPEDS completion survey. The analysis is further subset by degree 
level. Between 1985 and 2015, AACSB granted accreditation to 293 business programs while 
ACBSP newly accredited 269 baccalaureate-level programs and 192 associate’s programs. In 
nursing, ACEN newly accredited a total of 439 associate and 131 bachelor’s programs. Since 
1997, CCNE granted accreditation to 774 baccalaureate programs, 472 master’s programs, and 
274 doctoral programs in the same time span. These counts exclude programs accredited before 
1985 as those programs do not switch status during the observation window and thus, as detailed 
later, do not contribute to the identification of causal effects.  
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Table 3.1 summarizes descriptive statistics of undergraduate programs by accreditation 
status as of 2015. Panel A reports statistics for business; panel B does so for nursing. These 
descriptive statistics make it readily apparent that program characteristics vary widely across 
accreditors. In business as of 2015, AACSB accredits 27% of all undergraduate programs – but 
none in the for-profit sector, while programs at public institutions are significantly 
overrepresented. It is also clear that AACSB accredits mostly selective institutions, with 90% of 
its members falling in the “competitive” or higher Barron’s category. These institutions also 
enroll more students on average, graduating larger business cohorts than the other two groups. 
Finally, though these institutions charge tuition and fees comparable to those housing ACBSP-
accredited or unaccredited programs, their instructional expenditures per FTE are much higher – 
by 40% to 62% depending on comparison group. This pattern stands in sharp contrast to ACBSP, 
which accredits around 15% of baccalaureate-level business programs with an over-
representation of for-profit institutions (one-fifth of all ACBSP programs) and publics under-
represented. ACBSP institutions are less selective, with 83% of them ranked “competitive” or 
less selective by Barron’s. Historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) were entirely 
absent of the group of AACSB-accredited programs until the late 1970s but have by now 
attained parity in accreditation by AACSB – though ACBSP does accredit the majority of HBCU 
business programs. In the two-year sector where ACBSP operates as the sole accreditor, 13% of 
programs were accredited as of 2015. Virtually all accredited associate’s business programs 
(98%) are in public community colleges. Even though relatively few programs are accredited, 
these tend to be larger programs at institutions enrolling a greater number of students and 
granting more associate of business degrees.  
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 There are notable differences by accreditation status among nursing programs as well, 
and they largely mirror some of the patterns observed in business. For example, the more 
prestigious accreditor (CCNE) tends to accredit programs housed at more selective and larger 
institutions. Though students at CCNE-accredited institutions face higher published tuition and 
fees, these institutions also spend about one-third more on instruction than do ACEN-accredited 
ones. For-profit providers of nursing programs are largely unaccredited at both the two- and 
four-year sectors, even as they continue to grow their enrollments and graduate an increasing 
share of registered nurses. Unaccredited nursing programs are still subject to state authorization 
by the applicable state Board of Nursing as described in the previous chapter. 
Table 3.2 provide descriptive statistics on instructional costs by program based on a 
pooled cross-section from 2015 to 2017. These include information on total instructional activity 
and faculty characteristics like salary, workload, and rank. Panel A covers business programs and 
B nursing. In business, programs accredited by AACSB deliver more credit hours of instruction 
with a similar split between undergraduate and graduate levels as unaccredited programs. 
Instructional costs per credit are around 27% higher, a result of higher faculty salaries (by almost 
60%) for faculty that do less teaching (workload is 16% lower, or around 0.6 fewer course 
sections per year). Compensating for these factors is the class size of AACSB programs, which 
are approximately 50% larger at the undergraduate level and 40% larger for graduate courses. 
AACSB programs employ a lower share of supplemental and temporary faculty than 
unaccredited programs. In nursing, differences in terms of instructional costs and their drivers 
are more muted across accreditation status. Programs with accreditation by CCNE are larger in 
terms of instructional activity, but differences in faculty salary, workload, and class size are 
generally small. CCNE programs do use fewer tenure-track faculty and more regular faculty with 
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recurring appointments. Accreditation requirements require that faculty hold current RN 
licensure, maintain clinical expertise, and supervise clinical practice experiences, which many 
programs do by employing part-time faculty who are also practicing nurses. In terms of 
instructional costs, CCNE-accredited programs are around 10% cheaper on a per-credit basis 
than their peers. 
Methods 
 Because accreditation is voluntary, there is likely to be significant selection into 
specialized accreditation by programs. That is, programs attaining such accreditation may differ 
from their unaccredited counterparts on observable (clearly the case, as seen in Table 3.1) and 
unobservable characteristics, complicating causal inference about the effects of accreditation. 
Absent a randomized control trial, there are numerous quasi-experimental methods that can 
overcome such issues depending on the mechanisms underlying selection. I identify the 
relationship between accreditation and the two outcomes of interest by using the (plausibly) 
exogenous variation in the incidence and in the timing of accreditation. I use a generalized 
difference-in-differences approach that stands as the most common causal inference method in 
social science research (Goodman-Bacon, 2018), including among higher education scholars 
where it has seen significant growth over the past ten years (Furquim et al., 2020).  
In a difference-in-differences (DID) setup, the effect of interest is identified by 
comparisons of “treated” units (accredited programs) and comparison units (unaccredited 
programs) before and after “treatment” (attainment of accreditation). The DID method has 
proven quite useful in the social sciences because such scenarios are encountered frequently. In 
higher education, for example, policies and practices diffuse slowly as institutions and states 
retain significant autonomy in their decision-making, frequently giving rise to opportunities to 
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employ DID in studies of performance-based funding policies, admissions practices, financial 
aid programs, promise zones, and more (Furquim et al., 2020).  
As applied in this analysis, I estimate models in their most basic form as:  
𝑦𝑝𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑝𝑡 + 𝜃𝑝 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝑝𝑡 (1) 
The dependent variable 𝑦𝑝𝑡 represents the outcome of interest (degrees awarded or instructional 
costs, both in logs). The variable 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑝𝑡 is a time-varying dichotomous indicator for the 
accreditation status of program p in year t; that is, the variable takes a value of one for each year 
and program that is accredited and a value of zero otherwise. Its associated coefficient 𝛿 is the 
parameter of interest, capturing the causal relationship between programmatic accreditation and 
the outcome. Difference-in-differences relies on a comparison of the pre- and post-treatment 
outcomes among the treated and comparison groups. To recover those, I use two-way fixed 
effects at the program (𝜃𝑝) and year (𝜗𝑡) levels. These account for unobserved time-invariant 
differences between treated and comparison programs and unit-invariant unobserved time trends. 
Standard errors are clustered by institution, which is the unit of treatment (following Bertrand et 
al., 2004).  
 A first-order concern for such an approach is whether there is sufficient variation in the 
timing of treatment. That is, are there enough academic programs attaining accreditation across 
years to provide sufficient statistical power for the model? The two panels in Figure 3.1 display 
the number of programs accredited each year and cumulatively. The programs switching statuses 
(from unaccredited to accredited), plotted on the left, drive the difference-in-differences 
identification outlined above. Across both fields and all four accreditors, there are anywhere 




 The central assumption underlying causal inference in difference-in-differences is that of 
parallel trends: is the trend in the outcome observed for the comparison group a reasonable 
counterfactual for the “treated” group absent accreditation? One could argue that as constructed, 
the full universe of programs makes a sensible counterfactual since unaccredited programs still 
operate within the norms and bounds of US higher education, belonging to institutionally 
accredited colleges and universities and subject to all the other accountability and quality 
improvement regimes governing higher education. However, it is also possible that institutions 
with fundamentally different missions would serve as poor counterfactuals. For example, the for-
profit sector largely seeks to expand enrollments while the selective colleges may prefer to hold 
enrollment constant even as applications grow. I address this issue by estimating models across 
multiple samples, including a sample that includes only accredited programs (i.e., it excludes 
never-treated programs entirely).  
 Another assumption of the model as specified in Equation (1) is treatment effects are 
constant post-accreditation. An outcome like degree conferrals could lag a change in 
accreditation (or any other treatment) for a few years as it takes time for students to graduate. As 
Wolfers (2006) wrote, “Any reduced-form or structural analysis that assumes an immediate 
constant response to a policy shock may be misspecified if actual dynamics are more complex 
than a simple series break” (p. 1807). A growing body of research has pointed to the threat of 
time-varying treatment effects in difference-in-differences. Both de Chaisemartin and 
D’Haultfoeuille (2019) and Goodman-Bacon (2018) have demonstrated that in the presence of 
heterogenous treatment effects across either units or time can introduce bias to the two-way fixed 
effects estimator. The average treatment effect (ATE) estimated by Equation 1 is the weighted 
average of several discrete DID comparisons among never-treated units, units treated a short 
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time, units treated for a long period, and so on (Goodman-Bacon, 2018). Heterogeneity in the 
ATEs across either groups or time can result in negative weights being assigned to some of those 
pairwise comparisons, biasing the estimated ATE (de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille, 2019). 
There is also a possibility for anticipatory effects of accreditation. Programs do not apply for 
accreditation suddenly; they may spend months or years in preparation and in consultation with 
accrediting bodies before applying. For example, if AACSB accreditation is preceded by steady 
hiring of better-compensated faculty, its effect on instructional costs would occur prior to the 
official start of the accreditation “treatment” as operationalized here.   
 I (partly) address these concerns in two ways. First, I respecify Equation 1 as an event 
study, which allows the effect of accreditation on the outcomes of interest to vary over time. The 
event study allows for a more precise and interpretable estimated treatment effect for each period 
under accreditation:  
𝑦𝑝𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑡(𝑡 = 𝑘 + 𝑗)
𝑞
𝑗=−𝑚
+ 𝜃𝑝 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝑝𝑡 (2) 
In this model, the single post-treatment coefficient from Equation (1) is replaced by m leads and 
q lags from the year of treatment, yielding one 𝛿𝑗 coefficient for each lead and lag save for the 
omitted category (typically set at zero, or the year of initial accreditation, for ease of 
interpretation). Another advantage of this specification is that the statistical significance and 
magnitude of 𝛿𝑗 for all j < 0 (leads) can informally assess whether the pre-treatment trends are 
reasonably parallel and whether anticipatory effects are observed. Though absence of divergent 
pre-trends does not necessarily imply that parallel trends hold, it can at least provide some 
suggestive evidence that the comparison group makes an appropriate counterfactual. Second, I 
use the time-corrected Wald ratio estimator proposed by de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille 
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(2019) (the Wald-TC estimator) in addition to the two-way fixed-effects estimator from 
Equations 1 and 2. Their approach is robust to treatment effect heterogeneity by modifying how 
the averaging of average treatment effects is weighted. Rather than having weights proportional 
to the number of treated units in a cohort (i.e., year of initial accreditation) and the variance of 
treatment therein, de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2019) construct weights based on the 
share of treated units in each cohort and estimate cohort-specific treatment effects that are then 
appropriately averaged.  
Robustness checks and limitations 
 The event study specification and Wald-TC estimator address some of the limitations and 
threats to identification inherent to difference-in-differences with varying treatment timing. I 
conduct several additional robustness checks such as the inclusion of unit-specific trends, 
placebo tests that vary the timing of treatment, and analyses of non-equivalent outcomes that are 
unrelated to business/nursing accreditation such as degree conferrals and instructional costs in 
psychology.  
The choice of comparison group is an important one for the validity of causal estimates. 
One may believe that unaccredited programs are so distinct from their accredited peers that they 
should not be used for identification at all. An overly restrictive comparison group, on the other 
hand, could yield findings that are sample-dependent. I estimate models based on a few different 
comparison groups, ranging from samples inclusive of virtually all programs to samples 
restricted based on key observed characteristics of interest. I also estimate models based on 
“switchers” only, identifying the average treatment effect solely from variation in the timing of 
treatment for eventual switchers and omitting never-treated units (Sun & Abraham, 2020). The 
switcher-only sample also addresses issues of eligibility for accreditation. For example, even the 
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most selective business program housed at a for-profit institution cannot become accredited by 
the AACSB. Such a program may also have no incentive to constrain enrollments, potentially 
making for a poor counterfactual given its likely divergent trends for an outcome like degrees 
conferred. The trade-off for more restricted comparison groups is that those restrictions can limit 
the external validity of the estimates. 
The data gathered on specialized accreditation status introduces another limitation. I can 
only identify the initial date of accreditation for programs that are currently accredited. If a 
program gained and lost accreditation within the duration of the panel, it is (incorrectly) coded as 
never accredited. None of the accrediting agencies make available systematic documentation on 
formerly accredited programs. Requests for such information were declined by all accrediting 
bodies. This limitation can introduce survivor bias to the analysis if, for example, programs that 
are unable to increase enrollments or that cannot sustainably afford the costs of accreditation are 
more likely to lose their accredited status. Such a bias could inflate estimates of the impact of 
accreditation. Three accreditors (AACSB being the exception) occasionally publish minutes of 
board meetings where accreditation decisions are documented. A review of published minutes 
from 2012 to 2015 for ACBSP, ACEN, and CCNE, reveals that anywhere from zero to five 
programs may lose accreditation annually; the relative rarity of accreditation loss means such 
bias is likely minimal. Another data-related limitation is inherent to the Delaware Cost Study. 
Only a handful of institutions with ACBSP- or ACEN-accredited programs participate in the 
study, making analysis for these accreditors untenable. By extension, findings have no external 
validity to the types of institutions that do not participate in the DCS like for-profit universities.  
A conceptual limitation is that the empirical models leave unanswered questions of 
mechanism. The conceptual framework maps several channels through which specialized 
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accreditation may affect degree conferrals and costs for programs. The empirical approach of the 
paper answers whether any effects are observed but not why. For example, the models cannot 
disentangle if an observed increase in degree conferrals is due to increased demand by students, 
improvements to the quality of accredited programs, or a combination of the two. I engage in 
some informed speculation but acknowledge that adequate understanding of mechanisms 
requires significant additional research, including long-term qualitative research embedded in 
programs undertaking accreditation efforts. 
Findings and Discussion 
Accreditation and degree conferrals 
Table 3.3 reports results for a naïve model of the effect of AACSB accreditation on 
degree conferrals. The model is of the form specified in Equation 1 and includes all unaccredited 
programs as the comparison group. Results show a negative impact of accreditation on degrees 
granted, ranging from a 9% decrease for master’s programs to 13% for bachelor’s degrees. These 
results are somewhat attenuated when looking at a more restrictive comparison group but remain 
largely negative.  
Event study results reported in Figure 3.2 (and specified as in Equation 2) suggest that 
this specification may violate the parallel trends assumption as there are substantial, statistically 
significant pre-treatment differences in the trends of accredited and unaccredited degree 
conferrals. These results also suggest that treatment effects are likely heterogeneous over time. 
The pre-treatment trends are also unsurprising given the patterns of accreditation coverage of 
business degrees reported in Chapter 2: the share of degrees accredited by AACSB is largely 
stagnant since 1985 even as the number of programs accredited continues to increase. This 
suggests that non-AACSB programs have expanded degree conferrals at a faster rate than 
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AACSB-accredited ones (Garrity, 2012). Such a pattern seems consistent with the high 
proportion of selective, research-intensive universities that have earned AACSB accreditation, 
suggesting that unaccredited business programs at less selective, teaching-focused institutions 
and for-profit colleges are generally more expansionary and may not serve as a realistic 
comparison group.  
Table 3.4 reports difference-in-differences results for each accreditor’s impact on degree 
conferrals that account for the issues demonstrated above. To address the issues associated with 
weighting in the two-way fixed effects estimates, I use the Wald-TC estimator and include five 
post-treatment periods (accounting for treatment effect heterogeneity). Reported coefficients are 
the weighted average of treatment effects over a five-year period. These coefficients are derived 
from the preferred comparison group for each accreditor. Because of the idiosyncrasies of 
AACSB accreditation, the preferred model uses only “switchers” or programs that become 
accredited. For other accreditors, comparison groups include all degree-granting programs. As a 
robustness check, column 6 reports results based on a propensity score matching-like approach to 
derive comparison groups. These comparison groups are based on a logistic model that predicts 
accreditation status on a robust set of covariates derived from the analysis in Chapter 2. Only 
observations in the common support region are included (plots included in Supplemental 
Materials Figure 3.7A), but the weighting of observations is left to the Wald-TC estimator. 
Finally, column 4 reports the p-value for a joint test that placebo coefficients going back five 
years from treatment jointly equal zero; this test serves as a check for parallel pre-trends. 
Results on Table 3.4 show that among business programs, specialized accreditation has a 
limited effect on degree conferrals. Among switchers for AACSB at the bachelor’s level, for 
example, the treatment effect is estimated as a 2.4% increase in the number of degrees awarded. 
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The ATE for AACSB accreditation at the doctoral level is a high but imprecisely estimated 55% 
increase (e^0.441); this point estimate also fails the parallel pre-trends test. Results for ACBSP 
are reported separately for two- and four-year institutions. Findings reveal a positive and 
marginally significant estimated effect of ACBSP accreditation on associate degree production 
equivalent to an increase of 8.6% averaged over the first five years post-accreditation. At the 
four-year level, results are null across baccalaureate, master’s, and doctoral levels. Findings for 
nursing show a markedly different pattern. At the two-year level, ACEN accreditation is 
associated with a 7% increase in associate degree conferrals. The effect for baccalaureate degrees 
is much higher but results show significant divergence in pre-treatment trends. The inclusion of 
unit-specific trends and of the switcher-only samples yield null findings for the effect of ACEN 
accreditation at the bachelor’s level. Attainment of CCNE accreditation is associated with 
subsequent increases in degree conferrals at the baccalaureate, master’s, and doctoral levels 
across samples, with well-behaved parallel pre-trends.   
Event study estimates reported in Figures 3.3 through 3.6 illustrate the heterogeneous 
effects of accreditation on degree conferral over time. Among AACSB-accredited programs, 
seemingly null average effects are the result of steadily increasing average treatment effects over 
time. The magnitude of the effect five years after accreditation is 6% at the bachelor’s level and 
7% for master’s degrees. Effects for doctoral degrees also increase over time but are imprecisely 
estimated because of the low number of “switchers” driving identification of each event study 
estimate. 
 Results for ACBSP are reported separately for two- and four-year institutions in Figure 
3.4. As was the case with AACSB, there is something of a lag between accreditation and 
observed changes in enrollment, with larger coefficients in later post-accreditation years; 
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estimated ATE two to five years from accreditation are almost twice the magnitude of short-run 
effects. show apart from baccalaureate, where results suggest that degree conferrals decrease 
relative to unaccredited programs and do so at a steady pace. This is a somewhat surprising 
finding to be discussed later.  
 The same pattern repeats for CCNE accreditation. For bachelor’s degrees, the effect 
ranges from 4 to 10% and is higher for later periods. Effects are larger at the graduate level, 
reaching as 17% for master’s degrees and 55% for doctoral degrees in the later event study 
estimates. Caution is warranted when interpreting event study estimates for doctoral degrees 
because of the small number of programs accredited for more than a few years as CCNE only 
began accrediting such programs in 2002. The pattern of coefficients is consistent with the 
somewhat constrained ability to grow baccalaureate cohorts in the short run that many nursing 
programs face and with the professionalization and credentialization of the nursing profession 
that AACN has advocated for since founding CCNE (AACN, 2004). For ACEN accreditation, 
event study estimates show a more constant treatment effect over time at the associate’s level, 
which seems consistent with the shorter duration of such programs. The estimates for bachelor’s 
degrees clearly illustrate the absence of parallel pre-trends that precludes interpreting these 
coefficients as causal.  
As an additional robustness check, panel A of Table 3.6 reports results for the association 
of accreditation in business or nursing with degree conferrals in an unrelated field (psychology 
for four-years, liberal arts for two-years). Results lend further credence to the estimates presented 
in this section. For example, they suggest that AACSB and CCNE accreditation are uncorrelated 
with baccalaureate degree conferrals in psychology (but are for their respective fields) and that 
ACBSP accreditation in not associated with conferrals of associate’s degrees in the liberal arts. 
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These results suggest that there is no confounding relationship between specialized accreditation 
and a secular increase in degree conferrals generally. 
In an environment of increased scrutiny and calls for accountability in higher education, 
third-party validation of academic programs can become a signal desirable to administrators 
pursuing legitimacy in a competitive enrollment environment and to prospective students facing 
uncertain and complex educational decisions. Business and nursing are fields with longstanding 
accreditation practices facing fundamental questions about the impact that accreditors have on 
the field. Research question 1 focuses on the impact that accreditation has in programs’ degree 
conferrals. For business, I find that AACSB accreditation may increases degree conferrals in the 
long run among programs liable to seek such accreditation in the first place – with effects of 
large magnitude at the master’s level, which may come with significant revenue implications. 
AACSB accreditation carries significant prestige and is a prerequisite for inclusion in many 
rankings of business schools; the organization also places significant (though diminishing) 
emphasis on research. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that AACSB-accredited programs see 
increased degree conferrals relative to peer programs yet to attain such recognition.  
Results for ACBSP stand in contrast to those for AACSB, as there was a negative effect 
on degree conferrals at the baccalaureate and null for higher degree levels. ACBSP lacks the 
recognition and prestige that AACSB possesses, accrediting business programs mostly at less 
selective regional comprehensive and for-profit institutions. Though these may be programs best 
positioned to expand enrollments, it seems to be the case that ACBSP is not a sufficient 
differentiator to do so. Programs pursuing accreditation in response to falling enrollments could 
also account for the negative effects observed at the bachelor’s level, though placebo tests 
suggest degree conferrals have trends similar to unaccredited programs before accreditation. To 
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the extent that specialized accreditation carries costs, it is incumbent on academic leaders to 
identify what about ACBSP accreditation justifies those costs – increased enrollment (as proxied 
by degree conferrals) likely an unsupported justification for four-year institutions. I do find a 
positive and meaningful effect of ACBSP accreditation on two-year programs. Two-year 
institutions are open-access and thus may be more able and willing to grow programs in response 
to increased demand. Community colleges are also highly responsive to the quality improvement 
mandates of accreditors (Head & Johnson, 2011), so it is possible that improvements to 
programmatic performance partly account for increased degree conferrals. 
 Nursing provides a somewhat different story, as I find positive effects of sizable 
magnitude on degree conferrals across degree levels. Nursing is a more professionalized field 
than business, with aspiring nurses’ career prospects governed by licensure requirements at the 
state and federal levels. Eligibility for the NCLEX exam, for example, generally requires 
graduation from a program that is either accredited or approved a state’s Board of Nursing (or 
both). So, it is unsurprising that programs attaining accreditation that directly aligns to licensure 
exams and to graduates’ eligibility to practice would increase degree conferrals. As was the case 
in business, the magnitude of the effect on degree conferrals varies by accreditor. CCNE has 
experienced significant growth in terms of programs accredited, while ACEN appears to have 
somewhat shifted in focus. Since 1985, ACEN has accredited about three times as many two-
year programs as baccalaureate programs, whereas CCNE has made significant and quick 
headway to become the leading accreditor of four-year and graduate-level nursing programs – 
including numerous accelerated nursing programs (AACN, 2019). These trends for both 
accreditors have allowed each to remain relevant rather than purely compete. A growing share of 
the nursing profession graduates from two-year associate degree programs after substantial time 
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in other careers or out of the workforce or via accelerated (12-18 months) baccalaureate 
programs designed for holders of four-year degrees (Auerbach et al., 2007). The willingness of 
both accreditors to work with for-profit providers has also proven critical as those institutions 
account for a growing share of nursing degrees granted annually.  
Accreditation and instructional costs 
 Because of the sample size limitations associated with the Delaware Cost Study, 
estimates for the relationship between costs and accreditation are presented for difference-in-
differences models only (no event study estimates). Table 3.5 reports the estimated effect that 
each accreditor has on instructional costs. I find that AACSB accreditation results in a 13 percent 
increase in instructional costs when compared to all business programs and among switchers 
only. Program-specific trends attenuate the magnitude of the relationship to an increase of 8%. 
Unit-specific trends control for any time trends at the program level that could affect the 
outcome, but they carry a high cost in terms of degrees of freedom and introduce the risk of 
overfitting the model, obscuring the effect of accreditation on costs by leaving too little 
unexplained variation (see, e.g., Kahn-Lang and Lang, 2020 and Wolfers, 2006). For CCNE 
accreditation, I find a small and statistically insignificant estimated effect ranging in magnitude 
from 0.05 to 2.7%. Robustness checks reported in panel B of Table 3.6 appear to rule out two 
potential threats to identification. First, a placebo test (shifting the timing of treatment by four 
years) finds no effect of the placebo accreditation on costs, suggesting that trends are parallel 
absent accreditation. Second, an analysis of a non-equivalent outcome (instructional costs in 
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psychology) finds that accreditation by either body is uncorrelated with changes to costs of an 
unrelated discipline.  
 As far back as the 1950s, critics already expressed concern over the costs of accreditation 
(Pinkham, 1955). Most criticism over specialized accreditation centers on its direct costs – the 
multiple fees that institutions are assessed and the time they must spend documenting 
compliance with accreditation standards. This paper adds to our understanding of the costs of 
specialized accreditation by documenting its impact on instructional costs. It is certainly true that 
AACSB accreditation carries direct costs through membership and annual fees and other 
associated expenses. As shown above, however, this accreditor has a causal effect on 
instructional costs themselves, making each credit hour of instruction on average 13 percent 
more expensive. This increase is driven largely by an increase to faculty salaries (around 0.08, se 
= 0.029), a slight reduction in workload, and no offsetting increase in class sizes (reported in the 
second panel of Table 3.6). As espoused by AACSB, qualified faculty hold field-specific 
terminal credentials and are active in research. It is unsurprising that these faculty command 
higher salaries and thus increase instructional costs. Given the large increase in degree conferrals 
observed in RQ1 and the presence of tuition differentials for business programs at many of the 
public institutions AACSB accredits (Stange, 2014), accredited business schools may easily 
offset these increased costs. What remains unclear, however, is the impact of these rather costly 
accreditation standards on learning. Students in programs accredited by AACSB experience 
larger class sizes and are more likely to be taught by non-tenure track faculty, which prior 
research suggests may carry some downsides to students (Bedard & Kuhn, 2008; Kokkelenberg 
et al., 2008).  
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 In the case of nursing, CCNE accreditation leads to small, essentially null impacts on 
costs. These results are consistent across samples (all program and among switchers only) and 
are most attenuated in the model including program-specific trends. Though this finding may 
seem surprising given the numerous criteria that CCNE espouses, it makes sense in context of 
the history of accreditation in nursing. CCNE is a relatively new accreditor that has drawn most 
of its accredited member programs away from ACEN at the baccalaureate and graduate level. 
Importantly, “the criteria and procedures for the two accrediting bodies are essentially similar” 
(Belack et al., 1999, p. 42). These criteria are not prescriptive, giving programs significant 
leeway in demonstrating that they are met. CCNE states that it identifies programs that engage in 
effective educational practices with a focus on collegiality and continuous quality improvement 
and in the context of each institution’s mission. As such, programs that already complied with 
ACEN standards (and to Board of Nursing requirements) before switching to CCNE should not 
face significant increases to instructional costs. In addition to Board of Nursing approval, 
unaccredited nursing programs housed within institutionally accredited institutions are also 
subject to continuous quality improvement and program review practices common at most 
colleges and universities in the United States. In other words, the comparison group or 
counterfactual condition to CCNE accreditation is not so dissimilar from having such 
accreditation in terms of instructional costs.  
Conclusion 
 Higher education has come to face increased scrutiny and calls for accountability in an 
era of growing skepticism about its value. In such an environment, third-party validation of 
quality can be a valuable signal desirable to administrators pursuing legitimacy in a competitive 
enrollment environment and to prospective students making decisions based on opaque 
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information about academic programs. Professional associations seeking to safeguard benefits to 
members of their professions continue their efforts to codify professional knowledge in higher 
education curricula as specialized accreditation expands within and across fields. Highly 
selective elite business programs continue to sort into the prestigious accreditation of AACSB, 
though striving middle-selectivity institutions have also pursued this accreditation – especially as 
AACSB has relaxed some of its standards to take a more mission-centered approach to 
accreditation. In contrast, ACBSP has come to accredit many institutions seeking to legitimate 
themselves: the least selective colleges and universities, along with the for-profit sector. In 
nursing, accreditation is similarly stratified as CCNE has quickly come to dominate in the 
baccalaureate and graduate levels while ACEN holds a monopoly on accreditation at the two-
year level.  
This paper provides arguably well-identified answers to two questions: do academic 
programs benefit from specialized accreditation through increased degree production? On the 
other hand, does specialized accreditation increase costs to academic programs? On the former, 
evidence suggests that degree conferrals do respond to specialized accreditation across fields 
with varying magnitude by degree level and accreditors. A vexing limitation is the lack of clarity 
around the mechanism by which degree conferrals increase. Does accreditation improve quality 
and lead to greater production of degrees, attract more prospective students, or a combination of 
the two? Here we can gain some insight by considering the case of nursing more carefully. As 
CCNE quickly drew nursing programs away from ACEN accreditation without meaningfully 
affecting costs and while enforcing similar standards, it seems plausible that its effect on degree 
conferrals comes from its signaling value – after all, little else appears to change. For business, I 
find that AACSB increases both degree conferrals and instructional costs. To the extent that 
 
 109 
expenditures on instruction are a (weak) proxy for the quality of instruction, it remains unclear 
what channel(s) may be driving the increase in conferrals. However, data from DCS does suggest 
that though AACSB faculty are paid more, students do not experience either smaller class sizes 
or more instruction by tenure-track faculty. I interpret this pattern as again suggestive that 
signaling, rather (or to a greater extent) than the quality associated with accreditation is the main 
driver of observed effects. The impact on degree conferrals for ACBSP and for ACEN, on the 
other hand, were concentrated in the two-year sector, where I lack detailed information to 
explore mechanisms more deeply.  
 The preceding chapter mapped the evolution of accreditation in these two fields and how 
programs have come to sort into different accreditors. The chapter at hand should provide 
academic leaders facing decisions regarding accreditation with some parameters that make that a 
more informed choice. Left unaddressed, however, is the long-standing question of whether (and 
how) specialized accreditors improve programmatic quality. It remains the central claim of 
accreditors to justify their outsized role in higher education and is a critical area for future 
research. For highly credentialed fields such as nursing, it may be plausible to investigate how 
graduates of these programs fare in licensure exam and professional practice. In less 
professionalized fields like business, research may be more constrained to graduate outcomes 
like earnings. In cases of true desperation, researchers may even resort of rankings of academic 
programs as a measure of quality. However limited, research in this area remains desperately 
needed and can build on studies such as the present one by shifting the focus from programs to 
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Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics by Accreditation Status in 2015. 
A. Business 











Control      
Public 0.68 0.26 0.17 0.98 0.81 
Not-for-profit 0.32 0.54 0.62 0.01 0.04 
For-profit 0.00 0.21 0.20 0.01 0.15 
Minority-serving Status      
HBCU 0.05 0.12 0.03   
Predominantly Black 0.01 0.02 0.02   
Hispanic Serving 0.10 0.09 0.09   
Selectivity (Barron's)      
Noncompetitive 0.01 0.08 0.06   
Less competitive 0.08 0.22 0.15   
Competitive 0.43 0.53 0.50   
Very competitive 0.29 0.16 0.20   
Highly competitive 0.10 0.01 0.04   
Most competitive 0.08 0.01 0.01   
Size      
Fall FTE enrollment 14,116.7 4,775.9 2,732.9 5,537.8 3,479.9 
 (14,749.2) (1,310.8) (7,818.6) (6,092.0) (5,196.5) 
Undergrad biz degrees 436.8 196.4 96.0 112.8 73.5 
 (409.4) (541.4) (213.1) (185.1) (119.7) 
Finances      
Tuition and fees 16,655.4 17,544.6 18,920.1 3,928.0 4,642.8 
 (14,599.9) (9,956.5) (10,565.5) (2395.2) (3,886.6) 
Instructional $/FTE 11,384.3 6,884.7 7,511.9 5,889.6 6,011.8 
 (8070.1) (3,143.9) (5,620.2) (1,796.6) (2,796.1) 















Control      
Public 0.56 0.44 0.23 0.89 0.64 
Not-for-profit 0.41 0.53 0.40 0.09 0.12 
For-profit 0.03 0.03 0.37 0.02 0.23 
Minority-serving Status      
HBCU 0.11 0.01 0.03   
Predominantly Black 0.03 0.01 0.01   
Hispanic Serving 0.07 0.10 0.15   
Selectivity (Barron's)      
Noncompetitive 0.13 0.02 0.07   
Less competitive 0.29 0.11 0.14   
Competitive 0.48 0.51 0.57   
Very competitive 0.09 0.25 0.18   
Highly competitive 0.01 0.04 0.03   
Most competitive 0.00 0.03 0.00   
Size      
Fall FTE enrollment 4,818.3 9,149.1 6547.6 5,058.8 4,409.0 
 (5,202.8) (13,538.8) (18,762.0) (5,532.1) (8,146.0) 
Undergrad nursing degrees 77.1 161.0 94.3 91.3 61.4 
 (83.1) (388.8) (153.4) (83.2) (89.1) 
Finances      
Tuition and fees 12,997.3 18,020.4 14,185.3 4,980.0 6,173.9 
 (10,203.4) (11,775.5) (9,313.0) (4,889.0) (6,004.2) 
Instructional $/FTE 7,695.7 10,095.3 6,947.7) 6,495.5 6,329.4 
 (3,070.0) (8,400.3) (6,595.7) (3,234.8) (3,758.7) 
Notes: Statistics for reporting year 2014-2015 by accreditation status in year 2015. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Source: Author’s calculations from accreditation data and IPEDS.
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Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Costs and Cost Drivers by Accreditation Status. 
















Pct. undergraduate 0.88 0.87 0.81 0.84 
Pct. graduate 0.12 0.13 0.20 0.17 
























Average class size     
















Share of instruction by faculty rank     
Tenure track 0.50 0.53 0.36 0.47 
Other regular 0.27 0.18 0.44 0.34 
Supplemental 0.22 0.30 0.20 0.19 
Teaching Assistants 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: Statistics for pooled cross-section of survey years 2015-2017 by accreditation status in year 2015. Standard deviations in 
parentheses. Salaries in 2015 dollars. 
Source: Author’s calculations from accreditation and Delaware Cost Study data. 
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Table 3.3 Naïve Difference-in-Differences Results for Impact of AACSB Accreditation on 
Business Degree Conferrals. 
DV: Logged Degree 
Conferrals 
Coefficients (SEs) 
Baccalaureate Master’s Doctoral 
AACSB Accredited -0.133*** -0.087~ -0.119 
 (0.030) (0.050) (0.175) 
N 43,009 24,928 4,048 
Adj R-Squared 0.89 0.84 0.66 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Institution FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Models include no additional covariates and are estimated by two-way fixed effects 
regression. Standard errors clustered by institution. ~p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 









Table 3.4 Difference-in-Differences Results for Impact of Specialized Accreditation on 
Degree Conferral (preferred model and sample). 







































































0.610 2,041 0.437* 
(0.157) 
1,840 
Notes: Models include no additional covariates and are estimated by the Wald-TC estimator 
proposed by de Chaisemartin & d'Haultfoeuille (2019). Standard errors estimated via 50 
bootstrap iterations and clustered by institution. ~p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 




Table 3.5 Difference-in-Differences Results for Impact of Specialized Accreditation on 
Instructional Costs. 
DV: Logged Instructional 





Accredited 0.127** 0.129** 0.077 0.027 0.022 0.005 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.058) (0.047) (0.041) (0.037) 
Program FEs Yes Yes 
Year FEs Yes Yes 
Program-specific trends No No Yes No No Yes 
Sample All Switchers All All Switchers All 
Adj R-Squared 0.722 0.718 0.859 0.560 0.573 0.760 
N 3,226 2,263 3,226 2,128 1,745 2,128 
 
DV: Logged Cost Driver… Coefficients for AACSB 
Accredited 
Salary 0.073*  
(0.031) 
Workload -0.054  
(0.113) 
Class Size -0.036  
(0.029) 
Notes: Models include no additional covariates and are estimated by two-way fixed effects 
regression. Standard errors clustered by institution. ~p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 





Table 3.6 Robustness Checks for Degree Conferrals and Instructional Costs Using Nonequivalent Outcomes. 
a. Degree Conferrals 
Accred Level -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
AACSB 4-yr 
-0.003 -0.003 0.016 0.014 0.017 -0.012 -0.009 -0.007 0.038 0.060 0.019 
(0.032) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.031) (0.029) (0.039) (0.045) (0.037) 
ACBSP 
2-yr 
0.051 0.002 0.000 0.035 0.051 0.108 0.104 0.095 0.062 0.090 0.076 
(0.051) (0.065) (0.058) (0.047) (0.053) (0.050) (0.052) (0.059) (0.067) (0.081) (0.076) 
4-yr 
-0.002 -0.017 0.025 0.078 0.016 -0.015 -0.051 0.081 0.016 -0.019 -0.014 
(0.037) (0.034) (0.032) (0.036) (0.031) (0.034) (0.040) (0.040) (0.045) (0.049) (0.046) 
ACEN 
2-yr 
-0.066 0.056 -0.008 0.142 0.030 0.024 0.063 0.043 0.143 0.128 0.051 
(0.031) (0.040) (0.027) (0.060) (0.058) (0.047) (0.051) (0.074) (0.076) (0.098) (0.084) 
4-yr 
-0.092 -0.159 -0.185 0.235 -0.004 -0.041 -0.241 -0.029 -0.148 -0.085 -0.171 
(0.071) (0.123) (0.285) (0.258) (0.110) (0.104) (0.145) (0.062) (0.111) (0.105) (0.101) 
CCNE 4-yr 
0.000 -0.016 -0.012 0.014 0.010 -0.040 -0.010 -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 0.001 
(0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023) 
Notes: Outcome is (logged) degrees conferred in psychology for four-year level and liberal arts for two-year level. Models based on 
preferred specifications and samples for each accreditor. SEs estimated via 50 bootstrap iterations. ~p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; 
***p<.001. 





b. Instructional Costs 
DV: Logged Instructional 





Accredited -0.034 -0.036 0.013 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.048) (0.032) (0.029) (0.032) 
Program FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Program-specific trends No No Yes No No Yes 
Sample All Switchers All All Switchers All 
Adj R-Squared 0.788 0.799 0.904 0.822 0.830 0.914 
N 3,014 2,157 3,004 1,971 1,626 1,971 
 
 
DV: Logged Instructional 
costs per credit in 
Business/Nursing (Placebo) 
AACSB CCNE 
Placebo Accreditation Indicator 0.043 -0.009 
 (0.072) (0.064) 
Program FEs Yes Yes 
Year FEs Yes Yes 
Adj R-Squared 0.602 0.615 
N 1,106 710 
Notes: Models include no additional covariates and are estimated by two-way fixed effects regression. Placebo accreditation defined 
as four years before actual accreditation. Standard errors clustered by institution. ~p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 










Notes: Left panels reflect the number of programs earning initial accreditation each year; right 
panels plot the overall number of accredited programs as of each year. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on information derived from accreditors’ websites. 
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Figure 3.2 Naïve Event Study Estimates for Effect of AACSB Accreditation on Logged 
Business Degree Conferrals. 
 
Notes: Coefficients estimated by two-way fixed effects model with no additional covariates. 
Estimates refer to baccalaureate degrees only. Sample includes all degree-granting business 
programs. Standard errors clustered by institution. 95% confidence interval plotted. 














Notes: Models include no additional covariates and use the Wald-TC estimator. Sample includes 
AACSB switchers only. Standard errors estimated by 50 bootstrap replications and clustered by 
institution. 95% confidence interval plotted. 
Source: Author’s calculations from accreditation and IPEDS data. 
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Figure 3.4 Event Study Estimates of ACBSP Accreditation and Business Degree 
Conferrals. 
A. Associate’s B. Bachelor’s 
  
C. Master’s D. Doctoral 
  
Notes: Models include no additional covariates and use the Wald-TC estimator. Sample includes 
unaccredited programs and ACBSP switchers only. Standard errors estimated by 50 bootstrap 
replications and clustered by institution. 95% confidence interval plotted. 












Notes: Models include no additional covariates and use the Wald-TC estimator. Sample includes 
unaccredited programs and CCNE switchers. Standard errors estimated by 50 bootstrap 
replications and clustered by institution. 95% confidence interval plotted. 










Notes: Models include no additional covariates and use the Wald-TC estimator. Sample includes 
all degree-granting nursing programs. Standard errors estimated by 50 bootstrap replications and 
clustered by institution. 95% confidence interval plotted. 





 The six figures below plot the common support area for the matched sample used as a robustness check for the degree 
conferral analysis. 
Figure 3.7A Distribution of Accreditation Propensity Scores. 
a. ACBSP 2-year b. ACBSP 4-year c. AACSB 
   
d. ACEN 2-year e. ACEN 4-year f. CCNE 
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These program-specific probabilities of (ever) attaining accreditation are estimated by logistic 
regression. At the four-year level, the regression includes covariates accounting for institutional 
control, HBCU status, predominantly Black-serving institution status, Hispanic-Serving 
institution status, Barron’s selectivity category, enrollment, and field-specific degree conferrals. 
For two-year programs, covariates include transfer intensity (measured by Carnegie class), 
enrollment, and field-specific degree conferrals. Time-varying covariates are measured in 1985, 
the beginning of the panel.   
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Chapter 4 Like Any Other Trap: The Circuitous Path of Student Loan Repayment 1 
 
Postsecondary credentials are more critical than ever for economic security and social 
mobility as the employment prospects of individuals without a college degree continue to 
deteriorate (Ma et al., 2016). An ever-increasing share of jobs and employers expect prospective 
employees to have earned at least some postsecondary credential. This “credentialism” has 
recently been framed as a key driver behind the growth of student debt (e.g., McMillan Cottom, 
2017; Morgan & Steinbaum, 2018). Even as employers demand more educated workers, 
investing in one’s college education has become riskier: Completion rates remain stagnant 
(Bound et al., 2010) and students bear a growing share of education costs (Desrochers & 
Hurlburt, 2016) financed largely through student loans (Akers & Chingos, 2016).  Millions of 
borrowers face significant challenges repaying those loans (Looney & Yannelis, 2015), with 
much of this burden borne disproportionately by students historically underserved by higher 
education.  
 The culmination of these trends is a student loan system in distress. As outstanding 
balances edge over $1.7 trillion2 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2020), the 
rising credentialization of the labor market obscures that median earnings are essentially stagnant 
or declining even for holders of college or graduate degrees—earnings have just declined even 
 
 
1 This chapter is coauthored with KC Deane, Brian McCall, and Stephen DesJardins. An authorship statement is 
included in Supplemental Materials. 
2 Over the years of drafting this paper we have revised this number upward by more than a quarter-trillion dollars. It 
is sure to be out of date by publication. 
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more sharply for those with no college (Morgan & Steinbaum, 2018). Though this pattern leads 
some to argue that the college earnings premium is at an all-time high, the debt many incur to 
finance their education leaves them in a precarious financial position. Many borrowers face high 
student loan payments soon after leaving college when their earnings are lower than their full 
potential (Dynarski & Kreisman, 2013). It is no surprise, then, that there is a student loan 
“repayment crisis” (Dynarski, 2014, p. 2): Upwards of 30% of borrowers default within five 
years (Mueller & Yannelis, 2017) and more than half of borrowers do not pay down any of their 
principal balance within three years (Kelchen & Li, 2017). In fact, many borrowers—57% of 
those entering repayment in 2012—owe more on student loans after two years of payments than 
they did initially, accruing interest faster than they pay down their loans (Looney & Yannelis, 
2015). 
 This paper analyzes student loan repayment as a longitudinal process by constructing 
repayment histories for a nationally representative sample of borrowers from initial college 
enrollment for up to twelve years post-college. These histories capture a stretch of individuals’ 
lives through formative ages. Rather than focusing on single loan events such as default, the unit 
of analysis is the borrowers’ entire sequence and duration of events that borrowers experience 
during repayment. The findings indicate that borrowers carry student loans for long stretches of 
time and have their progress toward repayment frequently interrupted by cycles of deferment, 
forbearance or negative amortization, and default. Frequently cited metrics of the “repayment 
crisis” understate the struggles and racial disparities of student loan repayment when considering 
longer periods of time and accounting for the complex array of repayment events that borrowers 
can experience. Drawing on these findings, reform efforts—be they student loan forgiveness, 
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renewed institutional accountability regimes, or financial aid packaging and counseling—can 
account for a more complete picture of loan repayment. 
We identify five common archetypes of repayment histories. Two of these groups, which 
we call persistent defaulters and perpetual payers, experience perhaps the most adverse 
repayment histories; the former has frequent and long-lasting spells of unresolved student loan 
default, whereas the latter alternates between repaying loans and spells of deferment and 
forbearance. Both groups owe more on average at the end of the observation period than when 
they begin repayment. Two clusters, dubbed rapid full payers, late full payers, take different 
routes to fully repaying their loans. The first group has the lowest loan balances among all 
borrowers and reaches full repayment quickly. The second group takes longer to repay their 
loans fully and goes through stretches of deferment, forbearance, and default before doing so. 
The final group of borrowers, consolidators, uses consolidation to settle their original debt 
quickly in their repayment period, but face new repayment obligations on those consolidated 
loans. No group is immune from adverse loan outcomes, with at least 10% of borrowers in each 
cluster defaulting on loans and 51% or more having periods of negative amortization or 
forbearance. Black students, Pell recipients, first-generation college-goers, students at for-profit 
institutions, and students who do not earn a credential are disproportionately represented among 
persistent defaulters. White borrowers are over-represented among full payer and consolidator 
clusters. Baccalaureate-degree recipients are over-represented among perpetual payers and 
consolidators, with for-profit students also concentrated in the latter.  
Literature Review 
 Student loans are integral to higher education finance, comprising one-third of the total 
aid the average student received in 2018-2019 (College Board, 2019). Loans account for as much 
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as two-thirds of federal spending on postsecondary aid, owing to the growing prevalence of 
borrowing, higher amounts borrowed by students, and stagnant spending on grant aid (Akers & 
Chingos, 2016). Though overall borrowing has declined slightly since 2014, the long-term trend 
is unambiguous: From 1990 to 2008, the percentage of undergraduates borrowing almost 
doubled from 19 to 35% while total federal loan dollars tripled over the same period (Avery & 
Turner, 2012). Completers of bachelor’s degrees in 2018 owed on average $16,800—or $29,000 
among the 58% of graduates who borrowed (College Board, 2019). Coinciding with this increase 
in borrowing was a deterioration of student loan repayment, whether measured by incidence of 
delinquency or default (Looney & Yannelis, 2015), institutional cohort default rates (Looney & 
Yannelis, 2019), or negative amortization on loans (College Board, 2019; Looney & Yannelis, 
2015). 
Taking on Student Debt 
 Aggregate debt statistics obscure the variation across students. Of particular concern is 
the way that debt accumulates for historically minoritized students. A large body of research has 
documented that Black students leave college with a disproportionate share of student debt (e.g., 
Goldrick-Rab et al., 2014, Despard et al., 2016; Hillman, 2015; Price, 2004) and such disparities 
grow over time. Addo et al. (2016) found that by age 25, Black students have loan burdens that 
are 68% higher than their White counterparts, or 40% higher when controlling for institutional 
characteristics and familial contributions to college expenses (Addo et al., 2016). Houle and 
Addo (2019) documented that the Black-White disparity in student debt “increases across the 
early adult life course from around the early 20s to mid-30s” (p. 571), accounting for close to 
one-quarter of the wealth gap between the two groups at age 30. Studying a sample of college 
entrants in 2004, Scott-Clayton and Li (2016) noted that the initial difference in debt of $7,400 
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between Black and White students at graduation triples within four years, owing largely to debt 
accumulated for graduate education and accrued interest.  
Student debt disproportionately burdens other marginalized populations, including first-
generation college-goers (Furquim et al., 2017; Javine, 2013) and women, who hold almost two-
thirds of student loan balances (American Association of University Women, 2017, 2020; Kaba, 
2017). An exception is that Latinx college students borrow at lower rates than their peers 
(Cunningham & Santiago, 2008) and currently have lower levels of indebtedness (Taylor et al., 
2020). McDonough et al. (2015) found that borrowing decisions among Latinx students are 
familial rather than individual and are closely tied to “[p]arents’ trust perceptions of financial 
institutions” (p. 144), resulting in heightened loan aversion (Elengold et al., 2020). 
 The sorting of students across institutions partly shapes the distribution of debt. Perhaps 
most notable is the high level of debt in the for-profit sector, which in 2009-2010 enrolled 14% 
of students but accounted for 25% of loan disbursements (Jaquette & Hillman, 2015). Cellini and 
Darolia (2017) demonstrated that observed student and institution characteristics explain less 
than 40% of the difference in the incidence and amount of borrowing by for-profit enrollees. 
Though the for-profit sector is responsible for the highest levels of indebtedness, debt has risen 
across higher education, including at public institutions that have historically had lower levels of 
debt (College Board, 2019). The divestment of states from public higher education, particularly 
during the Great Recession (Desrochers & Hurlburt, 2016), has resulted in an accelerating “cost-
shifting from public subsidies to individual payments in higher education” (Barr & Turner, 2013, 
p. 168) likely to intensify due to the budgetary effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The 
disparities in borrowing across student characteristics and sectors of higher education are 
mutually reinforcing given the stratified nature of postsecondary enrollment, as minoritized 
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students are more likely to attend the least well-resourced public institutions (Carnevale et al., 
2018) and higher-cost for-profit colleges (Iloh & Toldson, 2013). 
 In the absence of sufficient federal and state efforts to curb tuition increases, student 
loans have become integral to higher education affordability and seem, in most cases, justified by 
borrowers’ expected returns to higher education (Avery & Turner, 2012). Student loans can also 
positively affect student outcomes beyond college access. Marx and Turner (2019) used a 
randomized controlled trial to vary the information provided to students about student loans at a 
community college, finding that higher loan offers increased borrowing but also grade point 
averages, credit accumulation, and transfer rates to four-year institutions. Analyzing the 
consequences of increased student borrowing limits, Black et al. (2020) found that greater loan 
availability enabled credit-constrained students to borrow more, improved short-term academic 
attainment (congruent with Barr et al., 2019 and Wiederspan, 2016), and increased degree 
completion, earnings, and long-term financial well-being. These results stand in contrast to 
earlier mixed findings between loans and similar outcomes (e.g., DesJardins et al., 2002; Dowd 
& Coury, 2006; Singell, 2004), but improvements to methodology and data sources lend greater 
credence to this emerging research.  
Paying off Student Debt 
 For most borrowers, federal student loans function as mortgage-like loans carrying a 
repayment schedule of ten years with fixed payments that does not reflect the life course and 
earnings trajectories of most individuals (Chapman & Dearden, 2017). As a result, many 
borrowers frequently experience repayment trajectories more complex than standard loan terms 
suggest. Some repay loans well in advance of their 10-year term (Gonzáles Canché, 2017), 
others enroll in alternative repayment plans such as income-driven repayment (Collier et al., 
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2020), and still others consolidate their loans and start a new payment process. Borrowers also 
have their repayments interrupted by frequent transitions between schooling, employment, and 
unemployment (Monaghan, 2020), resulting in cycles of college attendance and borrowing, loan 
repayment, delinquency, default, deferment, and forbearance that stretch over many years.  
Student loan repayment is a temporal process that occurs in conjunction with an 
individual’s life circumstances like choices about career (Field, 2009; Rothstein & Rouse, 2011) 
and family formation (Bozick & Estacion, 2014; Stivers & Berman, 2020), as well as other 
financial decisions such as home ownership (Mezza et al., 2020) and starting a new business 
(Ambrose, Cordell, & Ma, 2015). However, most research into student loans is focused on the 
student- and institution-level correlates of one event: default, and in particular default occurring 
within the three-year window that defines cohort default rates (CDRs). Many of the early studies 
of default documented the correlations of student body characteristics such as race/ethnicity, Pell 
eligibility, and standardized test scores to CDRs (see Gross et al., 2009 for a summary of 30 
years of default research). Early work on CDRs generally argued that institutions played little to 
no role in students’ default outcomes (e.g., Flint, 1997; Knapp & Seaks, 1992; Monteverde, 
2000; Hakim & Rashidian, 1995). More recent studies, however, have established a clear 
relationship between the two (e.g., Darolia, 2013; Deming et al., 2012; Hillman, 2014; Ishitani & 
McKitrick, 2016; Webber & Rogers, 2014). In this newer body of research, the for-profit sector 
has emerged as consistently having the highest default rates and is associated with two to three 
times the odds of default as public institutions (Hillman, 2014). Two-year institutions also have 
high default rates, though a low incidence of borrowing (e.g., Scott-Clayton, 2018). The high 
default rate at public two-year institutions relative to public four-year institutions is largely 
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accounted for by those same covariates of student characteristics, completions, and employment 
(Hillman, 2014).  
An important confounder to loan repayment is degree attainment. Non-completers are 
more than twice as likely to default on loans than students who earn their degree (Gladieux & 
Perna, 2005; Perna et al., 2017). Following the Great Recession, enrollments and the flow of 
federal dollars via student aid programs expanded greatly among institutions with higher default 
and lower graduation rates (Jaquette & Hillman, 2015). The fastest-growing group of borrowers 
is older, independent students attending college part-time, who are primarily concentrated in the 
two sectors most available to them but also with the lowest completion and highest default rates: 
for-profit institutions and community colleges. These sectors account for about half of all new 
borrowers but 70% of all defaults (Looney & Yannelis, 2015). 
Overlooked in much of this literature are the intricate trajectories of borrowers over the 
repayment process. The typical three-year default window does not capture well even default 
itself. Scott-Clayton (2018) showed that borrowers remain at risk of default far beyond the three 
years that define the CDR; for borrowers tracked over 20 years from enrollment, 40% of defaults 
occurred 12 years or more after students begin college. These longer tracking periods reveal 
greater disparities by sector, with nearly half of all students at for-profits eventually defaulting, 
and by race, as just 20 percent of White students defaulted within 20 years compared to nearly 50 
percent of Black students (Scott-Clayton, 2018). 
Default is not a terminal status for a loan or borrower. Among defaulters, 70% eventually 
exit default, while another 17% enter default multiple times over the life of their loans (Delisle et 
al., 2018). Besides defaulting, borrowers may deviate from loan repayment through periods of 
non-payment, deferment, forbearance, or by consolidating loans. Consolidation can simplify 
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repayment of multiple loans and may provide some savings on interest, but repayment 
obligations on the consolidated loan remain and may extend loan repayment well beyond the 
typical ten-year term. Borrowers must also consider a multitude of income-driven repayment 
(IDR) plans now available. These plans may lower monthly payments and protect borrowers 
from default but at the cost of slower progress toward paying down principal balances. Less than 
half of borrowers on IDR plans pay off any principal after three years in repayment (Lacy et al., 
2018).  
Each of these numerous statuses has its own associated bureaucratic and administrative 
processes that borrowers face and, as our repayment histories show, face repeatedly. Navigating 
this system is a cost mostly absent from discussions of the student loan repayment process, but 
that may contribute to adverse outcomes. Cox et al. (2020) showed that the complicated 
messaging about student loan repayment options led many students into the standard repayment 
plan when IDR would better serve them. What mechanisms do exist to orient students appear 
ineffective: Loan entry and exit counseling are of limited utility as they are too distal from 
repayment (Baker, 2019), so that one-third of students underestimate their indebtedness 
(Andruska et al., 2014). Exit counseling has grown to encompass over 25 topics but is inadequate 
preparation for borrowers given its content and timing (Baker, 2019) and the fact that many 
borrowers simply do not complete exit counseling (Klepfer et al., 2015).  
Taken together, limitations in how prior research has treated relevant outcomes (focusing 
on single, dichotomous outcomes) and time (studying outcomes that occur early in repayment) 
present opportunities for additional research that reflects the complexity of students’ repayment 
experiences and contextualizes them. A better understanding of student loan repayment requires 
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treating repayment as a process and employing appropriate research methods to study it as such. 
Thus, we ask two research questions.  
Research Question 1 (RQ1): What patterns of student loan repayment do borrowers 
experience?  
Research Question 2 (RQ2): What student and institutional factors are associated with 
different patterns of repayment? 
The empirical approach employed to answer these questions is framed by the concepts discussed 
next. 
Conceptual Framework 
 Our empirical work provides a detailed description of the student loan repayment 
process. However, there is no integrated conceptual framework that speaks directly to this 
phenomenon. We draw from life course perspectives, which gained traction as researchers 
grappled with the patterns and structures of individuals’ lives (Elder & Rockwell, 1979). We 
conceptualize student loan repayment as possessing a lifecycle during which individuals 
experience transitions across various statuses of repayment, which are themselves partly the 
product of individuals’ contexts and higher education experiences. Our unit of analysis is not a 
repayment status at a point in time. Rather, we define the outcome of interest as the full temporal 
sequencing and duration of repayment events, in recognition that “single events should not be 
isolated from each other but have to be understood in their continuity” (Aisenbray & Fasang, 
2010, p. 421). 
 Two recent studies of higher education make use of life course perspectives. Monaghan 
(2020) studied individuals’ transitions between college enrollment, employment, and family 
formation through early adulthood. His approach revealed the trade-offs that individuals face 
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between schooling and work, how these tradeoffs evolve as individuals age, and what they imply 
for other milestones such as family formation. Such analysis makes clear the value of “moving 
from separate investigations of specific enrollment behaviors (e.g., delayed enrollment) to 
grasping how individuals combine such behaviors to form complex patterns of discontinuous 
educational participation” (p. 424). Houle and Addo’s (2019) work on the accumulation of 
student debt over early adulthood also draws on a life course perspective. The authors argue that 
“Although social scientists have suggested that social inequalities in debt are a function of 
processes that play out across the life course, cross-sectional or point-in-time debt estimates do 
not adequately reflect these processes” (p. 566). Our argument is similar: Cross-section or point-
in-time measures of repayment do not reflect the temporal experiences of borrowers. 
 Once we document borrowers’ longitudinal patterns of repayment, we use a multilevel 
framework to study the individual- and institutional-level correlates of those patterns. Following 
Hillman (2014), who argued that “default is a combination of student-level and institution-level 
factors” (p. 178), we posit that correlates of default are in fact correlates of repayment histories 
more holistically. Thus, we situate student loan repayment as the joint product of individuals, 
institutions, and educational outcomes. We map these factors temporally: pre-enrollment factors 
that are time-invariant or measured before initial enrollment; collegiate influences that occur 
during college; and post-college outcomes that unfold in parallel with repayment.  
Figure 4.1 suggests that individual characteristics such as demographics, socioeconomic 
status, financial aid use, attendance patterns, degree attainment, and labor market outcomes 
condition borrowers’ overall level of indebtedness and ability to repay. In recognition of the role 
that institutions play in influencing students’ level of debt and outcomes, we also posit that 
factors such as institutional control, level of academic offerings, selectivity, and tuition correlate 
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with student loan repayment. These variables (partly) condition where students enroll, level of 
indebtedness, degree attainment, and the labor market returns that borrowers can expect—thus 
correlating to their repayment trajectories. There is nothing particularly novel in this 
framework—prior research has long established the relationship between these factors and loan 
default, repayment rates, and overall debt. Arguably novel, however, is that we extend the unit of 
analysis from single measures of repayment at fixed points in time to holistic, longitudinal 
repayment patterns of individuals. 
Empirical Approach 
Data 
 Student and institutional characteristics. The Beginning Postsecondary Students 
2004/2009 (BPS:04/09) survey from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) is the 
data source for all measured repayment outcomes and covariates of interest. The BPS:04/09 
survey followed a nationally representative subset of respondents from the National 
Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS) from the Fall of 2003 for up to six years after initial 
enrollment. It contains information on students’ backgrounds, academic experiences, enrollment 
histories, degree attainment, and work experiences. Data were collected over three waves: at the 
end of students’ first year of enrollment followed by waves three and six years thereafter. We use 
information collected across all waves to capture the variables relevant to the conceptual 
framework. These include race/ethnicity, gender, parental education, institutions attended, 
patterns of attendance, financial aid use, degree attainment, and post-collegiate support. 
Institution-level variables are measured both for the first institution that students attend and for 
any institution ever attended; these measures include control and level of academic offerings. 
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The analytical sample focuses on borrowers only (n ~ 9,990)3 after a series of exclusions from 
the original ~ 12,040 borrowers in the BPS:04/09 sample (detailed in Supplemental Materials). 
Summary statistics for borrowers and non-borrowers are provided in Table 4.1. 
 The borrower sample differs from non-borrowers across virtually all student- and 
institution-level measures. Borrowers are more likely to be female, to be Black and Native 
Hawaiian / Pacific Islander, and to come from lower-income households than their non-borrower 
counterparts. Non-borrowers are more likely to attend lower cost institutions, including public 
colleges and universities at the two-year or less than two-year level; as a result, borrowers face 
70% higher tuition and fee charges than non-borrowers.  
Student loan repayment. The December 2017 release of the BPS added detailed student 
loan repayment records sourced from the National Student Loan Data System (NSLDS). From 
the origination of each loan, this data tracks borrowers’ principal and interest balances, loan 
payments, and instances of default, deferment, and forbearance. The data is at the student-loan-
transaction level. We construct holistic repayment histories at the student-quarter level through 
several transformations of the source data (detailed in Supplemental Materials). Each 
transformation implies a trade-off between nuance and ease of interpretation. We lose some 
detail by aggregating across loans for borrowers, and from months to quarters, but at significant 
gains in the simplicity of repayment histories and analytical clarity. We believe this trade-off is 
worthwhile because individual loans are not of interest per se, but rather the aggregated 
experiences of borrowers within the student loan system—what we term holistic repayment 
 
 
3 All numbers rounded in accordance to reporting guidelines from National Center for Education Statistics. 
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histories. These individual-level histories span 56 quarters. For each quarter, borrowers are 
assigned to one of the statuses described in Table 4.2. 
Methods 
 Research Question 1. In RQ1, we identify patterns in the trajectories of student loan 
repayment using social sequence analysis (SSA). Abbott (1995) pioneered the use of this method 
in the social sciences in his analyses of career trajectories; recent applications of this method 
include Monaghan (2020) and Humphries (2019). Social sequence analysis treats as the unit of 
analysis the entire longitudinal trajectory of repayment statuses for each borrower. The approach 
taken is a standard application of SSA: treating the temporally arranged sequence of statuses for 
each borrower as a 56-character string (given 56 quarters observed), we compute the 
(dis)similarity across each pair of strings (or pair of borrowers) and group them by similarity. 
With seven possible statuses over 56 quarters, there are 7^56 possible unique sequences, though 
only ~ 7,970 unique strings are observed in the data. Akin to cluster analysis, after constructing 
repayment histories the aim of SSA “is to reduce each sequence to some simplest form and then 
to gather all sequences with similar ‘simplest forms’ under one heading” (Abbott, 1995, p. 105). 
Cluster analysis methods apply to continuous variables; as the outcome variable in this instance 
is a string, the analysis requires some algorithm to transform strings into a numeric variable 
comparable across pairs of observations (Abbott & Tsay, 2000). We apply the standard optimal 
matching (OM) method to quantify the similarity of repayment patterns, calculate a matrix of the 
similarity of each pair of statuses, and then cluster borrowers based on that matrix.  
The OM algorithm estimates similarities by assigning a cost to the changes to a string of 
repayment status required to equalize it to another string and computing the “edit distance” – that 
is, it quantifies the “edits” required for one string to turn into another string. The costs associated 
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with these changes are defined as such: Insertions and deletions into the string each carry a cost 
of one. Because every deletion requires an insertion (and vice-versa), the cost of this operation is 
defined as two. For replacements, we follow the approach of Aassve et al. (2007) and Monaghan 
(2020), deriving the cost of replacements empirically. Rarer replacements (less likely transitions 
based on the data) carry a higher cost. For example, it is rare for a borrower to transition from the 
status of Deferment to Paid in Full, so such a replacement is more costly than the more 
frequently observed transition from Repayment to Paid in Full. Formally, as noted in Aassve et 










Equation (1) defines the probability of transitioning from status a to b for interval t to t+1 as the 
ratio of the number of individuals transitioning from a to b to the number starting in status a. The 
replacement cost between a and b is higher the less likely such transitions are: 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑎, 𝑏) = 2 − 𝑝𝑡,𝑡+1(𝑎, 𝑏) − 𝑝𝑡,𝑡+1(𝑏, 𝑎) (2) 
Note that the cost of a replacement is less than two so long as 0 < 𝑝𝑡,𝑡−1(𝑎, 𝑏) or 0 <
𝑝𝑡,𝑡−1(𝑏, 𝑎), whereas the cost of an insertion and deletion is always two. Table 4.3 reports the 
replacement costs used to compute the similarity of repayment histories. The intuition behind 
these costs is just to treat as least costly those transitions that are most frequently observed. 
Based on the costs of insertions and deletions and of replacements, we create a symmetric 
matrix with N rows and N columns (~ 9,990 by ~ 9,990 in our case) that contains the distances 
between all observed pairs of strings. In other words, the matrix contains a dissimilarity measure 
for each individual repayment history relative to every other individual repayment history. From 
this matrix, we use agglomerative clustering methods (Ward’s distance) to identify clusters of 
similar patterns. Our preferred clustering identifies five distinct clusters of holistic repayment 
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histories. We explored alternative clustering solutions ranging from three to eight clusters, which 
made it readily apparent that five maximized the between-group differentiation of the clusters.4 
 Research Question 2. After grouping borrowers into repayment history clusters, we 
study the student- and institution-level characteristics associated with each cluster. The analysis 
starts with descriptive statistics reported for each cluster. A multinomial logit model is used to 
explore conditional relationships between student and institution characteristics and repayment 
clusters. The probability of being assigned to cluster m out of j possibilities is: 
𝑙𝑛
Pr (𝑦 = 𝑚|𝑥)
Pr (𝑦 = 𝑏|𝑥)
= 𝑋′𝛽𝑚|𝑏  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑚 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝐽 
(3) 
where b designates a reference outcome (or cluster). The terms 𝑋′𝛽𝑚|𝑏 are vectors of covariates 
at the student and institution level and their associated parameters. Estimates of these parameters 
measure the relationship between each covariate and the probability of a borrower being in 
category m relative to the reference category b.  
Limitations 
 Though this analysis expands our understanding of student loan repayment histories, 
there are several limitations. First are the nuances lost in constructing such repayment histories. 
Each data transformation reduces granularity temporally (from months to quarters) and cross-
sectionally (collapsing multiple loans of each borrower). Another data limitation relates to what 
is collected by BPS:04/09. There are no survey waves past 2009 even though repayment histories 
are tracked through 2016, meaning there is little information about borrowers during repayment, 
such as earnings. Another limitation is that repayment histories are necessarily right-censored as 
 
 
4 Because three of the clusters are quite distinct from all others, all clustering solutions above five merely subdivided 
the consolidator cluster based on timing of consolidation. Solutions with fewer than five clusters obscured 
differences in the timing of loan payoff. 
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many borrowers still hold student loans past the end of 2016. We also make compromises 
between data availability and our conceptual framework and acknowledge there are likely 
variables omitted from the model. A methodological limitation is that sequence analysis is highly 
inductive, with many decisions left to researchers. Others analyzing these same data may 
construct repayment histories differently, use alternative algorithms to compare histories and 
arrive at different findings. We provide a detailed explanation of data processing steps as part of 
the Supplemental Materials.  
Results 
Visualizing Repayment Histories 
 Using the holistic repayment histories of all borrowers, Figure 4.2 displays the 
distribution of repayment statuses by quarter of initial enrollment. There is a long lag for many 
borrowers from college to repayment—it takes about 16 quarters for half of borrowers to enter 
repayment; by 24 quarters, 75% have done so. Within the observation period, about one-quarter 
of all borrowers fully repay their loans, with another ~ 25% taking on a new consolidation loans 
on which they still face payments. The proportion of borrowers in default increases 
monotonically through the first 12 years of repayment, whereas deferment peaks in the middle 
period of the panel. All borrowers begin in a pre-payment status of varying length. For clarity, 
Panel B of Figure 4.2 summarizes the length of actual repayment statuses observed across the 
sample. Over 97% of borrowers are in one of the repayment statuses for at least five years; 
approximately 50% of the sample is observed in some form of repayment for ten years. 
The status distribution plot can be subset by characteristics of interest as illustrated in 
Figure 4.3. Panel A displays status distributions for Black, Latinx, and White borrowers. The 
plots are illustrative of the higher frequency, earlier occurrence, and longer duration of default 
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for Black and Latinx students relative to their White peers. Black and Latinx borrowers are also 
more likely to defer or have negative amortization/forbearance and to do so for longer stretches 
of time, reflecting both the more variable college attendance patterns of marginalized students 
and greater economic adversity these students face. Status distribution plots for Asian and 
multiracial borrowers (available by request) reveal patterns similar to those of White and Black 
borrowers respectively. Panel B divides the sample based on for-profit attendance. Borrowers 
attending for-profit institutions (either initially or through transfer) exit pre-payment more 
rapidly, have more frequent instances of negative amortization, and default at higher rates. 
Finally, Panel C reports repayment patterns by completion status. Consistent with prior research, 
borrowers who do not complete a credential are at higher risk for adverse repayment outcomes 
such as negative amortization/forbearance and default. This group also enters deferment more 
frequently, during which borrowers may take on yet more student loans.  
Figures 2 and 3 report the share of repayment statuses by quarter (the stock). The flow of 
transitions across statuses is reported in Supplemental Materials. Some statuses are persistent, 
such as “paid in full,” as borrowers who pay off their loans are unlikely to exit that state barring 
re-enrollment and new borrowing. Perhaps more worrying is the stability of default as a status; 
the probability of exiting default in any given quarter never exceeds 0.10. Based on the NSLDS 
data for defaulters, the most likely pathway out of default is full repayment of loans through a 
lump sum payment (especially for defaulters with relatively low balances) or through a 
consolidation loan carrying its own repayment obligations. About half as frequently, borrowers 
rehabilitate loans by making the necessary number of consecutive payments. Repayment is most 
frequently interrupted by spells of deferment or negative amortization/forbearance. Such loan 
repayment interruptions are consistent with the “swirling” patterns of attendance and transfer that 
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characterize the postsecondary experiences of many students (Monaghan, 2020), particularly for 
lower-income individuals and those attending less selective or two-year institutions (e.g., 
Goldrick-Rab, 2006). Once borrowers find themselves in negative amortization/forbearance, 
about half eventually return to making payments or consolidate their loans, though an equal 
share enter default or deferment. 
Patterns of Holistic Repayment Histories 
 The next step in the analysis is to identify clusters of borrowers with similar repayment 
histories that reflect the variety of repayment trajectories observed in the data. Our preferred 
solution, based on the distinctiveness of the clusters and how parsimoniously they captured 
prevailing repayment patterns, yields five clusters. We have named the five clusters persistent 
defaulters, perpetual payers, rapid full payers, late full payers, and consolidators, and introduce 
them in Figure 4.5 and Table 4.4. Panel A of Figure 4.4 details the distribution of statuses by 
quarter for each cluster, whereas Panel B presents the repayment histories of ~ 150 representative 
borrowers in each cluster. 
Persistent defaulters account for 12% of all borrowers. The defining characteristic of the 
repayment pattern for this cluster is that all borrowers have repeated and long periods of default 
that remain unresolved through 2016. Default is preceded by multiple periods of repayment 
when borrowers do not make payments, with 72% of the time spent in repayment for this cluster 
having negative amortization or forbearance. Half of these borrowers enter this status at least 
once, with spells lasting on average 5.5 quarters. Persistent defaulters average 21 quarters in 
default; by the end of the observation period, 81% are in default whereas only 13% of these 
borrowers were able to fully repay their loans (but half do so through consolidation). This cluster 
includes the largest shares of Black (29%), Latinx (18%), and multiracial (3%) students, Pell 
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recipients (65%), and first-generation collegegoers (68%). It is also the cluster with the largest 
share of for-profit enrollees (43% attended a for-profit institution) and with the lowest degree 
attainment as 68% did not complete a credential by 2009. Almost half (47%) of all borrowers 
who ever default are persistent defaulters. 
The cluster of perpetual payers is characterized by long spells of regular loan payments 
(on average 15 quarters in the repayment status). This group seems to follow the intended 
repayment terms of federal student loans most closely, but perpetual payers still go through 
frequent deferment (60% defer at least once, spending on average 8 quarter in deferment) and 
one in ten default on loans. Twenty-nine percent of perpetual payers pay their originating loans 
in full, but 86% do so via consolidation. The high incidence of consolidation loans, deferment, 
and borrowing for graduate school (25% of this cluster takes on graduate loans) means that 
perpetual payers face repayment obligations well beyond the period of observation for this 
analysis. Their parents may face similar obligations as 22% of perpetual payers make use of 
Parent PLUS loans as well. This is the largest cluster, accounting for 38% of borrowers, and the 
most highly educated with 42% of perpetual payers earning a baccalaureate degree, 11% earning 
an associate degree, and 7% earning a certificate. Borrowers in this cluster also reported the 
highest family income at the start of college (~ $49,000).  
The next two clusters comprise borrowers who fully repay their loans but took different 
pathways to do so. Rapid full payers (13% of borrowers) repay their loans quickly, spending on 
average less than 6 quarters in repayment. This cluster has the lowest level of indebtedness, 
owing ~ $7,400 on average. The low levels of debt are partly explained by shorter college 
attendance: 47% of rapid full payers left college with no credentials or with a short-term 
certificate (15%) and relatively few entered deferment. Approximately 17% of borrowers in this 
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cluster defaulted on their loans and subsequently made a single lumpsum payment to resolve 
their default. Late full payers (16% of borrowers), on the other hand, experience long spells of 
repayment (an average of 14 quarters) with a low incidence of negative 
amortization/forbearance. Deferment and default are rare among this group, so their spells of 
repayment are generally uninterrupted and terminate with eventual payment in full.  
Finally, 22% of borrowers are consolidators who pay off their original student loans by 
taking on a consolidation loan. This typically occurs quite quickly once borrowers exit the pre-
payment status; on average, consolidators spend less than four quarters in repayment (and on 
average experience negative amortization during that period) before consolidating. Thirty-four 
percent of these borrowers initially enrolled in the for-profit sector, the second-highest rate, and 
28% enrolled in two-year institutions, the lowest rate among clusters. Consolidators have the 
highest level of degree attainment, as 61% of them had earned a credential by 2009. But half go 
through periods of negative amortization, and 15% of them default at least once. The cluster also 
has the highest reported use of private loans (45%) and may face complicated financial decisions 
regarding student loan payment. Using NSLDS data to track the status of (most) consolidated 
loans, we found that 20% of consolidators paid off their consolidated loans, with 40% still in 
repayment at the end of 2016. In other words, one in five consolidators resemble late full payers, 
while 40% mirror perpetual payers.  
Borrowers’ loan balances reflect the distinct repayment trajectories of each cluster. 
Figure 4.5 plots the average total amount owed (principal and interest) over time, tracked from 
and indexed to the quarter when borrowers first leave pre-payment, for up to eight years (sample 
sizes become small past 32 quarters). Persistent defaulters have increasing loan balances after 
entering repayment, driven by compounding unpaid interest on default loans, fees associated 
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with loans, and additional loans taken out during deferment spells of re-enrollment. As a result, 
persistent defaulters owe, on average, 30% more eight years after they first start repaying loans 
than they did originally. Perpetual payers also appear to make little progress toward reducing 
their indebtedness, owing about 10% more eight years after they begin repayment than they did 
initially and likely much more considering the high usage of graduate loans among these 
borrowers. This cluster also shows the highest usage of income-driven repayment (14%), which 
can account for the slow progress in paying down debt and has implications for eventual loan 
forgiveness through IDR plans.  
Rapid full payers exhibit a sharp reduction in outstanding balances within the first four 
quarters in repayment, with average balances declining quickly. Within five years of entering 
repayment, this cluster has mean outstanding loans that are essentially zero, with few borrowers 
carrying any balance after that point. Part of the reason for the rapid decline in average balances 
is that many of these borrowers make full lumpsum payments, in some cases after default. Late 
full payers exhibit a smoother continuous decline in average outstanding balances; by that same 
five-year mark, this cluster had paid off 60% of their total loan balances. Finally, the loan 
balances of consolidators indicate a sharp drop in balances within one or two quarters of entering 
repayment, caused by borrowers that are quick to consolidate. Average outstanding balances 
decrease linearly from that point as additional borrowers in this cluster consolidate after 
infrequent and brief periods of repayment, deferment, or default. Because balances on 
consolidated loans are not consistently observed, it cannot be determined whether these 
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borrowers are progressing toward repayment similarly, more quickly, or more slowly than 
perpetual payers.  
Modeling cluster characteristics 
Table 4.4 reports descriptive statistics for each cluster, but to disentangle the conditional 
relationship between characteristics of interest and repayment clusters requires the use of 
regression modeling. Based on Figure 4.1 and Equation 3, a multinomial model is used to regress 
repayment clusters on a set of student-level variables, institutions attended, patterns of 
attendance, borrowing behavior, and degree attainment. For simplicity and ease of interpretation, 
we focus on the predicted values yielded by the regression (results reported in Supplemental 
Materials). Each point in Figure 4.6 represents the predicted probability of a borrower with a 
given characteristic being in each cluster, holding all other variables at observed values. 
 Whereas the statistics in Table 4.4 indicate that clusters differ from one another on 
several dimensions, Figure 4.6 illustrates more muted conditional relationships. Table 4.4 
indicated that Black and Latinx borrowers were disproportionately represented in the persistent 
defaulter and perpetual payer clusters and underrepresented among rapid or late full payers. The 
predicted probabilities reported in Figure 4.6 suggest that this finding is robust to the numerous 
controls included in the model, but these differences are attenuated. This pattern suggests that 
there are important confounding relationships not evident in unconditional statistics. Net of all 
controls, the most pronounced disparities across students and institutions is in the persistent 
defaulter cluster and, to a less extent, among the rapid full payers group. The results also make 
clear that the most salient characteristic associated with holistic repayment patterns is 
race/ethnicity, specifically the burden placed on Black and Latinx students. This finding is 
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consistent with and builds upon a large body of research; student loan default and other adverse 
loan outcomes are both more frequent and more persistent for minoritized students.  
 Panel B of Figure 4.6 suggests that large unconditional differences in repayment by 
institutional control are greatly reduced in a regression framework. For example, borrowers who 
attended for-profit institutions seem to have similar repayment outcomes to those attending 
public two- or four-year colleges. However, the indicators for attendance of various institution 
types are not mutually exclusive; a borrower may attend both a for-profit and a public college or 
any other combination thereof. Figure 4.7 compares marginal effects for select variables between 
borrowers who attended a for-profit institution versus those who did not, holding all else at 
observed values. Net of all covariates, a Black borrower who does not attend a for-profit 
institution has a six percentage-point lower probability of being a persistent defaulter than a 
borrower with the same observed characteristics who did attend a for-profit. Borrowers who did 
not attend for-profits have lower probabilities of being a persistent defaulter for virtually all 
student- and institutional characteristic. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 To the best of our knowledge, this paper provides one of the most comprehensive 
overviews of student loan borrowers’ repayment experiences. It reveals the frequency of change 
that borrowers face in meeting their repayment obligations—a process made even more 
complicated by the variety of income-driven repayment plans now available to borrowers. We 
document that student loan repayment is frequently interrupted by spells of deferment, negative 
amortization/forbearance, and default that can last years. We find that half of all borrowers see 
their outstanding balances rise after they enter repayment even though these same borrowers 
make payments on their loans for years. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated this 
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repayment crisis, as almost 90% of borrowers are making no payments toward student loans 
during the pandemic (Nova, 2020). Though coronavirus forbearance made available by the 
Department of Education provides critical relief to borrowers during an unprecedented crisis, its 
future is uncertain. Once lifted, borrowers may face renewed debt obligations during a tenuous 
economic recovery. 
 Even as we recognize the diversity of repayment experiences borrowers have, we were 
able to identify five overarching patterns. Persistent defaulters account for 12% of borrowers 
whose repayment trajectories are characterized by long spells of default that are largely 
unresolved within the observation period, and who owed on average 30% more in 2016 than 
when they started repayment. Perpetual payers make up 38% of borrowers who have the 
steadiest student loan repayments patterns. On average, balances for this group are around 15% 
higher at the end of the repayment period even as 30% of them fully repay their debt, driven by 
deferment spells during which students re-enroll and take on additional loans. The last three 
clusters of rapid full payers, late full payers, and consolidators differ most meaningfully in their 
path to full repayment, whether they do so rapidly after facing some adversity (rapid full payers), 
slowly and steadily (late full payers), or through consolidation – with the latter group facing 
largely unobserved repayment obligations on their consolidated loans.  
 The utility of analyzing holistic repayment histories over discretized repayment outcomes 
like default is in grasping the full extent of disruptions that borrowers experience when settling 
their student debt. Persistent defaulters not only experience default for long periods, but half of 
them also go through spells of deferment and only 12% of them fully repay within the observed 
period. Interruptions to repayment are common even among perpetual payers, 62% of whom go 
into deferment and 10% default at least once. The two clusters that fully repay their loans have 
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high a prevalence of disruptions, ranging from 14% to 35% undergoing deferment and 15% to 
29% experiencing default at least once. Consolidators are both the largest group and the one 
about which the least is known. At least 40% of consolidators are in effect perpetual payers who 
still owe on their consolidated loans at the end of 2016, so even accounting for consolidation a 
minority of borrowers are observed to follow standard loan repayment terms as designed.  
Student loan repayment occurs in the context of students’ lives during formative early 
adulthood years. Persistent defaulters carry student loan default and its consequences into their 
mid-30s; the oldest quarter of these borrowers finds itself dealing with default well into their 40s. 
Perpetual payers owe as much on student loans at age 35 as they did when they started paying 
off loans in their early 20s, as do many consolidators. Future research could leverage other data 
sources to investigate the welfare implications of these repayment patterns. We briefly explore 
financial outcomes measured in the 2009 wave of the BPS:04/09 in Table 4.5. Persistent 
defaulters, perpetual payers, and consolidators are more likely to indicate that student debt 
influenced their employment decisions; these same groups are also least likely to own a home. 
Perpetual payers and consolidators are also the clusters most likely to carry credit card balances 
month to month; persistent defaulters are least likely to report having a credit card at all but, 
among those who do, are the most likely to carry balances. Most of these associations remain 
significant when controlling for a host of individual and institutional characteristics (marginal 
effects reported in Table 4.5; full model results are available in Supplemental Materials). 
Perhaps one manifestation of frustrations with the current student loan system is the 
attitude of borrowers toward higher education. Borrowers across all repayment clusters are more 
likely than nonborrowers to report that their undergraduate education was not worth the cost: 
perpetual payers have the lowest such rate (22%) and persistent defaulters the highest (31%) 
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relative to the 17% of non-borrowers that say the same (authors’ calculations). There is no causal 
claim to be made given the methods used in this analysis. However, these patterns present 
opportunity for future research into the impact that student debt has over the life course and its 
implications for public support for higher education.  
The incoming Biden administration may pursue meaningful reform of higher education 
financing, ranging from greater institutional accountability for student outcomes, “debt-free” 
community college or tuition-free public institutions, and forgiveness of student debt. The richer 
understanding of the student loan repayment crisis in this paper can hopefully illuminate some of 
the hidden costs of the current student loan system and inform policymaking. For example, 
cohort default rates could be replaced by a weighted measure of not only the incidence of default 
but also its frequency, duration, and associated balances. Accountability metrics could 
incorporate dimensions of repayment difficulty like negative amortization and forbearance that 
occur at systematically higher rates among certain sectors of higher education. The long-term 
harm and disparities of student debt for millions has resulted in numerous proposals for broad-
based loan forgiveness (e.g., Goldrick-Rab & Steinbaum, 2020). Even limited loan forgiveness 
has the potential to meaningfully change borrowers’ lives for the better: $10,000 in forgiveness 
would have erased the total debt of 39% of all borrowers, including half of all persistent 
defaulters and one in five perpetual payers. In the absence of meaningful reform to student loan 
repayment, practitioners at college campuses may be called to provide more long-term support 
for borrowers and to reform student loan exit to prepare borrowers for the circuitous paths to 
repayment they are likely to experience. Finally, existing and emerging qualitative research on 
the lived realities of borrowers financing their education and later facing the student loan 
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Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics by Student Loan Borrower Status. 
 
Borrowers  
(n ~ 10,110) 
Non-borrowers  
(n ~ 8,110)  
Demographic data 
Female 0.60 0.54 *** 
White 0.61 0.62 * 
Black 0.17 0.10 *** 
Hispanic/Latinx 0.14 0.16 ** 
Asian 0.04 0.06 *** 
American Indian 0.01 0.01 ** 
Native HI/PI 0.01 0.00 * 
Other 0.01 0.02  
Multiracial 0.03 0.02  
Financial data (2003-2004) 




Pell recipient (03) 0.48 0.22 *** 
Attend FT (03) 0.78 0.58 *** 
Institutional data (03-04) 
Four year 0.52 0.36 *** 
Two year 0.38 0.59 *** 
Less than two year 0.1 0.05 ** 
Public 0.6 0.84 *** 
For-profit 0.22 0.04 *** 
Not-for-profit 0.18 0.12 *** 
HBCU 0.02 0.02 *** 
HIS 0.08 0.14 *** 
Very selective 0.11 0.11 *** 
Moderately selective 0.26 0.17 *** 
Minimally selective 0.07 0.04 *** 
Open access/NA 0.57 0.68 *** 




Notes: All statistics weighted by WTA000. Numbers rounded in accordance with NCES 
guidelines for privacy. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ~ p<0.1 





Table 4.2 Loan Repayment Statuses and Rankings for Repayment History Creation. 
Rank Status Definition 
6 Paid in full Borrower has paid all active loans in full.  
5 Paid in full through 
consolidation 
Borrower has paid all underlying loans through 
consolidation. Consolidation loan is not observed. 
2 Default Borrower has at least one loan in unresolved default.  
3 Deferment Borrower is in deferment for any reason. Loan balances 
may rise if borrower is re-enrolled and taking on 
additional loans. 
4 In repayment – no 
progress 
Borrower has negative amortization due to payments that 
are lower than interest charges, nonpayment, or is in 
forbearance. 
4 In repayment Borrower makes regular monthly payments that cover at 
least interest. 
1 Pre-payment Borrower is either enrolled in college or in the grace 
period before payments are due on any loans. 
Notes: Statuses are derived from transaction dates included in NSLDS records. Rank column 
indicates order in which statuses are selected when collapsing across multiple loans for the same 
borrower.  





Table 4.3 Costs for Replacement of Student Loan Repayment Statuses. 
 PIF PIF – C Repay Defer Default Repay – no 
progress 
PIF 0      
PIF – C 1.9637 0     
Repay 1.8196 1.7959 0    
Defer 1.9400 1.8792 1.7324 0   
Default 1.7564 1.8273 1.8724 1.9078 0  
Repay – no 
progress 1.4291 1.3844 0.5609 1.1276 1.2808 0 
Pre-pay 1.9913 1.9377 1.8185 1.9307 1.9997 1.4642 
Notes: Cost matrix estimated from transition probabilities for each pair of statuses. PIF is paid in 
full; PIF-C is paid in full through consolidation; Repay is in repayment; Defer is in deferment or 
forbearance; Repay – no progress is in repayment with negative amortization; Pre-pay is pre-
payment.  
















 (n ~ 1180) (n ~ 3770) (n ~ 1270) (n ~ 1570) (n ~ 2200) 
Repayment outcomes      
Ever in Paid in Full 0.063 0.037 1.000 0.999 0.012 
Ever in Paid in Full – 
Consolidation 0.064 0.253 0.001 0.009 1.000 
Ever in Default 1.000 0.102 0.173 0.285 0.151 
Ever in Deferment 0.501 0.597 0.136 0.347 0.231 
Ever in Repay – no progress 0.970 0.921 0.591 0.84 0.515 
Ever in Repayment 0.713 0.912 0.681 0.91 0.382 
Ever in Pre-payment 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Total Qs PIF 0.36 (1.48) 0.44 (2.67) 34.69 (6.17) 15.17 (6.58) 0.05 (0.54) 
Total Qs in PIF-C 0.50 (2.16) 3.24 (6.46) 0.00 (0.10) 0.032 (0.42) 34.54 (9.16) 
Total Qs in Default 
20.70 
(10.82) 0.85 (3.13) 1.24 (3.06) 3.43 (6.80) 1.53 (4.38) 
Total Qs in Deferment 5.59 (7.59) 8.06 (9.54) 0.96 (2.94) 3.51 (6.26) 2.12 (5.18) 
Total Qs in Repay – no progress 9.13 (6.80) 8.25 (8.01) 1.90 (2.63) 3.85 (4.31) 2.19 (3.52) 
Total Qs in Repayment 3.56 (5.58) 14.55 (11.20) 3.71 (4.40) 
13.52 
(10.13) 1.44 (3.13) 
Total Qs in Pre-payment 16.17 (8.27) 20.60 (9.11) 13.49 (6.39) 16.58 (7.72) 14.14 (5.06) 










Has private loans 0.371 0.348 0.311 0.309 0.451 
Has Parent PLUS loans 0.097 0.205 0.202 0.194 0.245 
Has Grad PLUS loans  0.029 0.224 0.090 0.087 0.166 
Enrolled in IDR 0.031 0.137 0.001 0.003 0.013 
Borrower Demographics      










White 0.455 0.590 0.654 0.668 0.664 
Black 0.293 0.187 0.097 0.094 0.157 
Hispanic/Latinx 0.183 0.135 0.145 0.151 0.100 
Asian 0.012 0.038 0.061 0.041 0.025 
American Indian 0.007 0.003 0.008 0.001 0.008 
Native Hawaiian/Pacif Islander 0.002 0.008 0.004 0.007 0.002 
Other 0.014 0.013 0.006 0.007 0.012 
Multiracial 0.034 0.026 0.025 0.031 0.031 
Male 0.467 0.370 0.423 0.418 0.379 
Attended full-time 0.745 0.765 0.802 0.771 0.852 
Pell recipient 0.652 0.430 0.470 0.433 0.527 
First-generation status 0.677 0.513 0.541 0.557 0.570 
Dependent 0.598 0.784 0.793 0.778 0.722 
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Degree Attainment as of 2009     
None 0.679 0.401 0.472 0.453 0.385 
Certificate 0.139 0.068 0.153 0.142 0.091 
Associate degree 0.071 0.111 0.063 0.079 0.117 
Baccalaureate degree 0.111 0.420 0.312 0.327 0.408 
Institutional Characteristics (Ever Attended)     
For-profit 0.430 0.200 0.290 0.285 0.335 
Two-year 0.496 0.469 0.452 0.458 0.279 
Public four-year 0.332 0.523 0.388 0.428 0.373 
Not-for-profit four-year 0.154 0.272 0.201 0.197 0.268 










Notes: All statistics weighted by WTA000. Numbers rounded in accordance with NCES 
guidelines for privacy.  















 (n ~ 1180) (n ~ 3770) (n ~ 1270) (n ~ 1570) (n ~ 2200) 
Home ownership 
     
Owns 0.106 0.139 0.191 0.172 0.165 
Rents 0.572 0.486 0.489 0.494 0.484 
Neither owns nor rents 0.323 0.378 0.320 0.333 0.351 
Marginal effect for owns (ref.) 0.041*** 0.089*** 0.064*** 0.062*** 
Credit card usage      
Has no credit card 0.615 0.327 0.346 0.384 0.365 
Pays balance each month 0.093 0.256 0.397 0.286 0.278 
Carries balance month to 
month 0.291 0.418 0.257 0.330 0.357 
Marginal effect for carries 
balance (ref.) 0.042* -0.072*** -0.016 0.016 
Influence on employment       
Debt influenced employment 0.441 0.471 0.289 0.334 0.431 
Marginal effect (ref.) -0.024 -0.107*** -0.062* -0.046~ 
Higher education worth       
Undergraduate ed was worth 
cost 0.309 0.215 0.227 0.256 0.279 
Marginal effect (ref.) 0.024 0.027 0.014 -0.009 
Notes: All statistics weighted by WTA000. Numbers rounded in accordance with NCES 
guidelines for privacy. Marginal effects for repayment cluster estimated from 
logistic/multinomial regression that also includes controls for race/ethnicity, gender, first-
generation status, Pell recipient status, age, dependency status, adjusted gross income in 2004 
(logged), indicators for attendance of 2-year, public 4-year, not-for-profit 4-year, and for-profit 
institutions; tuition charges in 2004 (logged), total amount borrowed (logged), indicator for use 
of private loans, number of institutions attended, full-time/part-time enrollment indicator, and 
indicators for highest degree earned. Regression weighted by WTA000. All other variables held 
at observed values. ~p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 









Figure 4.2 Chronogram of Repayment Statuses for All Borrowers (n ~ 9,990). 
a. Chronogram of Repayment Statuses 
 
b. Duration of Observed Repayment Histories (excludes pre-payment period) 
 
 
Notes: Panel A shows proportion of all borrowers in each status by quarter. Panel B shows the 
proportion of all borrowers not in the staring pre-repayment status for each quarter. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from BPS:04/09 survey.  
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b. For-Profit Attendance 





c. Degree Attainment 
Earned Credential No Credential 
  
 
Notes: For-profit attendance reflects enrollment between 2004 and 2009. Degree attainment 
reflects any degrees earned as of 2009. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from BPS:04/09 survey. 
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Figure 4.4 Repayment Patterns of Five Clusters (n ~ 9,990). 
a. Status distribution plot 
 
b. Index plot 
 
Notes: Panel A shows share of borrowers in each status by quarter; Panel B shows individual 
histories.  
Source: Authors’ calculations from BPS:04/09 survey. 
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Figure 4.5 Quarterly Outstanding Loan Balances by Repayment Cluster. 
 
Notes: Balances are indexed to amount owed at first repayment (=100) and weighted by 
WTA000. Shaded area indicates 95% confidence interval for mean. 




Figure 4.6 Predicted Probability of Repayment Cluster by Select Individual and Institutional Characteristics. 




Notes: Predicted probabilities based on multinomial regression including race/ethnicity, gender, first-generation status, Pell recipient 
status, age, dependency status, adjusted gross income in 2004 (logged), indicators for attendance of 2-year, public 4-year, not-for-
profit 4-year, and for-profit institutions; tuition charges in 2004 (logged), total amount borrowed (logged), indicator for use of private 
loans, number of institutions attended, full-time/part-time enrollment indicator, and indicators for highest degree earned. Regression 
weighted by WTA000. All other variables held at observed values. Lines indicate 95% confidence interval. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from BPS:04/09 survey. 
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Figure 4.7 Difference in Predicted Probability of Persistent Default when Excluding For-
Profit Attendees. 
 
Notes: Bars represent difference in predicted probability of persistent default for for-profit 
attendees vs. borrowers who never attended a for-profit institution. Predicted probabilities based 
on regression model described in Figure 4.6 and using WTA000 weight. All other variables held 
at observed values.  
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B. Sample limitations 
There are limitations to the borrowers and to the types of loans included in the analytical 
sample. The BPS:04/09 sample includes a total of ~ 12,040 borrowers. The analytical sample 
includes only borrowers whose loans originated during the survey observation period, which 
results in the exclusion of ~ 830 borrowers who took out loans exclusively before Fall 2003 or 
after 2009. The NSLDS data includes records for loans with a disbursed amount of zero that are 
also excluded, affecting ~ 290 borrowers. A final exclusion is the removal of ~ 120 borrowers 
who experienced certain rare events. Specifically, these are borrowers who were deceased during 
the observation period or whose loans were discharged through bankruptcy, because of 
disability, or due to school closure or a finding of fraud.  
There are two exclusions based on loan type. The analytical sample focuses on federal 
loans that impose a repayment obligation on students (e.g., FFEL, Stafford, Perkins), which 
excludes ~ 720 borrowers with exclusively graduate and/or parent loans. Second, though the 
sample includes borrowers and underlying federal loans to the point of consolidation 
(approximately 35% of borrowers eventually consolidate their loans), it does not track the 
consolidated loans themselves. The NSLDS records for consolidated loans are inconsistent, 
providing an incomplete picture of what happens to those loans that prevent their accurate 




C. Creation of holistic repayment histories 
The process of constructing holistic repayment histories begins with deriving a dataset at 
the student-loan-month level that assigns a single status to each loan from the underlying 
transactional data reported by NSLDS. This is made possible by the dates associated with each 
loan transaction that are included in the NSLDS data. From those dates, each student-loan-month 
record is assigned to one of the statuses described in Table 4.2. This dataset is then collapsed 
across all loans held by an individual, resulting in a student-month dataset. Overall, 86% of 
borrowers in the analytic sample have more than one loan, with the mean number of loans per 
borrower equal to 4.2. For each month beginning with the initial point of entry into repayment, a 
borrower is assigned to the single status most representative of their current repayment across 
loans. We do so by imposing a logical hierarch of statuses that allows for a single status to trump 
all others across loans and which is reported in Table 4.2. Borrowers are classified as in default if 
at least one loan is in default (regardless of the status of other loans). At the other extreme, 
borrowers are classified as having paid in full only when all loans are fully repaid.  
The final step in the categorization process involves deriving a student-quarter dataset 
from the monthly statuses. In any given quarter measured from the beginning of 2003, a 
borrower is assigned to the longest-lasting status within each quarter; in instances where multiple 
statuses tie in duration, the latest status within a quarter is selected. The only exception to this 
rule is that borrowers are coded as in default if they are in default in any month within a quarter, 
in recognition of the importance of this status to borrowers, policymakers, and researchers. 
Because borrowers do not all enter repayment at the same time, observations begin with a spell 
of “pre-payment,” which reflects time spent in college enrollment and/or in the grace period after 
leaving college but before any loan payments are due. Fifty-two percent of borrowers are 
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observed for at least 40 quarters (10+ years); the average number of quarters under observation 
after the pre-repayment period is 39.6 (sd = 8.0). 
Figure 4.8C chronicles the process of creating the holistic repayment history of a single 
hypothetical borrower. Borrower E took out two loans during the BPS study period, one for the 
2004-05 academic year (Loan A) and one for the 2005-06 academic year (Loan B). All months 
in this period are recorded as “pre-payment.” The borrower first began repaying both loans at the 
end of the 2005-06 academic year (the 43rd quarter in the history). In the ten years after this 
enrollment spell, both of the borrower’s loans entered deferment multiple times. At the end of 
the borrower’s last recorded deferment spell (the 111th quarter in the history), loan B entered a 
nearly three-year-long default that ended with rehabilitation and the return to repayment. Loan A 
remained in repayment for the duration of loan B’s default (the spell of default) and was 
ultimately paid in full in June 2015 (quarter 150 in the history). Loan B transitioned from 
repayment to Paid in Full in December 2015 (quarter 156 in the history).  
In the transition to a holistic history at the month level (labeled “Holistic Month” in 
Figure C1), two changes of note occur. First, the default spell for loan B takes precedence over 
the continued repayment of loan A during the same period. Second, loan A is paid in full six 
months before loan B, but the constructed history only reflects a status of paid in full when loan 
B reaches this milestone. The last step collapses months to quarters (labeled “Holistic Quarter” 
in Figure C1), eliminating spells that last only a single month (except for default, which take 
priority over other statuses within the quarter). Figure 4.9C summarizes all transitions of status in 
the student-quarter histories. 
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Figure 4.8C Repayment History Creation for Hypothetical Borrower. 
 
Notes: Figure illustrates manipulation of NSLDS data for a single hypothetical borrower for 
moving from student-loan-transaction to student-quarter grain.  





Figure 4.9C Transition Plot by Repayment Status for All Borrowers (n ~ 9,990). 
 
Notes: Leftmost figures plot the number of borrowers in each status by quarter of repayment. 
Diagonal figures display the percent of borrowers in a status remaining in that status across 
quarters. Other figures plot transitions between statuses.  
Source: Authors’ calculations from BPS:04/09 survey.  
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d. Regression Results 








Female (ref. White) 0.682*** 1.242* 1.074 1.152 
 (0.069) (0.108) (0.098) (0.107) 
Race/ethnicity (ref. White) 
Black 3.312*** 2.561*** 1.080 1.634** 
 (0.507) (0.374) (0.175) (0.250) 
Hispanic/Latino 1.965*** 1.962*** 1.393* 0.947 
 (0.292) (0.266) (0.193) (0.141) 
Asian 0.251*** 0.627* 0.598* 0.371*** 
 (0.093) (0.127) (0.129) (0.089) 
American Indian/Alaska Native 1.710 0.960 0.307 2.166 
 (1.055) (0.590) (0.266) (1.250) 
 Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islander 0.233 0.981 1.013 0.036** 
 (0.251) (0.597) (0.645) (0.043) 
Other 5.017** 5.614** 1.862 3.683* 
 (3.074) (3.223) (1.179) (2.184) 
Multiracial 1.503 0.823 0.965 1.068 
 (0.444) (0.220) (0.267) (0.298) 
First generation (ref not first gen) 1.234~ 1.093 1.165 1.266* 
 (0.136) (0.102) (0.115) (0.126) 
Pell recipient (ref. no Pell) 1.254~ 0.933 0.944 1.012 
 (0.169) (0.111) (0.119) (0.127) 
Age at first enrollment 1.011 0.990 0.983 1.015 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Is Dependent (ref. Independent) 0.565** 0.566** 0.699* 0.616** 
 (0.102) (0.098) (0.126) (0.111) 
Adjusted gross income in 2004 (logged) 0.776*** 0.997 0.959 0.853* 
 (0.049) (0.060) (0.060) (0.053) 
Institutions ever attended (ref. did not attend specific type) 
For-Profit  1.331 0.794 0.938 0.855 
 (0.240) (0.130) (0.159) (0.153) 
4-year Public 1.776** 1.535** 1.228 1.081 
 (0.319) (0.241) (0.202) (0.187) 
4-year Not-for-Profit 1.149 1.180 1.008 0.646* 
 (0.226) (0.200) (0.180) (0.121) 
2-year Public 1.503* 1.278 1.080 1.070 
 (0.270) (0.203) (0.179) (0.185) 
Tuition and fees charged (logged) 0.912 0.847** 0.957 1.486*** 
 (0.058) (0.048) (0.057) (0.095) 
Total undergraduate loans (logged) 3.488*** 6.880*** 1.782*** 5.013*** 
 (0.209) (0.386) (0.093) (0.296) 
Has private student loans (ref. does not) 1.162 1.067 0.915 1.484*** 
 
 195 
 (0.122) (0.097) (0.089) (0.142) 
Number of institutions attended through 
2009 0.987 0.994 1.076 0.844 
 (0.113) (0.100) (0.112) (0.094) 
Attended Full-Time in first year (ref. part-
time) 0.941 1.097 0.920 0.993 
 (0.131) (0.135) (0.116) (0.134) 
Highest degree earned by 2009 (ref. none) 
Certificate 0.551*** 0.795 0.983 0.592*** 
 (0.087) (0.121) (0.145) (0.093) 
Associate's 0.583** 1.414* 1.129 1.636** 
 (0.117) (0.241) (0.205) (0.290) 
Bachelor's 0.215*** 0.754* 0.831 0.810 
 (0.034) (0.091) (0.107) (0.106) 
Constant 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.028*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) 
Notes: Coefficients reported as relative risk ratios. Reference category is rapid full payers. 
Regression weighted by WTA000. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. ~p<.1; 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 










Female (ref. Male) 1.175** 
 (0.070) 







American Indian/Alaska Native 1.534 
 (0.598) 






First generation (ref not first gen) 1.068 
 (0.067) 
Pell recipient (ref. no Pell) 1.063 
 (0.082) 
Age at first enrollment 1.000 
 (0.007) 
Is Dependent (ref. Independent) 1.392** 
 (0.163) 
Adjusted gross income in 2004 (logged) 0.971 
 (0.038) 
Institutions ever attended (ref. did not attend type) 
For-Profit  1.053 
 (0.118) 
4-year Public 0.970 
 (0.104) 
4-year Not-for-Profit 1.058 
 (0.119) 
2-year Public 0.963 
 (0.104) 
Tuition and fees charged (logged) 1.076~ 
 (0.045) 
Total undergraduate loans (logged) 1.374*** 
 (0.057) 




Number of institutions attended through 
2009 1.109 
 (0.080) 
Attended Full-Time in first year (ref. part-
time) 0.959 
 (0.085) 







Repayment cluster (ref. persistent defaulter) 
Perpetual payer 0.903 
 (0.097) 
Rapid full payer 0.631*** 
 (0.075) 






Notes: Regression weighted by WTA000. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. ~p<.1; 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 









Female (ref. Male) 1.121* 
 (0.062) 







American Indian/Alaska Native 0.897 
 (0.303) 






First generation (ref not first gen) 0.960 
 (0.056) 
Pell recipient (ref. no Pell) 1.030 
 (0.074) 
Age at first enrollment 1.001 
 (0.007) 
Is Dependent (ref. Independent) 0.901 
 (0.093) 
Adjusted gross income in 2004 (logged) 1.050 
 (0.037) 
Institutions ever attended (ref. did not attend type) 
For-Profit  0.614*** 
 (0.060) 
4-year Public 0.954 
 (0.091) 
4-year Not-for-Profit 0.814* 
 (0.082) 
2-year Public 1.058 
 (0.105) 
Tuition and fees charged (logged) 0.942 
 (0.035) 
Total undergraduate loans (logged) 1.026 
 (0.035) 




Number of institutions attended through 
2009 1.283*** 
 (0.084) 
Attended Full-Time in first year (ref. part-
time) 0.935 
 (0.076) 







Repayment cluster (ref. persistent defaulter) 
Perpetual payer 1.141 
 (0.107) 
Rapid full payer 1.163 
 (0.134) 






Notes: Regression weighted by WTA000. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. ~p<.1; 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 











Female (ref. Male) 0.956 1.094 
 (0.050) (0.083) 
Race/ethnicity (ref. White)   
Black 1.366*** 0.377*** 
 (0.106) (0.048) 
Hispanic/Latino 1.065 0.653*** 
 (0.089) (0.076) 
Asian 1.944*** 0.837 
 (0.270) (0.192) 
American Indian/Alaska Native 0.860 0.784 
 (0.314) (0.333) 
 Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islander 0.785 0.201* 
 (0.350) (0.151) 
Other 1.157 0.525 
 (0.248) (0.222) 
Multiracial 1.030 0.643~ 
 (0.155) (0.150) 
First generation (ref not first gen) 1.004 1.443*** 
 (0.055) (0.115) 
Pell recipient (ref. no Pell) 0.953 1.032 
 (0.065) (0.098) 
Age at first enrollment 0.994 1.039*** 
 (0.010) (0.007) 
Is Dependent (ref. Independent) 2.402*** 0.445*** 
 (0.298) (0.057) 
Adjusted gross income in 2004 (logged) 1.058 1.211*** 
 (0.039) (0.059) 
Institutions ever attended (ref. did not attend type)  
For-Profit  1.091 1.056 
 (0.109) (0.132) 
4-year Public 0.966 1.019 
 (0.085) (0.122) 
4-year Not-for-Profit 1.522*** 1.311* 
 (0.141) (0.173) 
2-year Public 1.086 1.146 
 (0.099) (0.143) 
Tuition and fees charged (logged) 1.079* 0.910* 
 (0.039) (0.042) 
Total undergraduate loans (logged) 0.943~ 0.979 
 (0.032) (0.045) 
Has private student loans (ref. does not) 1.089 0.918 
 (0.058) (0.070) 
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Number of institutions attended through 
2009 0.877* 0.938 
 (0.051) (0.075) 
Attended Full-Time in first year (ref. part-
time) 1.143~ 0.921 
 (0.091) (0.092) 
Highest degree earned by 2009 (ref. none)   
Certificate 0.831~ 1.122 
 (0.092) (0.134) 
Associate's 1.064 1.414** 
 (0.105) (0.161) 
Bachelor's 1.387*** 0.765* 
 (0.093) (0.081) 
Repayment cluster (ref. persistent defaulter)  
Perpetual payer 1.030 1.626*** 
 (0.096) (0.218) 
Rapid full payer 0.860 2.298*** 
 (0.095) (0.333) 
Late full payer 1.032 2.013*** 
 (0.121) (0.333) 
Consolidator 0.989 1.940*** 
 (0.098) (0.269) 
Constant 0.160** 0.046*** 
 (0.097) (0.035) 
Notes: Reference category is rental. Regression weighted by WTA000. Relative risk ratios 
reported. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. ~p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 












Female (ref. Male) 0.749*** 0.760*** 
 (0.044) (0.045) 
Race/ethnicity (ref. White)   
Black 2.028*** 0.714** 
 (0.162) (0.077) 
Hispanic/Latino 0.821* 0.726** 
 (0.071) (0.071) 
Asian 0.690* 1.321~ 
 (0.127) (0.190) 
American Indian/Alaska Native 1.543 0.557 
 (0.552) (0.258) 
 Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islander 1.159 0.102* 
 (0.452) (0.105) 
Other 0.722 0.841 
 (0.182) (0.212) 
Multiracial 1.116 0.642* 
 (0.177) (0.115) 
First generation (ref not first gen) 0.936 0.808*** 
 (0.057) (0.050) 
Pell recipient (ref. no Pell) 1.091 0.896 
 (0.079) (0.072) 
Age at first enrollment 0.991 0.983~ 
 (0.006) (0.010) 
Is Dependent (ref. Independent) 0.873 1.021 
 (0.093) (0.144) 
Adjusted gross income in 2004 (logged) 0.926* 0.994 
 (0.035) (0.043) 
Institutions ever attended (ref. did not attend type)  
For-Profit  1.191~ 0.663** 
 (0.118) (0.083) 
4-year Public 0.694*** 0.940 
 (0.065) (0.097) 
4-year Not-for-Profit 0.930 1.045 
 (0.094) (0.112) 
2-year Public 0.865 0.948 
 (0.083) (0.102) 
Tuition and fees charged (logged) 0.913* 1.101* 
 (0.034) (0.046) 
Total undergraduate loans (logged) 0.943 0.955 
 (0.034) (0.038) 
Has private student loans (ref. does not) 0.806*** 0.688*** 
 (0.047) (0.042) 
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Number of institutions attended through 
2009 1.015 1.038 
 (0.062) (0.072) 
Attended Full-Time in first year (ref. part-
time) 1.209* 1.122 
 (0.099) (0.103) 
Highest degree earned by 2009 (ref. none)   
Certificate 1.055 1.152 
 (0.106) (0.159) 
Associate's 0.684*** 1.295* 
 (0.066) (0.143) 
Bachelor's 0.595*** 1.802*** 
 (0.046) (0.142) 
Repayment cluster (ref. persistent defaulter)  
Perpetual payer 0.615*** 1.361* 
 (0.057) (0.188) 
Rapid full payer 0.807~ 2.939*** 
 (0.091) (0.442) 
Late full payer 0.703** 2.020*** 
 (0.091) (0.316) 
Consolidator 0.614*** 1.727*** 
 (0.061) (0.245) 
Constant 21.637*** 0.523 
 (12.992) (0.372) 
Notes: Reference category is borrower carries balance month to month. Regression weighted by 
WTA000. Relative risk ratios reported. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. ~p<.1; 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 





Chapter 5 Conclusion 
 
In lieu of a summary of findings, this brief chapter focuses instead on possible extensions 
of research into accreditation and student debt as well as the challenges researchers continue to 
face in advancing research in both areas. 
Research into Accreditation  
 Chapters 2 and 3 are complementary studies of specialized accreditation in business and 
nursing. They make a small inroad on the broader topic of accountability for colleges and 
universities, which remains one of “the most advocated and least analyzed words in higher 
education” (Burke, 2005, p. 1). Across the numerous forms that accountability takes in higher 
education are three central relationships: who is held accountable, to whom, and for what (Ewell 
& Jones, 2006). Clark’s (1983) governance triangle identified state authority, the market, and 
academic oligarchs as three loci of coordination in higher education systems. Burke (2005) 
mapped these concepts from governance to accountability as responding to three forces: state 
priorities that capture the needs and wants of the polity as mediated by political processes; 
academic concerns, or the interests of academic professionals like faculty and administrators; 
and market forces, which reflect demands of students, employers, and other clients of higher 
education. These embody, respectively, political, professional, and market accountability. 
The accountability triangle is a useful taxonomy for understanding different 
accountability regimes along the three axes. Performance-based funding, for example, is a form 
of political accountability responsive to state priorities around workforce preparation and 
institutional efficiency. The numerous efforts mandating disclosure and improving access to 
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information about college-specific costs and outcomes (e.g., Steffel et al., 2020) intend to 
support market accountability by enabling students to make optimal enrollment choices. By 
centering peer review at its core, accreditation arguably represents the academic concerns of 
higher education professionals for the quality of the sector. As accreditors have become entwined 
with federal and state regulatory systems, however, and as accreditation validates institutions and 
credentials to the public, it has come to play important roles across all three forms of 
accountability. As the Spellings Commission made clear, its embeddedness has also made 
accreditation subject to criticism and external pressure. Among its recommended reforms are 
several proposals deeply antithetical to current accrediting practices, including direct 
comparisons among institutions of learning outcomes and student outcomes; greater flexibility 
that encourages innovation in the sector; specific benchmarks for institutional and programmatic 
performance benchmarked to national and international peers; and greater transparency of 
accreditation processes and outcomes to the public. 
 There is little research on the efficacy of accreditation as an accountability mechanism 
for quality improvement. A research agenda centered on accreditation is hard to conceive and 
challenging to execute. Quantitative researchers face at least two challenges. The first relates to 
the measurement of outcomes of import. Quality remains a vague and contested concept in 
higher education; quality improvement, what accreditors assert is their focus, seems even more 
challenging to measure. The (ideally exogenous) variation necessary for regression-based 
estimates of the relationship between accreditation and any meaningful outcome is also almost 
entirely absent. Virtually all institutions of higher education are accredited (Eaton, 2015) and 
accreditation status does not distinguish across institutions: from the perspective of, say, the 
Higher Learning Commission, the University of Michigan, Strayer University, and Minneapolis 
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Community and Technical College are indistinguishable. Qualitative researchers, on the other 
hand, are unlikely to gain much access to the working of accreditation processes given the 
potential risks to institutions involved.  
The limited research in this area does not find much evidence in support of accreditation. 
Klasic and Hutt (2018) analyzed the characteristics of all institutions subject to the near universe 
of accreditor actions between 2011 and 2015. These actions ranged from termination to 
probation and warnings but left unscathed a very large share of colleges that perform poorly on 
available measures of institutional outcomes like graduation or cohort default rates. More 
importantly, there is no evidence that the infractions that do result in accreditor actions are 
themselves aligned to student outcomes. In other words, it is entirely unknown whether resolving 
accreditor sanctions improves colleges themselves or the outcomes that students experience. But 
there is some evidence that students do respond to accreditation actions. Burnett (2020) found 
that institutions experiencing sanctions saw a five to ten percent decrease in enrollment. 
Accreditors typically require that institutions disclose sanctions to current and prospective 
students, so it is unsurprising that enrollments would respond. Left unanswered, however, is 
whether this reduction in enrollment is net positive for students: do they stop out from college 
entirely or transfer? Will they graduate from another institution?  
 For a researcher, specialized accreditation overcomes some of these limitations. There is 
much greater variance in specialized accreditation within and across fields than for institutional 
accreditation, and these accreditors are typically more transparent in the standards they enforce. 
There are also field-specific outcomes like licensure attainment rates that can serve as proxies of 
programmatic quality. Beyond analytical convenience, specialized accreditors should be subject 
to research scrutiny because of their import and reach across the higher education sector. 
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Programmatic accreditation also lends itself to an arguably more meaningful unit of analysis as 
academic programs and the departments housing them “constitute the fundamental 
organizational unit of colleges and universities” (Tierney, 1980, p. 454). As Clark (1983) argued 
when setting disciplines as the core membership unit of academic systems, no one “can claim to 
know as much physics, and to know as much about its operation as a field, as the physicists. This 
is equally true in all the other fields” (p. 34). Academic programs and the professionals therein 
define the curriculum students experience, the standards that they must meet, and the hiring and 
promotion of the faculty teaching them (Lattuca & Stark, 2009). Outcomes like completion rates 
and labor market returns vary dramatically across programs (Carnevale, Cheah, & Hanson, 2015; 
Webber, 2014), even within institutions (Hastings, Neilson, & Zimmerman, 2013). 
 The obvious tradeoff is that studies of specialized accreditation likely need be field-
specific, proliferating the research task at hand. Chapters 2 and 3 deal with business and nursing 
while leaving unaddressed dozens of other fields with hundreds of specialized accreditors. I see 
at least three venues for future research in this area. The first addresses scope: extend the type of 
analysis presented here to other fields. Little is known about the workings of specialized 
accreditation in fields like education even as several states now mandate this form of 
accreditation for teacher preparation programs and as numerous districts favor graduates from 
accredited programs in hiring (Kelchen, 2018). Engineering is another area ripe for research as 
specialized accreditation grants students quicker eligibility for licensure and certification (Yuen, 
2012) and programs are highly responsive to accreditor mandates (Volkwein, Lattuca, Harper, & 
Domingo, 2007). A second area for future research is to study the numerous other important 
outcomes for programs and students that these two chapters neglect. An obvious omission is 
analysis of its impact on students: does specialized accreditation improve student outcomes like 
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completion, licensure attainment, and earnings? Finally, a third direction for future research 
concerns the generalizability of studies of accreditation. For example, Hagerty and Stark (1989) 
compared accreditation standards across professional fields and linked these standards to faculty 
beliefs about the professional competencies that graduates need. Stark et al. (1986) outlined a 
conceptual framework for understanding the similarities and differences of professional 
preparation programs. Building on these efforts can assist researchers in identifying alignments 
that make it possible to study multiple fields simultaneously and to articulate hypotheses on how 
accreditation may similarly or differentially impact programs.  
Research into Student Debt 
 There is perhaps no more conspicuous failure of accountability in higher education than 
the student debt crisis. The scale of student debt is by now well-publicized: $1.7 trillion in 
outstanding debt held by more than 41 million individuals (Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, 2020). The scope of the crisis still occasionally surprises, however, as 
researchers find new ways to capture the extent to which many individuals struggle with student 
debt, especially minoritized borrowers (e.g., Addo et al., 2016; Houle and Addo, 2019), those 
who do not earn a degree (e.g., Gladieux & Perna, 2005; Perna et al., 2017), and students from 
for-profit institutions (e.g., Scott-Clayton, 2018). Chapter 4 represents an effort to paint a more 
complete picture of borrowers’ experience of student loan repayment over the early life course. 
The analysis provides a comprehensive study for as long as 12 years for borrowers in their late 
20s to mid-30s. But even as the chapter expands our longitudinal understanding of loan 
repayment, it is important to acknowledge that student loans in fact affect borrowers well beyond 
the observation window of that study. Currently, people over the age of 50 hold one of every five 
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dollars of student debt, have the fastest-growing balances among all borrowers, and experience 
rates of default as high as 30% (Trawinski et al., 2019).  
 Several open questions remain for more research on student loans, from student loan 
take-up and loan aversion to repayment. I argue that given findings from Chapter 4 and from 
recent research with long-term perspectives on student debt, future research should situate 
student debt in individuals’ life course. Kasworm (2008) noted that higher education scholars 
treated college-going for too long as a pipeline when it is more aptly described as an airport, with 
multiple entry and exit points, arrival and departure times, and final destinations (e.g., 
Monaghan, 2020). The experience of at least a plurality of college students mirrors this metaphor 
as their swirling attendance patterns constitute a “new educational trajectory, one full of 
transitions” (Goldrick-Rab, 2006, p. 69). Student loan take-up and repayment occur on similarly 
interrupted spells that interact with and affect other aspects of the life course like employment 
and family formation. How those interactions occur and how they shape numerous outcomes of 
interest make for a wealth of research opportunities (mediated, of course, by data availability). In 
one sense, however, there is ample documentation of the extent of student debt, its disparities, 
and the challenges that borrowers face in meeting these obligations. The main shortcoming of the 
analysis in Chapter 4 is that it does not yield particularly useful prescriptions for improving the 
student loan system or the fate of borrowers made precarious by their student debt. For example, 
Seamster and Charron-Chénier (2017) aligned a set of findings (rising racial inequality in 
educational debt) to a mechanism (predatory inclusion) to policy prescriptions (accountability for 
institutions, debt jubilee for borrowers). I hope to find opportunities to build my professional and 
academic work in this direction in connecting fundamental questions about who and for what 
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